Emilie MEYER

Master 2 PEA

December 2004

Research dossier

The legal impact of the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

into the EU Constitutional Treaty for the protection of social rights

CONTENT

General introduction........................................................................................................................... 2

TEXT 1 “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, part II of the Constitutional Treaty.................... 5

TEXT 2 « Lettre sur le projet de Constitution de l'Union européenne »........................................... 7

TEXT 3 « La Constitution Européenne : Une conception des droits purement libérale »................ 10

TEXT 4 « Une suggestion pour améliorer la Constitution européenne »......................................... 14

TEXT 5 “EU constitutional treaty -The trade union movement and the European constitution”...... 18

TEXT 6 « CONSTITUTION EUROPEENNE : UN « PAS EN AVANT » SOCIAL ? »....................... 23

TEXT 7 “Draft EU Constitution - new law via the back door?”......................................................... 25

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 27

Lexicon ............................................................................................................................................. 29

Original texts...................................................................................................................................... 30

▪ TEXT 1................................................................................................................................. 30

▪ TEXT 2................................................................................................................................. 36

▪ TEXT 3................................................................................................................................. 38

▪ TEXT 4................................................................................................................................. 41

▪ TEXT 5................................................................................................................................. 44

▪ TEXT 6................................................................................................................................. 58

▪ TEXT 7................................................................................................................................. 60

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, social rights have been affected by significant constitutional developments at the European Union level. In the EU context, social rights now form part of the Charter of Fundamental Rights drawn up in 2000, which has been elevated to the part II of the EU draft Constitutional Treaty.

Social rights mainly include workers’ rights but also rights relating the actual existence of people in a broader understanding: for instance the right to be included into the labour market and society, the right to a minimum income allowing to live decently, the right to education and vocational training, the right to social assistance…

To begin with, it appears necessary to recall the historical background of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its integration into the Draft Constitutional Treaty.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was proclaimed jointly by the President of the Council, the President of the European Parliament and the President of the Commission, in the margins of the European Council in Nice, on 7 December 2000. It is addressed to the institutions and organs of the Union, and to the Member States only when they are acting in the field of Union law. Consequently all laws, decisions, and policies produced by the EU institutions have to comply with the provisions of the Charter.

It was designed as an EU “Bill of Rights”, providing an instrument for the EU to protect fundamental rights. The Charter gathered in 54 articles different rights that were spread sofar between several legal documents, namely the EU Treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter etc. That is why the Charter was designed to be a synthesis of European Law in the form of an autonomous document. For the first time, the EU had listed in a single text all civil, political, economic and social rights enjoyed by European Citizens and all the people living in the EU. Thus, it made fundamental rights more visible to citizens.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union included, in addition to the traditional “civil and political rights”, a large number of rights of an economic or social nature. The “Solidarity” title dealt with economic and social rights -regarding work, health, social protection…- which had previously been enshrined in the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter (1961) as well as in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights For Workers (1989). Among those rights: freedom of association (Article 12), right of collective bargaining and collective action (Article 28), workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), non-discrimination (Article 21), equality between men and women (Article 23), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30) etc. However, the Charter of Fundamental Rights did not include all rights figuring in those documents, and neither did it create new social rights.

As a matter of fact, as any Community legal document, the Charter was a compromise on the values that the EU embodied, including in the social sector. It was reluctantly accepted by certain Member-States and in particular by Britain –only under the guarantee that it was not referred to in the Treaties, and was not legally binding. On the one hand, countries such as Britain had tried to mitigate the outcome of the drafting process, and on the other hand trade unions and NGO’s had lobbied for more progress. For instance, organisations from civil society had demanded the right to work, the right to a fair salary, and the right to a decent pension to be added.

However, the text is often considered as not far-reaching enough: many European left-wing parties and trade unions were dissatisfied with the Charter’s final version, which was said to be too liberal. Its actual content was indeed not as progress-orientated as other key-documents like the European Social charter. Yet, although it was clearly not legally binding, it exerted an influence on the EU institutions (Commission, Court of Justice) and was frequently referred to by EU politicians or officials.

This Charter was then incorporated in the body of the EU Constitutional Treaty by the Convention on the Future of Europe in charge of drafting the Constitution from January 2002 to June 2003, but was amended as well as during the round of Intergovernmental Conferences which finalised the draft before reaching the final agreement in June 2004.

In order to take stock of the latest developments in the field of the protection of fundamental social rights in Europe, the precise content of the Charter as included in the draft must consequently be scrutinised, having regard to the existing legal framework. Then, this will lead to tackle the core questions: what legal effects is the integration of the Charter of Fundamental rights into the Constitution Draft likely to have? Is “social Europe” gaining ground when considering the content and reach of the Charter? Does the “constitutionalising” of the Charter anchor social security and protection? If the EU adopted the constitution, would it make it easier to advance and protect the social interests of European citizens?

In this connection, the Charter may not only be analysed in terms of legal status and impact for the protection of social rights, but also in terms of content, which amounts to assessing the catalogue of social rights granted by it. In fact, many trade unions, NGOs and associations across Europe emphasised the loopholes of the proposed text, arguing that many social and cultural rights had been deliberately left out or worded very vaguely. However, this will unfortunately not be discussed in detail in this dossier, as this would imply to compare national laws regarding fundamental social rights as well as other international treaties with the EU Charter. The emphasis will be placed on the possible legal and judicial impact of the “constitutionalisation” of the Charter.

The issue of social rights in relation to the European Constitution Draft also raises another problematic: are economic and social rights fundamental rights, and thus, do they belong to a Constitution? Answering to this turns out to be very controversial. Social rights happen to be traditionally considered as a weaker category of human rights, and their enforcement is not always effective. Some legal experts argue that they are objectives for economic and social policy whose enforcement considerably depends on the economic overall situation, rather than purely supposedly natural, constitutional rights; therefore, they should be laid down, enforced and monitored by legislatures instead of being interpreted by courts of unelected judges who have the last word.

The purpose of this dossier is not precisely to weigh the pros and cons to have such social rights, that is to say the issue of the so-called “European Social Model” and the role of the State in providing social protection of citizens through social benefits will not fully be addressed here. This issue often raises much discontent and people evoke either the “social dumping” the EU is allegedly submitted to, or the burden implied by overwhelming social protection for EU businesses.

This dossier reports some analysis of the Constitutional Treaty and in particular the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and explores the political debate around its scope of application. It brings together various press articles, as well as papers by academics and leading experts in the field of Social Law, who worked on various aspects regarding social rights.

This collection of articles and essays therefore examines the position of social rights within the constitution draft, and considers the significance of the formal inclusion of such rights within the EU constitutional framework, in terms of protection of social and economic interests within and between the EU and Member States. What consequences might be observed in EU and Member-States’ law and policy because of economic and social rights enshrined in the EU Constitutional Treaty?

Many of those articles aim assess the achievements and limitations of the insertion of the Charter and the social rights it entailed, and their potential domestic enforcement, particularly in the UK. Recent developments are also scrutinised, especially amendments in the very wording of the articles.

TEXT 1: “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, part II of the Constitutional Treaty

Source

This document reproduces the second part of the Constitution draft, that is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It is the basis for the comments and analyses gathered in this dossier.

As an official document produced by the European Institutions, its form is that of a legal text, and it will be part of EU primary law if the Constitution is ratified by all Member-States.

Summary

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is the second part of the Constitutional Treaty. It proclaims the fundamental rights enjoyed by people within the EU in 54 articles under six titles: dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizenship and justice. The title 7 contains the text’s general provisions for application and interpretation.

It enshrines civil, political, economic and social rights, thus gathering existing rights that were spread between several documents as the European Convention of Human Rights (1950), the Council of Europe’s Social Charter (1961), and the Community Charter of Social Fundamental Rights of Workers (1989).

The “Solidarity” title establishes rights that are characteristic of the peculiar “European social model”. It guarantees the rights to consultation and to collective action for workers (including strike), the right to just and fair working conditions, as well as a protection against unjustified dismissal. It recognises the entitlement to social security benefits and assistance.

Résumé

La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne constitue la deuxième partie du Traité Constitutionnel. Elle comporte 54 articles définissant les droits fondamentaux des personnes au sein de l'UE. Ceux-ci sont répartis entre six titres : dignité, liberté, égalité, solidarité, citoyenneté et justice. Le septième titre contient les clauses générales d’interprétation et d’application du texte.

Au titre "Solidarité", sont énoncés les droits qui consacrent un modèle social européen original. La Charte garantie le droit à la consultation et à l'action collective des travailleurs (y compris la grève), le droit à des conditions de travail justes et équitables ainsi qu'à une protection contre tout licenciement injustifié. Elle reconnaît le droit aux prestations de sécurité sociale et à une aide sociale.

Commentary

The version of the Charter included in the Constitutional Treaty reads not exactly as the text originally signed in Nice in December 2000. A few amendments have been made, particularly in the Preamble and in the Title 7 (General Provisions Governing the Interpretation and Application of the Charter).

However, the Charter of Nice was already a compromise on the social values that the EU embodied. In this connection, it does not proclaim all fundamental rights recognised in each Member-States, but the major rights that are common to all Membre-States’ traditions and practices. Indeed, the systems of rights widely differ from a country to another.

The rights proclaimed in the Part II of the Constitution could therefore be invoked by European citizens against an act of the Union which would be contrary to them.

TEXT 2: « Lettre sur le projet de Constitution Européenne »

Link

http://www.commission-droits-homme.fr/binInfoGeneFr/affichageDepeche.cfm?iIdDepeche=96

Source

This letter is a formal document. It was sent to the French Prime Minister and to the concerned Ministers on July 8^th, 2003 by the French National Consultative Commission of Human Rights.

This Commission is a consultative body, attached to the Prime Minister. It is made up of appointed members, who are representatives of NGOs working in the field of Human Rights or humanitarian action and of the major union confederations, personalities chosen for their competence in the Human Rights field, French experts sitting on international Human Rights bodies, members of Parliament, the French Ombudsman, and representatives of the ministers concerned.

Its core role is to “throw light” on the law through the demands of the protection of Human Rights: it contributes to perfecting legal texts by providing expertise in this field.

The NCCHR actions mainly consist of elaborating recommendations to the Government, issuing an annual report on racism and xenophobia, and a few other activities such as training sessions on human rights.

Summary

The letter aims at drawing the attention of the French Prime Minister to two points relating to the version of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights integrated in the EU Constitution draft, which differs from the original version signed in Nice in 2000. Those amendments made to the Charter by the Convention in charge of drafting the Constitution are judged very negative by the Consultative Commission.

The first point regards social rights enshrined in the Charter, and the further restrictions made to their scope and the legal obligations for Member-States stemming from the Charter’s provisions. First, the distinction made between rights and principles has been increased, and the wording of article 52, which is now much longer, suggests that implementing those principles is not mandatory. Second, in a new paragraph, article 52 refers to “national laws and practices”, which shall be taken into account when enforcing the provisions of the Charter: this paragraph consequently limits the scope of the rights and principles established as they appear as reduced to existing “national laws and practices”.

The second matter, concerning the mentioning of a “religious inheritance” in the Constitution’s preamble, does not relate to the issue tackled in this dossier.

Résumé

Cette lettre de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme veut attirer l’attention du Premier Ministres français sur certaines modifications apportées à la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux de l’UE par la Convention chargée de rédiger la Constitution Européenne, et dont la portée est jugée négative.

Le premier point concerne des restrictions apportées dans la formulation des droits sociaux proclamés par la Charte, et notamment un affaiblissement de leur portée et des obligations juridiques qui en découlent pour les Etats-Membres. Le second problème abordé se rapporte à la mention d’un « héritage religieux » dans le préambule de la Constitution.

Commentary

This letter appears very relevant to illustrate the concerns raised by the amendments made to original Charter signed in Nice among legal experts. The debate therefore went beyond the only “academic” spheres and caused worries in more official, institutional bodies.

The tone is particularly grave, solemn, which indicates that they felt it urgent to draw the Government’s attention to the points raised. However, their call has had no actual effect on the content of the Constitution, as the amendments evoked in the letter are still to be found in the final text signed in Rome on October 29^th, 2004.

Translation

“Letter about the European Union Constitution Draft

(July 8^th, 2003)

President Joël Thoraval sent a letter dealing with the European Union Constitution Draft to the Prime Minister and to the concerned ministers on July 8^th. The content of this letter wad decided upon by the plenary assembly of the National Consultative Commission of Human Rights on July 3^rd, 2003.

________________________________

Paris, July 8^th, 2003

Dear Mr Raffarin,

The National Consultative Commission of Human Rights plenary assembly, meeting on July 3^rd, discussed the place of fundamental rights in the future European Constitution. Indeed, the NCCHR has always attached a lot of importance to this question. It notably expressed its position on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights through its September 21^st 2000 opinion, and participated to the national consultation on the future of Europe through its November 23^rd 2001 opinion. It also adopted an opinion on the outcomes of the Convention on the Future of Europe on March 27^th, 2003.

The NCCHR is pleased that the Convention succeeded. But, as texts currently stand, the Commission thinks it necessary to draw your attention to two significant alterations made to the Charter of Fundamental Rights introduced into the Constitution draft, which gave rise to very great concern among the Commission.

The first modification relates to the “social rights”. They were the point mostly discussed when the Charter was drawn up. Those discussions whose outcome was a compromise based on the distinction between “rights” and “principles” are today questioned. The then reached compromise consisted in admitting that social rights should not be weakened by restrictive global measures. Thus, in the spirit of the Charter’s drafters, principles stood as fundamental rights as much as the actual rights themselves: article 51 of the Charter stipulates that the Union and the Member States “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof”.

True, this phrase still figures in the Constitution draft, but article 52, much more developed, emphasizes the difference between “rights” and “principles”. Paragraph 5 reads “the provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts”. It is thus not mentioned that the Union and the Member States have to implement them as it is stipulated in article 51 of the Charter.

As for paragraph 6, it reinforces the reservations that are already so marked in the Charter: “full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter”.

The NCCHR thinks that these alterations, far from marginal, may undermine the Charter’s social content, and hence its usefulness having regard to the rights already enacted by the European Convention on Human rights.

The second modification refers to the question of “religious inheritance”. […]

To conclude, the NCCHR strongly hopes that the concern caused by these two matters of principle will be fully taken into account when negotiations will be held within the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference.

Yours faithfully,

Joël THORAVAL”

TEXT 3 : « Une conception des droits purement libérale »

Link

http://www.humanite.presse.fr/journal/2004-10-25/index7069.html

Source

This article was published in l’Humanité on 25^th October, 2004.

L’Humanité is a well-known French daily. It was the French Communist Party official newspaper, but gained its editorial independence in the 1990’s. Today, it is still definitely left-wing orientated.

The newspaper’s stance on social issues is consequently very firm, and expresses a strong opposition to liberal ideas and orientations.

Summary

The article is an interview of Serge Regourd, a professor of Public Law at the University of Toulouse. He is asked to analyse and comment upon the integration of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU Constitution draft from a legal point of view. He unequivocally asserts that this will involve no actual additional protection for EU citizens in the field of fundamental rights.

The first reason is that the fundamental political and civil rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter have already been proclaimed in the European Convention of Human Rights, which has been ratified by all EU Member-States, and whose provisions may be directly and individually invoked before the European Court of Human Rights by EU citizens. Moreover, the ECHR set of political and civil rights is more complete than the EU Charter’s: the Charter therefore lags behind.

Second, as regards the economic and social rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter, their scope is subjected to national laws and practices. Furthermore, most EU Member-States laws provide a more thorough catalogue of social rights and a stronger protection of them than the Charter.

Social rights shall be seized as rights of provision, that is to say rights to services provided by the State to organise the enforcement of those rights in actual facts, in the form of systems of benefits, or compensatory services. This approach to social rights and guarantees is completely ignored in the Charter, and makes way for a totally liberal, non-interventionist and market-driven logic.

Résumé

L’article est une interview de Serge Regourd, professeur de droit public à l’Université de Toulouse. Commentant l’intégration de la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux dans le projet de Constitution, il affirme clairement qu’elle n’entraînera aucune protection supplémentaire pour les citoyens de l’UE en la matière.

D’une part, les droits civiques et politiques contenus dans la Charte et d’autres encore bénéficient déjà d’une protection efficace dans le cadre de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme. D’autre part, les droits économiques et sociaux énumérés sont en-deçà des garanties en vigueur dans de nombreux Etats-Membres, et sont renvoyés aux pratiques et législations nationales.

Dans la Charte, la conception des droits sociaux en tant que droits créances, garantissant l’intervention effective de l’Etat pour les réaliser, est remise en cause au profit d’une logique totalement libérale, non-interventionniste et dictée par le marché.

Commentary

The interviewee rejects the very commonly expressed argument that the Constitutional Treaty is a step forward compared with the current state of law, notably in matter of social rights and guarantees. Thus, he stresses that they are far more developed and protective in most Member-States.

But Britain, for instance, does not belong to this group of countries where social protection, rights and freedoms are firmly and thoroughly anchored. For this reason, if the legal status Charter of Fundamental Rights is actual, the social provisions it contains may have an impact on UK law, in particular in the area of employment.

Translation

“EUropean constitution :

"A purely liberal approach to rights"

Interview with Serge Regourd, Professor of Public Law at the University of Toulouse-I

Does the integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the European Constitution draft advance rights and freedoms for EU citizens?

Serge Regourd. The answer is clearly : no. For a very simple reason: all EU member-states are also members of the Council of Europe. A very important convention was adopted within the framework of this Council in 1950: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. France ratified this text in 1974. This Convention enshrined a large set of rights and freedoms, and moreover established an “individual right of request/ petition”. This means that Member States’ nationals may directly lay a matter before the European Court of Human Rights when they consider that their rights and freedoms are not being respected in their country.

Does this Charter provide a “plus” / any additional protection compared with this European convention of Human Rights?

Serge Regourd. No, this Charter does not add anything in respect of rights and freedoms that citizens would not have enjoyed until now

We are today in a system of protection of fundamental rights, of civil and political rights, that is much superior to what this Charter of Fundamental Rights proposes.

Once again, all EU member-states come under a system of rights and freedoms within the framework of the Council of Europe and the procedure before the European Court of Human Rights. This system goes much beyond what the Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees.

The European Convention of Human Rights comprehensively lists the conceivable and asserted rights and freedoms. The set of rights and freedoms defined therein is almost “complete”, in a liberal democracy at least. These rights are also provided for with a procedure of guarantee, allowing an exceptional protection. This is virtually the only case in which a private person may directly refer a matter to the Council of Europe’s authorities, when they consider that national courts have not respected their rights and freedoms.

At least, the Charter of Fundamental Rights could be in line with the current state of law, which is actually not the case. There is like a smokescreen around this charter. In concrete terms, on the best assumption, it leads to absolutely no change for every concerned citizen.

Then, what about the recognition of the right to strike, the right of collective bargaining?

Serge Regourd. These rights are stated in the Charter, but immediately referred to “national laws and practices”. It is stupefying.

In France, as in other member-states, the right to strike and trade union freedoms come under a constitutional status that is fully guaranteed. There is the case-law of the Constitutional Council which is guarantor of trade union freedom and the right to strike. These freedoms have a constitutional value today, and so do major fundamental freedoms in most member-states.

As far as social rights are concerned, the supporters of the Constitutional Treaty put forward the idea that the text, and more precisely the Charter, contains only advances, and no regressions. What is your opinion about this?

Serge Regourd. There exist several generations of rights and freedoms. The first generation is enshrined in the French Declaration of Human and Citizen rights of 1789, which has a constitutional value in France. They are political and strictly individual rights.

The second generation of rights covers economic and social rights. In France, they were stated at the end of the Second World War, and inserted in the preamble of the Constitution of 1946. This preamble also has a constitutional value. In many respects, these rights are defined as “rights of provision”. Citizens are considered to have rights, because they have a claim on the State, and the State is to organise the realisation of those rights in concrete terms. Let’s take the example of the provisions concerning the right to work in the preamble of 1946. The right to work is proclaimed. It is not respected in actual fact with the level of unemployment recorded in our society. But it is indirectly respected, insofar as the State sets up schemes to ensure that those being jobless are protected: unemployment benefits, services provided by state jobcentres to help workers to find a job, etc. The right to work is proclaimed, and if society does not actually manage this right to be respected for all, the State has to invent compensation systems.

In this constitution draft, this approach to “rights of provision” is questioned. Rights are no more conceived in terms of guarantees or allowances supported by the government organisation that is entrusted with the implementation of those rights to the benefit of citizens, but as simple faculties that individuals may possibly make use of in a liberal logic.

The right to work is thus replaced by the “right to engage in work” and the “freedom to seek employment”. This approach is the most liberal you can imagine. It is a considerable regression: the concept of freedoms, of “rights of provision” is given up to adopt a purely liberal approach. This means “everyone has to sort it out for themselves; everyone is free to seek a job if they want to”. When this is said, strictly nothing is said. It would be the last straw if one could not look for a job.

When the Charter deals with an “entitlement to social security benefits”, it also departs from the scope you name “rights of provision”. What can the concrete consequences of such a wording be?

Serge Regourd. In France, the order of 1945 that created and organised Social Security as a public utility comes under the same generation of human rights.

In the framework of what was called the logic of the “Republic’s / republican pact” in France, a majority of people agreed to take away a certain number of activities from the logic of market and profits. This was the case for Social Security and its different subsystems.

This European Constitution draft promotes a reverse logic. Public utility is considered as referring to a purely derogatory logic in this text.

In the social field, even though it is not clearly said, private insurances will possibly be considered as the norm. And it is only in case the private initiative market would turn out to be totally inadequate that logics of public utility could be reintroduced, but in a strictly derogatory and exceptional way.

Of course, it is never said that the Social security system should be dismantled in order to put everything in the hands of private insurances. But if the Charter is looked at within the global framework of the Constitution draft, one may fear that logics of public utility, which rely on the concept of “rights of provision”, be totally questioned to the benefit of private services.

Does the enshrinement of the principle of “free movement of goods and capital”, from the Charter’s preamble, mean that fundamental rights are subordinated to this principle?

Serge Regourd. It is the first time that purely economic, market-orientated, commercial provisions are enshrined in a constitutional text and become legal standards, constitutional provisions. It is therefore natural to wonder about the consequences of the constitutional principle of a “market where competition is free and not distorted” on the overall state of social law.”

TEXT 4 : « Une suggestion pour améliorer la Constitution européenne »

Link

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4?id=1573&lang=4&m=series

Source

This article was published on the website of an international association of quality newspapers from a large number of countries called Project Syndicate.

This association is designed to bring together commentaries, news analysis and other press articles written by famous international contributors, such as senior politicians, leading experts and researchers, for them to be published in the member newspapers in order to circulate them to a wider audience.

The commentary belongs to the May 2004 edition of the monthly series “European Economies”, whose articles discuss major problems as well as recent economic and political developments in Europe and in particular the EU. It is written by a French academic, a Professor of Economics. Consequently, the author is no lawyer but an economist.

Summary

With the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitution draft, the social rights contained in it have gained a constitutional status. This is bound to bring about major difficulties for economic actors as social rights, though generous, have a considerable cost.

Social rights have to be granted only through decisions of national parliaments -which can better assess their possible costs and decide on their content- and not by means of constitutional law, which is more difficult to change.

During the negotiations, Britain did its utmost to ensure that the scope of the rights enshrined was limited, but the provisions added with this purpose do not work in practice. To improve the Treaty, the right solution would be to withdraw fundamental rights from Part II, and introduce them in a non-binding declaration attached to the Constitutional Treaty. Or, failing that, article 52 should be altered and completely exclude Member-State actions from the Charter’s field of application, even when implementing EU law.

If the Constitution does not let to foresee any more the supremacy of the model of a Welfare State ruled by judged, then it will be more likely to be ratified by all Member-States.

Résumé

L’inclusion de la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux et de ses droits sociaux dans le Projet de Constitution ne manquera de générer des coûts importants pour les agents économiques. En effet, seul le Parlement est à même de légiférer en matière de droits sociaux, et d’en décider les modalités, et non les juges. A ce titre, les droits sociaux ne devraient pas figurer dans le droit constitutionnel.

Malgré les tentatives britanniques de limiter la portée des droits fondamentaux de la Charte, ils gardent un impact potentiel majeur. Dès lors, la solution consisterait à retirer ces droits du Traité Constitutionnel, et de les inscrire dans une déclaration non-contraignante en annexe. A défaut, il conviendrait de modifier l’article 52 de la Charte, excluant de sa portée les actions des Etats-Membres, même lorsqu’ils mettent en œuvre le droit de l’UE. Ceci permettrait de rallier au projet les pays plus sceptiques, en effaçant le spectre d’un modèle prédominant d’Etat-Providence régi par les juges.

Commentary

This article presents an opposite point of view from the two previous texts. Being an economist -and that is probably the main cause for his diverging understanding of the stakes of granting or not social rights at a European level- he focuses more on the cost inferred by such entitlement as right to unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, and so on, when lawyers tend to favour. On the issue of democratic functioning, he implicitly recalls that judges are not elected, when members of national parliaments are. Consequently, they should be in the position to decide on and implement social rights.

Another interesting point to put under scrutiny in this document is the chosen language. It is far from neutral: turns of phrase are clearly negative concerning EU-level social developments, and even deliberately eurosceptical and anti-social in a few occurrences: for instance one of the positive consequences of the changes he suggests to make to the Constitution is to allow “watering down the Union’s social directives” or when he argues that “the fact that certain “social rights” managed into some European countries’ national constitutions is no reason to impose them on the whole Union”… He appears very hostile to further developments in the social field at a Community level for a variety of reasons, and considers the current draft’s social content as too far-reaching already.

Translation

“Hints on how to improve the European Constitution

by Georges de Ménil

The prospect of many referenda on the EU Constitution considerably changed the chance it has of being ratified. Europhiles and Eurocrats alike are terrified at the thought that a rejection by several Member-States, in particular the major countries, might result in scrapping the draft, for in that case the EU will have to cope with the Nice Treaty. But if those stakeholders show patience, the breath of democracy could allow a more substantial Constitution to emerge, without the risk of an economic and legal nightmare that some aspects of the current draft lead to foresee.

The EU has to quickly democratize its procedures and reorganise its institutions, so that the enlargement that just occurred does not reach a bureaucratic deadlock. The Constitution draft contains acceptable solutions to many questions of governance. The Social Chapter had previously been in the list of good intentions, but its elevation to the status of fundamental constitutional law threatens to confront workers and businesses in the Member-States with engaging in heavy administrative proceedings and implementing expensive social rights, written by judges in Luxembourg whose decisions are beyond appeal.

However, the inclusion in Part II of the draft on “social rights” — such as the right not to be unjustly dismissed, or the right to receive old-age pensions, unemployment or health benefits (whatever the cost) — is in no way necessary to the functioning of the whole. These provisions are certainly laudable, but they have a cost.

The very term “social right” is not relevant. If something is a “right”, then the cost is not an issue. For example, the economic cost for the defence of freedom of speech is not to be discussed. The possible payment of high public pensions, on the other hand, cannot be dissociated from their cost to taxpayers.

The onus is on members of Parliament to legislate on social protection, for they are well placed to evaluate their constituents’ interest. The most ardent supporters of the right to expanded public health care must admit that the place for advocating their project is the Parliament, not the European Court of Justice. These entitlements do not belong in a Constitution, particularly in one that cannot be easily amended.

The fact that certain “social rights” managed into some European countries’ national constitutions is no reason to impose them on the whole Union, as the current draft does. It is noteworthy that in the Scandinavian countries, which enjoy some of the most progressive social protections in Europe, these entitlements are provided by statutory laws enacted by legislatures rather than by courts enacting constitutional “rights.” They are social dividends, allocated by national parliaments, according to real economic growth.

In France, advocates of the European Constitution, on both the left and the right, shrug and argue that the inclusion of the Social Chapter in the draft is a compromise. The ‘social rights’ in Part II are considered as a compensation for voters on the left, in return for introducing ‘competition’ among the fundamental objectives of the Union in Part I of the draft. But neither one nor the other has a place in the Constitution. Natural monopolies are sometimes economically desirable, but legislators, and not judges, should decide under what conditions they may be allowed.

For a decade, Britain stood up almost alone against the expansion of the Social Chapter. The Blair government accepted including its provisions into the body of the text written by the Convention, while demanding a wording that would limit their reach.

Unfortunately, the British safeguard does not work. Article II-52 states that the Fundamental Rights recognised in the Constitution (including 12 “social rights”) apply only to the acts of the Union and of Member-States when they are implementing Union law. But with the EU enlarging, these decisions will become overwhelming. For instance, if an environmental directive leads closing down a polluting plant in Britain, the Constitution would give trade unions the right to go to litigation against the resultant redundancies.

Fortunately, the impact of Britain’s ineffective initiative can be lessened without jeopardizing the draft. The simplest solution would be to remove the fundamental rights of Part II from the text, and give them the same status as the Social Chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty, that is to say a declaration of intentions appended to the Treaty. All traditional individual rights are already enshrined in the Declaration of Human Rights, and closely enforced by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg.

“Social rights” are not the responsibility of judges; they should remain a matter for legislators. If a political compromise is needed, ‘competition’ should not appear among the fundamental objectives of the Union anymore. Free movement of goods, services, labour, and capital is more than enough.

If this solution –probably the most relevant- proves unacceptable, then an alternative would be to modify Article II-52, to state clearly that the twelve “social rights” of Part II apply to the Union, but not to Member-States, even when they are implementing Union law. If the Union decides, as it may, that all Member-States must provide access to public health care for unemployed people, it would be up to national parliaments, and not 25 judges in Luxembourg, to determine the concrete terms for achieving this goal. This would water down the Union’s social directives, and would give more substance to the principle of subsidiarity.

By withholding the prospect of a Welfare State run by judges from the draft Constitution, its designers will increase the chance that Britain and other sceptics will in the end ratify the final version.

May 2004

Georges de Ménil is Professor of Economics at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris”

TEXT 5: “EU constitutional treaty - The trade union movement and the European constitution”

Link

www.tuc.org.uk/euconstitution/tuc-8562-f0.cfm

Source

The Trade Union Congress (TUC) is the national confederation of British trade unions. As such, it keeps a wary eye on social and more generally political developments at the EU level. It therefore followed the drafting of the EU Charter and Constitution. When the final version of the Constitution was agreed, the TUC commissioned an analysis of the Constitutional Treaty from Professor Brian Bercusson, a leading expert in European law of Kings College London in order to have an expert’s position paper as a discussion material to distribute to members and correspondents and feed the discussion before launching an internal consultation.

Professor Brian Bercusson is a widely acknowledged expert on EU labour law in Britain. He was asked to scrutinize the potential impact of the Constitutional Treaty and to determine whether the constitution benefits unions and working people.

Summary

The top lawyer’s main point is that the Constitutional Treaty will boost citizen rights, in particular worker rights. To a large extent, this assertion relies on the impact analysis he carried out on the status the Charter of Fundamental Rights is likely to have once the new Treaty will be in force.

The ratification of the Constitution will make Member-States liable to a “European social model” based on two major aspects.

The first one is the institutionally guaranteed “social dialogue” between collective organisations representing workers and employers at EU and national levels, resting on the model of a “social partnership”.

The second one is the set of rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the second part of the Constitutional Treaty. The main asset of the Charter is to provide a single list of fundamental civil, political, economic and social rights. It is now part of EU constitutional law, and may be binding for Member-States through the principle of supremacy of EU law.

In this connection, the Charter may be resorted to to provide rights at work through two distinct ways: on the one hand, using it as an autonomous legal source of rights; on the other hand, using it as a mean to dispute the transposing of Union’s law by Member-States in matter of rights at work when it happens to be irrelevant or faulty.

Despite the attempts of the British Labour government to dilute the scope of the Charter through amendments -that will actually not stand up-, it will certainly have a tremendous legal impact on UK law, especially in the field of employment or trade union rights, which could well become fields for judicial intervention of the European Court of Justice.

Résumé

L’auteur affirme sans ambiguïté que la Constitution représente une avancée pour les droits des citoyens européens, et en particulier pour ceux des travailleurs. Ainsi, la ratification de la Constitution Européenne entraînera dès lors l’assujettissement des Etats-Membres au « modèle social européen », qui est essentiellement caractérisé par l’existence d’un « dialogue social » entre les organisations syndicales et patronales et à divers niveaux, ainsi que par la protection des droits fondamentaux énoncés dans la Charte figurant en partie II du Traité Constitutionnel. La Charte pourrait ainsi être utilisée pour garantir les droits en matière de travail sur la base du principe de primauté du droit de l’Union.

Malgré les efforts du gouvernement travailliste britannique pour en limiter la portée, la Charte aura certainement un effet juridique non négligeable sur la législation du Royaume-Uni en matière d’emploi et de droits syndicaux, qui se situe en retrait par rapport aux provisions de ladite Charte, sous le contrôle juridictionnel de la Cour Européenne de Justice.

Commentary

Over the past few years, the UK government made numerous attempts to ensure that integrating the Charter in the new treaty would not allow the European Court of Justice to overrule existing UK -not really worker-friendly- employment law, to the dismay of trade union leaders. During and after the negotiations, Tony Blair repeatedly stressed that the inclusion of the Charter in the Constitutional Treaty would have a minor impact. So the conclusions of this analysis contradict the whole discourse of the British government, and present arguments that could lead the TUC to adopt a stance in favour of the text.

In this respect, the official position taken by the TUC is bound to have a major influence as a referendum is due to take place next year in the UK. Trade unions’ stance may be followed by a quite large number of British workers, especially those being traditionally left-wing.

Translation

« Résumé exécutif

Le projet de Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe adopté le 18 juin 2004 est le point culminant d’un processus historique d’intégration européenne. Il est important de saisir les enjeux de la nature de « constitution » de ce texte.

Malgré les combats d’arrière-garde menés par les gouvernements britanniques depuis 1979, l’UE a développé un “model social” dont les éléments-clés sont inscrits dans la Constitution de l’Union. Sa valeur pour l’Europe, et le Royaume-Uni en particulier, repose sur une qualité fondamentale. En tant que constitution, elle grave pour ainsi dire dans la pierre les valeurs et les objectifs de base de l’Union ainsi que ses politiques. Une fois la Constitution Européenne ratifiée (et si elle l’est effectivement), le Royaume-Uni et les autres Etats-Membres seront tenus de respecter un « modèle social » résultant de générations de luttes. La Constitution enferme les gouvernements du Royaume-Uni (et des autres Etats) dans un model social européen.

Le modèle de l’Union en matière de relations industrielles et d’emploi est déterminé par les formes organisationnelles de salariés et d’employeurs aux niveaux européen et national, et plus spécifiquement par leurs interactions de diverses manières et à différents niveaux, souvent caractérisées de « partenariat social ». La forme d’interaction sans doute la plus familière est la négociation collective entre un employeur et un syndicat à un niveau sectoriel, qui existe dans la plupart des pays, mais aussi à l’échelon de l’entreprise. Mais, dans l’Union, il s’agit seulement d’une des trois formes institutionnelles d’interaction. Les deux autres sont des procédures à l’échelon national (macro-niveau) et sur le lieu de travail (micro-niveau). C’est l’existence de ces trois échelons réunis et leur interrelation qui définit le caractère spécifique du modèle européen d’emploi et de relations industrielles.

L’organisation collective sous la forme d’organisations collectives de salariés et d’employeurs, les acteurs centraux dans un modèle de « partenariat social », est un élément décisif du succès de ce modèle d’emploi et de relations industrielles spécifique à l’UE. Ce trait déterminant du modèle européen implique une syndicalisation importante, la condition préalable à l’émergence d’un partenariat social.

La Constitution européenne comprend des dispositions qui jettent les bases d’un modèle social européen. La partie I du projet de Traité Constitutionnel, dans son titre VI : « La vie démocratique de l’Union », prévoit à l’article I-47 « Les partenaires sociaux et le dialogue social autonome », que :

« L'Union européenne reconnaît et promeut le rôle des partenaires sociaux au niveau de l'Union, en prenant en compte la diversité des systèmes nationaux; elle facilite le dialogue entre eux, dans le respect de leur autonomie. Le sommet social tripartite pour la croissance et l'emploi contribue au dialogue social. »

Tout aussi importants que ces garde-fous institutionnels relatifs aux partenaires sociaux dans le modèle social européen sont les droits inscrits dans la partie II de la Constitution, la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux.

Il existe un large consensus sur le fait que la qualité probablement la plus importante de la Charte de l’Union est qu’elle innove en fournissant une liste unique de droits fondamentaux, non seulement les droits civiques et politiques traditionnels, mais également une longue liste de droits économiques et sociaux. Parmi les dispositions de la Charte figurent les droits syndicaux fondamentaux, qui sont au cœur du droit du travail en Europe.

La Charte, faisant partie d’une Constitution européenne, entraînera des effets juridiques potentiellement importants, notamment l’effet direct et la primauté. L’incorporation de la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux dans le droit constitutionnel primaire de l’Union aura un impact sur les Etats-membres, liés par la Charte par le biais de la doctrine de la primauté du droit européen.

On peut indiquer deux méthodes spécifiques d’utilisation de la Charte afin d’assurer le respect des droits en matière de travail : (i) en tant que source juridique indépendante de droits relatifs au travail (c’est-à-dire à grâce aux doctrines de l’effet « direct » et « indirect ») ; (ii) en tant que base pour mettre en cause le droit national transposant de façon incorrecte ou inadéquate le droit de l’Union conférant des droits en matière de travail.

Depuis le début, le gouvernement britannique néo-travailliste a engagé une campagne dans le but d’atténuer autant que possible le contenu de la Charte, et en particulier ses effets juridiques potentiels quant à son contenu social.

La Convention sur le futur de l’Europe a procédé à un certain nombre d’« ajustements » de la Charte. Un de ceux-ci a été inséré dans le préambule par le Praesidium de la Convention :

“La présente Charte réaffirme, dans le respect des compétences et des tâches de l'Union, ainsi que du principe de subsidiarité, les droits qui résultent notamment des traditions constitutionnelles et des obligations internationales communes aux États membres, de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales, des Chartes sociales adoptées par l'Union et par le Conseil de l'Europe, ainsi que de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne et de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme. Dans ce contexte, la Charte sera interprétée par les juridictions de l'Union et des États membres en prenant dûment en considération les explications établies sous l'autorité du Praesidium de la Convention qui a élaboré la Charte. »

Le Praesidium de la Convention qui a rédigé la Charte a soumis un texte final daté du 28 septembre 2000, accompagné par un autre texte, explicatif, daté du 11 octobre 2000 au Conseil Européen de Biarritz des 13 et 14 octobre 2000. Ce dernier document contenait des « explications » accompagnant le texte de la Charte. Ces explications n’ont clairement pas été rédigées ni approuvées par la Convention qui a élaboré la Charte, un élément que le Praesidium a lui-même souligné à plusieurs reprises. Le site internet de l’Union reproduit la Charte aux côtés des explications du Praesidium, et dans les notes de bas de page du texte de la Charte, il est clairement spécifié, par deux fois, que :

« Ces explications ont été établies sous l'autorité du Praesidium. Elles n’ont pas de valeur juridique et sont simplement destinées à clarifier les dispositions de la Charte. »

L’« ajustement » effectué au préambule de la Charte apparaît destiné à attribuer une valeur juridique aux explications dont les auteurs ont démenti la portée.

La rencontre au sommet du Conseil Européen des 17 et18 juin 2004 pour parvenir à une décision sur le projet de Constitution a vu la dernière tentative du gouvernement travailliste d’enterrer la Charte, de l’édulcorer en revoyant à la baisse les normes en matière de droit du travail et les droits syndicaux qui y sont inscrits.

Au final, le préambule de la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux a été amendé, ajoutant à l’amendement précité: « et mises à jour sous la responsabilité du Praesidium de la Convention européenne ». De plus, a été ajouté à l’article II-52 (Portée et interprétation des droits et principes) un septième paragraphe :

« Les explications élaborées en vue de guider l'interprétation de la Charte des droits fondamentaux sont dûment prises en considération par les juridictions de l'Union et des États membres. »

Ce résultat semble, contrairement aux tentatives du gouvernement britannique, avoir tout sauf amoindri la force juridique des explications. La phrase supplémentaire ajoutée au préambule par le Praesidium de la Convention sur le Futur de l’Europe était assez forte : « …la Charte sera interprétée…en prenant dûment en considération les explications... ». En comparaison, le nouveau paragraphe 7 de l’article II-52 ajouté par la CIG semble plus faible : « Les explications…en vue de guider l'interprétation…sont dûment prises en considération... ». Ainsi, « sera interprétée » devient « sont dûment prises en considération ». Le paragraphe 7 de l’article II-52 prime sur le préambule. En outre, le texte du paragraphe 7 du nouvel article II-52 ne fait aucune référence aux explications mises à jour.

Les heures qui ont suivi la clôture du Conseil Européen des 17 et 18 juin ont reflété de façon caractéristique les tactiques de double discours habituellement adoptées par le gouvernement travailliste. Dans sa conférence de presse du 18 juin 2004 faisant suite à la réunion, Tony Blair a annoncé :

« La Charte des Droits Fondamentaux est spécifiquement formulée de manière à éviter que la Cour Européenne de Justice modifie les lois relatives aux relations industrielles de notre pays en invoquant la Charte. »

Quelque soit l’impact de cet exercice de virevolte dans le contexte intérieur de l’opinion publique britannique, et ses conséquences sur le référendum, il est peu probable qu’il influence l’opinion en-dehors des cercles politiques du Royaume-Uni, tout aussi peu dans les juridictions nationales britanniques lorsque la Charte est invoquée, et encore moins dans le forum le plus important lorsqu’il s’agit de décider de l’effet juridique de la Charte : la Cour Européenne de Justice.

Le dernier jour de la réunion du Conseil Européen, le Financial Times du 18 juin 2004 (p .6) relatait une entrevue avec le Président de la Cour Européenne de Justice, Vassilios Skouris. L’article citait le juge, déclarant que le projet de constitution « amènera de nouveaux domaines et de nouveaux sujets sous la juridiction de la Cour », comme la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux. L’article continuait :

« M. Skouris a également invité à ce que la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux soit rendue contraignante juridiquement au sein de la constitution, un pas que les dirigeants de l’UE sont probablement prêts à faire aujourd’hui.

« Un catalogue complet de droits fondamentaux simplifiera les choses dans l’intérêt de la certitude juridique » a-t-il déclaré. La Grande-Bretagne a envisagé un compromis sur le texte de la constitution qui pourrait donner à la Charte une force juridique sur les institutions de l’Union mais pas sur les droits nationaux des Etats-membres. Cependant, de nombreux juristes doutent que l’impact juridique de la Charte puisse être délimité de la sorte. M. Skouris n’a pu assurer que la Charte n’aurait pas d’impact sur le droit britannique. »

La tentative du gouvernement travailliste de « protéger » le droit du travail britannique, plus restrictif, des droits fondamentaux proclamés dans la Constitution Européenne a échoué. La solution de repli consistant à se reposer sur les « explications » pour atténuer les conséquences de la Charte a tout aussi peu de chances d’avoir l’effet désiré. Il n’y aura pas de « protection » des lois britanniques sur le travail, fréquemment condamnées par les organes de surveillance de l’OIT et du Conseil de l’Europe pour des violations des normes internationales du travail, contre l’impact des droits syndicaux fondamentaux garantis par la Charte. »

TEXT 6: « CONSTITUTION EUROPEENNE : UN "PAS EN AVANT" SOCIAL ? »

Link

http://www.urfig.org/17%20Constitution%20europeenne%20un%20pas%20en%20avant%20social%20JdM%2028%20septembre%202004%20P%2041.doc

Source

The following article was the weekly column in the Journal du Mardi published on September, 28^th 2004.

The Journal du Mardi is a Belgian general progressive weekly created in the mid-90’s, after a certain number of scandals had broken in Belgium, leaving the whole country in a state of commotion. Since then, the newspaper has had a very peculiar place in the Belgian press. Its special profile was based on its commitment to truth, as well as on the will to remain close to basic citizens’ expectations and to combat racism. It has also allowed the expression of different civil and social movements such as anti-globalisation activists.

On the whole, its tone is free, non-conformist and ironical.

The author, Raoul-Marc Jennar, is a Doctor of Political Sciences. He has written many essays and articles on EU politics. He has also formerly been an adviser to the Belgian Parliament and government. He is now a researcher, working for the Belgian NGO “Oxfam Solidarité” and for the “Research, Training and Information Unit on Globalisation” (URFIG, France)

Summary

In order to determine whether the EU Constitution draft is a social step forward, the researcher analyses the social content of the Charter of Fundamental rights in details and compares the economic and social rights enshrined to those already existing in EU Member-States constitutions.

Many of these constitutions proclaim a certain number of collective social rights whose conditions of exercise have to be provided for by public authorities, as the right to work, the rights to health care, and to social security and welfare. In the EU Constitution draft, the wording is vague enough to imply no legal obligation for the UE, as for instance the expression “the Union recognises and respects”, which neither requires the right or entitlement recognised and respected to be laid down, nor prevents to reduce or do away with it.

The draft clearly mentions that the EU is adheres to the European Convention of Human Rights, which incidentally contains no collective or social rights, but not to other European or international declarations or documents, which do have a social content, a few of them being only referred to.

The proposed constitutional treaty consequently not only offers no improvement in the recognition and protection of social rights but is not nearly as complete as many Member-States’ constitutions in this respect. It merely proclaims rights that are actually faculties that people may make use of. Hence, it challenges the logic of Welfare-State existing in many national systems, in favour of a liberal logic.

Résumé

Non seulement la constitution européenne qu’on nous propose n’implique aucune avancée pour la reconnaissance et la protection des droits sociaux, mais elle se situe dans ce domaine bien en retrait des constitutions de certains Etats-Membres, qui consacrent des droits collectifs et sociaux à des prestations de la puissance publique comme le droit au travail, le droit aux soins de santé ou le droit à la sécurité et à l’aide sociale. Elle se contente de proclamer des droits qui sont en réalité des facultés que les personnes peuvent mettre en œuvre. Par là, la logique d’Etat-Providence caractéristique de nombreux systèmes nationaux en Europe est remise en cause au profit d’une logique libérale.

Commentary

This column is particularly scathing: through a meticulous review of EU Member-States national constitutions, the researcher wants to seize the opportunity to demonstrate and make absolutely clear that the Constitution entails the challenging of social and collective rights for many Member-States.

Precisely for this, he does not address the implications for those EU countries where social rights and entitlements are not so advanced, as the UK for instance. True, the draft does not make major provisions for enhanced obligations in the area of social protection and security. Nevertheless, many observers in Britain predict that the consequences of provisions in the Charter of Fundamental Rights will be many, especially in the field of legislation on employment.

The draft is basically said to be too liberal in its conception of rights, and to promote a logic that is contrary to the model of the Welfare-State. This launches on a large yet very abstract debate on models of politics and economics –liberalism versus State interventionism– and the implications of such a choice in the actual management and monitoring of public affairs.

TEXT 7: “Draft EU Constitution - new law via the back door?”

Link

http://lawzone.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=108887&d=205&h=207&f=259

Source

This article was taken from a newspaper’s website called The Lawyer. The Lawyer is a leading weekly for the legal profession, and in particular business lawyers, in the UK and but also across Europe. The news coverage is adapted to the profession’s specific demands.

The Lawyer.com is an online information service on the latest legal developments for those working in the business of law.

Its section entitled “Lawzone” also provides archive and a search tool. The following article belongs to the Practice Area “Employment” from these archives.

This comment was written by a lawyer working for IBB Solicitors.

Summary

The drafting of an EU constitution by the European Convention on the future of Europe -in charge of bringing the EU close to its citizens, of rethinking the institutional order to suit the forthcoming enlargements and of reinforcing the EU ability to lead the field on the world stage- is in process. It will then be followed by a round of intergovernmental conferences to finalize the draft by Spring 2004.

Much of these developments as well as recent ones relate to employment and social policy, an issue ranking high on the EU agenda, which led to a series of new measures in UK to comply with EU law in this field.

The draft acknowledges the expectations of supporters of an enhanced social protection, partly with the inclusion of a Charter of Fundamental Rights in the text, whose content is though in no way innovative. Where the shoe pinches for Britain is that negotiations currently tend towards allowing the European Court of Justice jurisdiction over it, however on a limited basis. But this restriction is not likely to be effective, and judicial review by the EU court may rapidly grow, notably in the employment field.

Furthermore, the Constitution draft sets out ambitious objectives the Union’s social policy, among which the very controversial “social market economy” and “full employment”. EU Competences now include co-ordination of Member-States’ economic policies just as employment and social policies. This change may lead to design expensive but inadequate EU-wide social schemes with tremendous possible effects, in particular economic distortions, and to deal with the very sensitive issue of tax harmonization, hence opening the symbolic discussion on national sovereignty and federalism.

The potential effects of the current constitution draft on employment and social protection cannot easily be forecasted as many details still have to be settled in the forthcoming months. Still, the adoption of this document will most probably result in new laws and rulings, thus fostering the growing of EU legislation and case-law in the employment and social fields.

Résumé

La Convention sur le Futur de l’Europe suivie de plusieurs conférences inter-gouvernementales vont aboutir à la rédaction d’une Constitution européenne, dont le contenu social risque d’avoir des effets considérables. Depuis quelques années, les questions sociales et d’emploi sont au centre de l’attention des institutions européennes, ce qui s’est traduit au Royaume-Uni par de nouvelles lois.

L’inclusion de la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux dans la Constitution répond aux attentes de la gauche. Il est même de question de la placer sous le contrôle juridictionnel de la Cour de Justice Européenne, en en limitant cependant le champ d’application.

De plus, la Constitution fixe d’ambitieux objectifs pour la politique sociale et de l’emploi de l’UE. La coordination au niveau européen des politiques nationales dans ce domaine devient une compétence de l’UE, ce qui pourrait aboutir à l’imposition de vastes programmes sociaux européens coûteux et rigides, créant par là des distorsions économiques.

En toute vraisemblance, l’adoption de la Constitution favorisera l’augmentation de la législation et de la jurisprudence dans le domaine social et de l’emploi.

Commentary

The author looks unfavourably on social developments at the EU level, and the pooling of Member-States competences in this area, employment and social issues being very specific to each country and hence more relevantly and efficiently tackled at a domestic level.

Through this, the fear of a Brussels-based federalist and centralist European “superstate” shows, as well as the suspicious and reluctant reception of an EU “Constitution”, very clear in the heading: “New law via the back door?”.

The tone is that of a column, scathing, ironical, and sneering, served by a very rich –sometimes polished– vocabulary. He stands back looking at the whole European process and dramatizes the stakes of it while holding it up to ridicule.

CONCLUSION

The EU Constitutional Treaty will incorporate the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which will thereby acquire legally binding force and be judiciable in the European Court of Justice. Consequently, the first point to be concluded is that the Charter will be granted a greatly enhanced status through its being formally incorporated into the Constitution. Its status has been a little more clarified at last.

The Charter thus strengthens fundamental rights, including economic, social and Trade Union rights: making the Charter a legal document will make it much more difficult to ignore, reduce or abolish the economic and social rights asserted therein. This establishes a responsibility, in the legal sense, of the EU member-states in enforcing those rights within the scope of application of the Charter, that is to say while implementing the Union’s law. And EU law now covers many areas of policy, notably on economic and social issues. The inclusion of the Charter in the Constitution also sets a legal framework for the EU institutions, which means they are to uphold a range of economic and social fundamental rights: the impact on EU politics will be considerable.

However, to some extent, the wording of the Charter’s social provisions happens to be quite vague, and its scope and legal impact are still to be seen. The importance of this second part is clearly limited since it is not meant to create any new competence or task for the EU, insofar as it applies to the EU and Member-States only when they are implementing EU law, and provisions are made “in compliance with EU law and national legislation and practices”. In a way, the Constitution draft is a missed opportunity to do much more for social rights through a stronger and more enforceable Charter of Rights, as its content has been poor from its drafting stage and its actual jurisdictional reach was watered down too much during the negotiation process.

Unfortunately, social rights providing for social security benefits –such as entitlements to a retirement pension, unemployment benefits, or a minimum income- based on systems of collective solidarity are merely “acknowledged and respected”, therefore still not guaranteed on the European level. This brings no additional guarantee for those living in Member-States where they currently exist, and no step forward either for those in countries where they don’t.

Nevertheless, the real impact of the Charter remains difficult to assess, insofar as the Constitution provides for rights in areas in which the Union has no competence, as it is the case for the right to strike. It will hence be up to the EU Court of Justice to determine the real impact of the Charter´s provisions on social rights through judicial intervention and interpretation. Hence, its real impact will not be known until the European Court has heard some test cases.

Indeed, the development of economic and social rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights could be furthered through the interpretation of the European Court of Justice. Some expert lawyers maintain that the scope of the Charter will not be merely restricted to interpreting EU law –according to the doctrines of “direct” and “indirect” effect- and that the European Court will be able to use the Charter in many of its decisions. In the past, the European Court has often produced decisions having regard to the content of the Charter, although it had no legal force yet.

But the hitch is the Court’s interpretation will also take into account the Charter’s frequently repeated phrases indicating that rights are asserted “in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices”, and in this context, EU competition law notably may well interfere with some of the Charter’s social provisions (concerning services of economic general interest, rights at work and so on…). So the European court’s future case-law might as well not foster the protection of collective and individual social rights.

But do the possible advances in the least socially advanced Member-States outweigh the potential negative effects in the most socially advanced, as predicted in several articles collected in this dossier? Will it undermine the possibility for a Sate to freely choose to develop a high level of social protection and, with this purpose, to intervene in domestic economics, possibly against some EU law principles? For sure, the Constitution fails to stand as a strong EU-wide guarantee of a social model providing a high level of protection, and its logic promotes a liberal approach of social matters. The Charter rather enshrines social freedoms than actual entitlements. The final draft is naturally a compromise as much as most international treaties, and certain Member-States were clearly all but ready to accept an enlarged scope of application and a more thorough list of economic and social provisions for the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Of course, the whole analysis rests on the assumption that the Constitution is ratified, which is not precisely due to happen at the moment. The Treaty establishing the Constitution was signed by EU leaders in November 2004, and since then, the Member States have two years to complete ratification procedures. In Britain, France as in some other countries, this will include a referendum, which leaves room for a tough battle between supporters of the constitution and doubters.

LEXICON

Legal terms

▪ French-English

dispositions----------------------------------------- provisions

droits créances (droits à prestation)----------------- rights of provision

droit de requête individuel--------------------------- right of individual application

▪ English-French

adversely affecting---------------------------------- portant atteinte à

field of application----------------------------------- champ d’application

to go to litigation------------------------------------ aller en justice, porter qch en justice

judicially cognisable--------------------------------- invocable devant le juge

principle of legal certainty--------------------------- principe de sécurité du droit / juridique

principle of state liability----------------------------- principe de responsabilité de l’Etat

primary law----------------------------------------- droit primaire

the ruling on the legality (of)------------------------- le contrôle de la légalité (de)

scope (of a right)------------------------------------ portée (d’un droit)

supremacy of EU law------------------------------- primauté du droit de l’Union

Idioms

to bequeath----------------------------------------- léguer

a blueprint (for sth)---------------------------------- une garantie, une recette (de qch)

to bode well/ill (for)--------------------------------- être de bon/mauvais usage (pour)

to buttress------------------------------------------ étayer

a cue------------------------------------------------ signal, réplique, top (ici : « entrée en scène de »?)

to enter the fray------------------------------------- entrer dans l’arène

galling----------------------------------------------- irritant, exaspérant

to have two bites of the cherry---------------------- avoir une seconde chance

to herald-------------------------------------------- annoncer, proclamer

lofty------------------------------------------------- élevé, haut

a magnifying glass----------------------------------- une loupe

portentously----------------------------------------- solennellement, pompeusement

a raft (of)------------------------------------------- une montagne, une foule (de)

to ratchet up---------------------------------------- enclencher

a sleight of hand------------------------------------- un tour de passe-passe, un tour de prestidigitation

a spur (for)------------------------------------------ une impulsion, un élément stimulant (pour)

to thrash stg out------------------------------------- discuter en détail, débattre de qch

a touchstone---------------------------------------- une pierre de touche ??

unploughed----------------------------------------- vierge, non cultivé

REFERENCE TEXTS

TEXT 1

THE DRAFT EU CONSTITUTION

IGC 87/04

PART II

CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PREAMBLE

The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values.

Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.

The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, services, goods and capital, and the freedom of establishment.

To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter.

This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights.

In this context the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States with due regard to the explanations prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter and updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention.

Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations.

The Union therefore recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out hereafter.

[…]

TITLE II

FREEDOMS

Article II-66 (ex 6): Right to liberty and security

Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

Article II-67 (ex 7): Respect for private and family life

Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.

Article II-68 (ex 8): Protection of personal data

1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.

2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.

3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.

Article II-69 (ex 9): Right to marry and right to found a family

The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.

Article II-70 (ex 10): Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right.

Article II-71 (ex 11): Freedom of expression and information

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.

Article II-72 (ex 12): Freedom of assembly and of association

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests.

2. Political parties at Union level contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.

Article II-73 (ex 13): Freedom of the arts and sciences

The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.

Article II-74 (ex 14): Right to education

1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training.

2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory education.

3. The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.

Article II-75 (ex 15): Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work

1. Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation.

2. Every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State.

3. Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.

Article II-76 (ex 16): Freedom to conduct a business

The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised.

Article II-77 (ex17): Right to property

1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law insofar as is necessary for the general interest.

2. Intellectual property shall be protected.

Article II-78 (ex 18): Right to asylum

The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Constitution.

Article II-79 (ex 19): Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition

1. Collective expulsions are prohibited.

2. No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

TITLE III:

EQUALITY

Article II-80 (ex 20): Equality before the law

Everyone is equal before the law.

Article II-81 (ex 21): Non-discrimination

1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.

2. Within the scope of application of the Constitution and without prejudice to any of its specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.

Article II-82 (ex 22): Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity

The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.

Article II-83 (ex 23): Equality between women and men

Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay.

The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under- represented sex.

Article II-84 (ex 24): The rights of the child

1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity.

2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration.

3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.

Article II-85 (ex 25): The rights of the elderly

The Union recognises and respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life.

Article II-86 (ex 26): Integration of persons with disabilities

The Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community.

TITLE IV:

SOLIDARITY

Article II-87 (ex 27): Workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking

Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.

Article II-88 (ex 28): Right of collective bargaining and action

Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.

Article II-89 (ex 29): Right of access to placement services

Everyone has the right of access to a free placement service.

Article II-90 (ex 30): Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal

Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.

Article II-91 (ex 31): Fair and just working conditions

1. Every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity.

2. Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave.

Article II-92 (ex 32): Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work

The employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to employment may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules as may be more favourable to young people and except for limited derogations.

Young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education.

Article II-93 (ex 33): Family and professional life

1. The family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection.

2. To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child.

Article II-94 (ex 34): Social security and social assistance

1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.

2. Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.

3. In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices

Article II-95 (ex 35): Health care

Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.

Article II-96 (ex 36): Access to services of general economic interest

The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Constitution, in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union.

Article II-97 (ex 37): Environmental protection

A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.

Article II-98 (ex 38): Consumer protection

Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection.

[…]

TITLE VII:

GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER

Article II-111 (ex 51): Field of application

1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the other Parts of the Constitution.

2. This Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined in the other Parts of the Constitution.

Article II-112(ex 52): Scope and interpretation of rights and principles

1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

2. Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in other Parts of the Constitution shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by these relevant Parts.

3. Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.

4. Insofar as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.

5. The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.

6. Full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter.

7. The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States.

Article II-113 (ex 53): Level of protection

Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions.

Article II-114 (ex 54): Prohibition of abuse of rights

Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for herein.

TEXT 2

http://www.commission-droits-homme.fr/binInfoGeneFr/affichageDepeche.cfm?iIdDepeche=96

Lettre sur le projet de Constitution de l'Union européenne

(le 08 juillet 2003)

Le Président Joël Thoraval a adressé une lettre le 8 juillet 2003 portant sur le projet de Constitution de l'Union européenne au Premier Ministre et aux ministres concernés. Le contenu de cette lettre a été décidé par l'assemblée plénière de la CNCDH du 3 juillet 2003

________________________________

Paris, le 8 juillet 2003

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

L’assemblée plénière de la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH), réunie le 3 juillet, a débattu de la place des droits fondamentaux dans la future Constitution européenne. La CNCDH a en effet toujours attaché une grande importance à cette question. Elle s'était notamment prononcée sur la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne, dans un avis du 21 septembre 2000, avant de participer à la consultation nationale sur l'avenir de l'Europe, avec son avis du 23 novembre 2001. Elle a également adopté le 27 mars 2003, un avis sur les travaux de la Convention pour l'avenir de l'Europe.

La CNCDH se félicite du succès de la Convention. Mais, en l’état actuel des textes, la Commission estime nécessaire d’attirer votre attention sur deux modifications importantes de la Charte des droits fondamentaux introduites par le projet de Constitution qui suscitent une très forte inquiétude de sa part.

La première modification a trait aux « droits sociaux ». Ceux-ci ont constitué le principal point de discussion lors de l’élaboration de la Charte. Discussions qui s’étaient soldées par un compromis résidant dans la distinction entre « droits » et « principes », aujourd’hui remis en cause. Le compromis retenu consistait à admettre que les droits sociaux ne sauraient être affaiblis par des mesures globales restrictives. Ainsi, dans l’esprit des rédacteurs de la Charte, les principes avaient la valeur de droits fondamentaux au même titre que les droits proprement dits : selon l’article 51 de la Charte, l’Union et les États membres « respectent les droits, observent les principes et en promeuvent l’application ».

Or, cette formule se retrouve dans le projet de Constitution mais l’article 52, beaucoup plus développé, accentue la différence entre « droits » et « principes ». Selon l’alinéa 5, « les dispositions de la présente Charte qui contiennent des principes peuvent être mises en œuvre par des actes législatifs et exécutifs ». Ainsi il n’est pas indiqué que l’Union et les États membres se doivent de les mettre en œuvre à l’instar de l’article 51 de la Charte.

Quant à l’alinéa 6, il vient renforcer les restrictions déjà si présentes dans la Charte : « les législations et pratiques nationales doivent être pleinement prises en compte comme précisé dans la présente Charte ».

La CNCDH est d’avis que ces modifications, loin d’être marginales, risquent de vider la Charte de son contenu social et par conséquent de son utilité, au regard des droits déjà reconnus par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

La seconde modification a trait à la question de « l’héritage religieux ». La CNCDH a déjà eu l’occasion de se prononcer sur cette question dans son avis du 21 septembre 2000 où elle estimait que « la référence à un ‘héritage’ notamment religieux […] risqu[ait] d’apparaître comme une marque de rejet et un facteur de discrimination allant ainsi à l’encontre d’un projet fondé sur les valeurs qui sont le patrimoine commun de l’humanité ». Finalement, la formule retenue par la Charte, était celle empruntée au Statut du Conseil de l’Europe : « le patrimoine spirituel et moral de l’Europe ».

Cette formule n’est pas directement remise en cause par le projet de Constitution puisque le préambule de la Charte y a été inséré tel quel. Mais le projet de Constitution contient également son propre préambule dans lequel le mot « religieux » fait sa réapparition : « s’inspirant des héritages culturels, religieux et humanistes de l’Europe, dont les valeurs, toujours présentes dans son patrimoine, ont ancré dans la vie de la société sa perception du rôle central de la personne humaine et de ses droits inviolables et inaliénables, ainsi que du respect du droit ». Ainsi les deux préambules coexistent dans le même texte ce qui nonobstant leur différence risque d’engendrer un problème d’interprétation de la Constitution.

La CNCDH espère vivement que ces difficultés et ces imprécisions ne conduisent pas à mettre en péril la laïcité de l’Europe, fondée sur la séparation du politique et du religieux. Dans son avis de mars 2003, la CNCDH avait rappelé que « les principes de laïcité, de tolérance et de pluralisme […] sont constitutifs de la liberté de conscience et de religion pour tous, dans le respect des convictions de chacun ». Là encore, l’équilibre sur lequel reposait la Charte, qui ne mentionnait ni la laïcité ni l’héritage religieux, se trouverait rompu si le projet de Constitution était adopté en l’état.

En conclusion, la CNCDH espère vivement que ces préoccupations sur ces deux questions de principe seront pleinement prises en compte lors des négociations qui auront lieu dans le cadre de la Conférence intergouvernementale.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, à l’assurance de ma haute considération.

Joël THORAVAL

TEXT 3

http://www.humanite.presse.fr/journal/2004-10-25/index7069.html

Article paru dans l'édition du 25 octobre 2004 de l’Humanité

constitution européenne

« Une conception des droits purement libérale »

Entretien avec Serge Regourd, professeur de droit public à l’université de Toulouse-I.

L’intégration de la charte des droits fondamentaux dans le projet de constitution européenne fait-elle avancer les droits et libertés pour les citoyens de l’Union ?

Serge Regourd. La réponse est clairement non. Pour une raison très simple : l’ensemble des pays membres de l’Union européenne sont membres par ailleurs du Conseil de l’Europe. Dans le cadre de ce Conseil, a été conclue en 1950 une convention très importante : la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme. La France a ratifié ce texte en 1974. Cette convention consacre un large périmètre de droits et libertés et institue de plus un « droit de requête individuel ». Cela signifie que les ressortissants des états membres ont la possibilité de recourir directement à la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, dès lors qu’ils considèrent que leurs droits et libertés ne sont pas respectés dans leurs pays.

Cette charte apporte-t-elle un « plus » par rapport à cette convention européenne des droits de l’homme ?

Serge Regourd. Non. Sur le terrain des droits et libertés dont les citoyens ne jouiraient pas jusqu’à maintenant, cette charte n’ajoute rien.

Nous sommes aujourd’hui dans un système de garantie des droits fondamentaux, des droits civils et politiques qui est très supérieur à ce que propose la charte des droits fondamentaux.

Encore une fois, l’ensemble des États membres de l’UE relèvent d’un régime de droits et libertés dans le cadre du conseil de l’Europe et de la procédure devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Ce régime va bien au-delà de ce que prévoit cette charte des droits fondamentaux.

La convention européenne des droits de l’homme énumère l’ensemble des droits et libertés concevables et revendiqués. Le périmètre des droits et liberté qu’elle définit est quasi « complet », en tout cas dans une démocratie libérale. Ces droits bénéficient d’une procédure de garantie, de protection exceptionnelle. C’est pratiquement le seul cas dans lequel une personne privée peut saisir directement les instances du Conseil de l’Europe, lorsqu’elle considère que les juridictions nationales n’ont pas respecté ses droits et libertés.

Au mieux, la charte des droits fondamentaux pourrait s’aligner sur l’état actuel du droit, ce qu’elle ne fait pas. Il existe un rideau de fumée autour de cette charte. Concrètement, dans la meilleure hypothèse, pour chacun des citoyens concernés, elle n’apporte strictement rien.

Que dire alors de la reconnaissance du droit de grève, de négociation collective ?

Serge Regourd. Ces droits sont énoncés dans la charte pour être aussitôt renvoyés aux « pratiques et législations nationales ». C’est ahurissant.

En France, comme dans d’autres États membres, le droit de grève et les libertés syndicales relèvent d’un statut constitutionnel parfaitement garanti. Il existe en France une jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel qui est garante de la liberté syndicale et du droit de grève. Ces libertés ont aujourd’hui une valeur constitutionnelle, au même titre que les grandes libertés fondamentales dans la plupart des États membres.

Du point de vue des droits sociaux, les partisans du « oui » au traité constitutionnel font valoir l’idée selon laquelle le texte, et précisément la charte, ne contiennent que des avancées, et pas de reculs. Quelle est votre appréciation ?

Serge Regourd. Il existe plusieurs générations de droits et libertés. La première génération est incarnée par la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789, qui a valeur constitutionnelle en France. Ce sont des droits d’ordre politique et strictement individuels.

La deuxième génération de droits recouvre les droits économiques et sociaux. En France, ils sont institués au sortir de la guerre, et sont incarnés par le préambule de la Constitution de 1946. Ce préambule a lui aussi valeur constitutionnelle. À bien des égards, ces droits se définissent comme des « droits créances ». On considère que le citoyen a des droits, parce qu’il a une créance à l’égard de l’État, et que celui-ci va concrètement organiser la réalisation de ces droits. On peut prendre l’exemple des dispositions concernant le droit au travail dans le préambule de 1946. Le droit au travail est proclamé. Il n’est pas respecté de fait avec le niveau de chômage qui existe dans notre société. Mais il est respecté indirectement, dans la mesure où l’État met en place des dispositifs pour garantir la protection de ceux qui sont privés de travail : indemnisations chômage, prestations de type ANPE pour aider les travailleurs à trouver un emploi, etc. Le droit au travail est proclamé, et si concrètement la société n’arrive pas à faire respecter ce droit pour tous, l’État est obligé d’inventer des dispositifs de réparation.

Avec ce projet de constitution, cette conception des « droits créances » est remise en cause. Les droits ne sont plus conçus en termes de garanties, ou de prestations à la charge de la collectivité publique et dont celle-ci doit assurer la réalisation au bénéfice des citoyens, mais comme de simples facultés que les individus peuvent éventuellement mettre en oeuvre selon une logique libérale.

Le droit au travail est ici remplacé par le « droit de travailler » et « la liberté de rechercher un emploi ». Cette conception est la plus libérale que l’on puisse imaginer. C’est un recul considérable : on sort de la conception de libertés, des « droits-créances » pour aller vers une conception purement libérale. Cela signifie : « que chacun se débrouille, libre à lui s’il le souhaite de rechercher un emploi ». Quand on a dit ça, on n’a strictement rien dit. Il ne manquerait plus que l’on ne puisse plus chercher un travail.

Lorsqu’il est question dans la charte d’un « droit d’accès à des prestations de Sécurité sociale », on sort également du périmètre de ce que vous appeler les « droits créances ». Quelles peuvent être les conséquences concrètes d’une telle formulation ?

Serge Regourd. En France, l’ordonnance de 1945 qui crée et organise la Sécurité sociale en tant que service public relève de la même génération de droits de l’homme.

Dans le cadre de ce que l’on a appelé en France la logique du « pacte républicain », une majorité était d’accord pour soustraire un certain nombre d’activités à la logique du marché et du profit. Ce fut le cas pour la Sécurité sociale et ses différents régimes.

Ce projet de constitution européenne promeut une logique inverse. Le service public est considéré par ce texte comme relevant d’une logique purement dérogatoire.

Dans le domaine des questions sociales, même si ce n’est pas dit clairement, on pourra considérer que les assurances privées seront la norme. Et ce n’est que dans les cas où le marché d’initiative privée se révélerait totalement inadéquat que l’on pourrait réintroduire des logiques de service public, mais de manière strictement dérogatoire et exceptionnelle.

Évidemment, il n’est jamais dit que la Sécurité sociale doit être démantelée pour tout remettre aux assurances privées. Mais si l’on replace la charte dans le cadre global du projet de constitution, on est en droit de redouter que les logiques de services publics, dont le support est une conception de « droits créances » soient totalement remises en cause au profit de prestations privées.

L’inscription, dès le préambule de la charte, du principe de « libre circulation des biens et des capitaux », signifie-t-elle la subordination des droits fondamentaux à ce principe ?

Serge Regourd. C’est la première fois que des dispositions à tonalité strictement économique, marchande, commerciale, sont inscrites dans un texte constitutionnel et deviennent des normes juridiques, des dispositifs constitutionnels. Il n’est donc pas absurde de s’interroger quant aux conséquences du principe constitutionnel de « marché où la concurrence est libre et non faussée » sur l’état global du droit social.

TEXT 4

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4?id=1573&lang=4&m=series

Une suggestion pour améliorer la Constitution européenne

par Georges de Ménil

La perspective de multiples référendums sur la Constitution de l'Union européenne a considérablement modifié ses chances de ratification. Tant les europhiles que les eurocrates tremblent à l'idée qu'un rejet par plusieurs Etats membres, notamment les pays les plus importants, n'enterre le projet, auquel cas l'UE devra se débrouiller avec le Traité de Nice. Mais si les protagonistes font preuve de patience, le souffle de la démocratie pourrait favoriser l'émergence d'une Constitution plus solide, sans le risque d'un cauchemar économique et juridique que certains aspects du projet actuel laissent entrevoir.

L'UE doit rapidement démocratiser ses procédures et réorganiser ses institutions pour que l'élargissement qui vient d'avoir lieu ne conduise pas à une impasse bureaucratique. Le projet de Constitution comporte des solutions acceptables à nombre de questions de gouvernance. Auparavant, le chapitre social ne figurait que dans la liste des bonnes intentions. Son élévation au statut de droit constitutionnel fondamental risque d'entraîner les travailleurs et les entreprises des Etats membres à se débattre dans de lourdes démarches administratives et de les confronter à l'application de droits sociaux coûteux, conçus par les juges du Luxembourg dont la décision est sans appel.

L'inclusion dans la partie II du projet des "droits sociaux" tels que celui de ne pas être injustement licencié ou celui de recevoir une retraite, des indemnités de chômage et une assurance maladie (quel qu'en soit le coût) n'est pourtant en aucune façon nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de l'édifice. Ces mesures sont sans doute dignes d'éloge, mais elles ont un coût.

Le terme même de "droits sociaux" ne convient pas. Si quelque chose est un "droit", on ne discute pas son coût ; ainsi, on ne va pas discuter du coût économique de la défense de la liberté d'expression. Par contre, le versement d'une retraite d'un niveau conséquent ne peut être dissocié de son coût pour le contribuable.

C'est aux parlementaires de légiférer sur la protection sociale, car ils sont bien placés pour en évaluer l'intérêt pour leurs électeurs. Les plus fervents défenseurs du droit à une assurance maladie généralisée doivent admettre que le lieu pour présenter leur projet est le Parlement et non pas la Cour européenne de justice. Ces droits n'ont pas leur place dans une Constitution, notamment dans une Constitution qui ne peut être amendée facilement.

Ce n'est pas parce que certains "droits sociaux" sont parvenus à s'introduire dans quelques Constitutions nationales de pays européens qu'il faut les imposer à l'ensemble de l'Union, comme le fait le projet de Constitution actuel. Il est à noter que dans les pays scandinaves qui ont l'une des meilleures protections sociales du continent, ils sont fixés par des lois votées par le législateur et non par une Cour fixant des "droits" constitutionnels. Ce sont des dividendes sociaux alloués par les parlements nationaux en fonction de la croissance économique réelle.

En France, tant à droite qu'à gauche, les défenseurs de la Constitution européenne haussent les épaules en arguant que l'inclusion du chapitre social dans le projet de Constitution est un compromis. Les "droits sociaux" de la partie II sont considérés comme une compensation accordée aux électeurs de gauche en échange de l'introduction de la "concurrence" dans la partie I du projet à titre d'objectif fondamental de l'Union. Mais ni l'un ni l'autre n'ont leur place dans la Constitution. Les monopoles naturels sont parfois économiquement souhaitables, mais c'est au législateur et non aux juges de décider dans quelles conditions on peut les autoriser.

Depuis une décennie, la Grande-Bretagne résiste pratiquement toute seule contre l'élargissement du chapitre social. Le gouvernement Blair a accepté que ses dispositions soient incluses dans le corps du texte élaboré par la Convention, tout en demandant que la formulation en limite la portée.

Malheureusement le garde-fou britannique ne fonctionne pas. Selon l'article II-52 du projet, les droits fondamentaux reconnus par la Constitution (qui comprennent douze "droits sociaux") s'appliquent seulement aux actes de l'Union et des Etats membres lorsqu'ils mettent en œuvre le droit de l'Union. Mais avec l'élargissement, ces décisions vont devenir envahissantes. A titre d'exemple, si les directives sur l'environnement entraînent la fermeture d'une usine polluante en Grande-Bretagne, la Constitution donnerait le droit aux syndicats de recourir à la justice à cause des licenciements qui en résulteront.

Heureusement, on peut pallier l'insuffisance de l'initiative britannique sans mettre en danger le projet. La solution la plus simple serait de supprimer les droits fondamentaux de la partie II du texte et de leur donner le même statut que le chapitre social du traité d'Amsterdam : une déclaration d'intention annexée au Traité. Tous les droits individuels traditionnels figurent déjà dans la Déclaration des droits de l'homme sur l'application desquels veille la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme de Strasbourg.

Les "droits sociaux" ne relèvent pas des juges, ils devraient rester l'affaire du législateur. S'il faut un compromis politique, alors la "concurrence" ne devrait plus être inscrite en tant qu'un objectif fondamental de l'Union. La libre circulation des biens, des services, de la main d'œuvre et des capitaux suffit largement.

Si cette solution, sans doute la plus adéquate, n'est pas acceptable, on pourrait modifier l'article II-52 pour qu'il stipule clairement que les douze "droits sociaux" de la partie II s'appliquent à l'Union, mais pas aux Etats membres, même lorsqu'ils mettent en œuvre le droit de l'Union. Si l'Union décide, ainsi qu'elle en a le droit, que tous les Etats membres doivent garantir l'accès aux soins des chômeurs, ce serait aux parlements nationaux et non aux 25 juges du Luxembourg d'en décider les modalités. Cela permettrait d'affaiblir les directives de l'Union en matière sociale et donnerait plus de force au principe de subsidiarité.

En supprimant du projet de Constitution la perspective d'un Etat providence régi par des juges, ses concepteurs augmenteront les chances qu'au bout du compte la mouture finale soit ratifiée par la Grande-Bretagne et les autres critiques du projet.

Mai 2004

Georges de Ménil est professeur d'économie à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales de Paris.

TEXT 5

www.tuc.org.uk/euconstitution/tuc-8562-f0.cfm

EU constitutional treaty

The trade union movement and the European constitution

An analysis by Professor Brian Bercusson, King’s College, University of London, of the outcome of the Inter-Governmental Conference held on 17-18 June 2004

Disclaimer

This report was produced for the TUC by Professor Bercusson. It is not a statement of TUC policy.

Contents

Ø Executive summary

Ø The economic, political and social integration of Europe

Ø The UK trade union movement and the EU Constitution

Ø The small print: legal effects of the EU Charter

Executive summary

The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe adopted on 18 June 2004 is the culmination of an historical process of European integration. It is important to understand the significance of its being a 'constitution'.

Despite the rearguard battles of UK governments since 1979, the EU has developed a 'social model' key elements of which are enshrined in the EU Constitution. One fundamental quality underpins its value as far as the EU, and the UK in particular, is concerned. As a Constitution, it fixes near enough in stone the underlying values, objectives and policies of the EU. Once (and if) the EU Constitution is ratified, the UK and the other Member States will be committed to a 'social model' which was the achievement of generations of struggle. The EU Constitution locks the UK (and other) governments into a European social model.

The EU model of employment and industrial relations is determined by the organisational forms of workers and employers at EU and national levels; specifically, their interactions in a variety of ways and at different levels, often characterised as 'social partnership'. Perhaps the most familiar is collective bargaining between an employer and a union at sectoral level in most countries, though also at company or enterprise level. But in the EU, this is only one of three institutional forms of interaction. The other two are processes at national level (macro-level) and at the workplace (micro-level). It is the existence of all three levels and their inter-relationship which define the specific character of the European model of employment and industrial relations.

Critical to the success of this specific EU model of employment and industrial relations is collective organisation in the form of collective organisations of workers and employers, the central actors in a 'social partnership' model. This defining feature of the European model implies substantial trade union membership, a pre-condition for the emergence of social partnership.

The European Constitution includes provisions which lay the foundation for the European social model. Part I of the draft Constitutional Treaty, Title VI: 'The Democratic Life of the Union', includes:

Article I-47: The social partners and autonomous social dialogue

'The European Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at Union level, taking into account the diversity of national systems; it shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy. The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment shall contribute to social dialogue'.

As important as these institutional safeguards of the social partners in the European social model are the rights enshrined in Part II of the Constitution, the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

There is a general consensus that perhaps the most important quality of the EU Charter is that it breaks new ground by including in a single list of fundamental rights not only traditional civil and political rights, but also a long list of social and economic rights. The EU Charter includes provisions, among them fundamental trade union rights, which are at the heart of labour law in Europe. [1]

The Charter would be part of a European constitution with potentially powerful legal effects, including direct effect and supremacy. The incorporation of the EU Charter into the primary constitutional law of the EU will have an impact on the Member States, bound by the Charter through the doctrine of supremacy of EU law.

Two specific methods of using the EU Charter to deliver rights at work may be indicated: (i) as an independent legal source of rights at work (e.g. through the doctrines of 'direct' and 'indirect' effect); (ii) as a basis for challenging national law which incorrectly or inadequately transposes EU law providing rights at work.

From the beginning, the New Labour government undertook a campaign to dilute so far as possible the content and, in particular, the potential legal effects of the EU Charter as regards its social content.

The Convention on the Future of Europe made a number of 'adjustments' to the EU Charter. One was inserted by the Praesidium of the Convention in the Preamble to the EU Charter:

'The Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States [2] with due regard for the explanations prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter'.

The Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the EU Charter submitted a final text of 28 September 2000, accompanied by another explanatory text of 11 October 2000, to the European Council at Biarritz on 13-14 October 2000. This latter document comprised 'explanations' to accompany the text of the Charter. These explanations were unambiguously not drafted or approved by the Convention which prepared the Charter, a fact repeatedly emphasised by the Praesidium itself. The EU’s website reproduces the Charter alongside these explanations of the Praesidium. There it is stated categorically twice in footnotes to the text of the Charter:

'These explanations have been prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium. They have no legal value and are simply intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter'.

The 'adjustment' made to the Charter’s Preamble appears intended to attribute a legal value to the explanations disclaimed by their authors.

The European Council summit meeting on 17-18 June 2004 to decide on the draft EU Constitution was the last ditch attempt by the New Labour government to water down the labour standards and trade union rights in the EU Charter.

The final outcome was that the Preamble to the EU Charter was amended adding to the above amendment: 'and updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention'. Moreover, there was added another paragraph 7 to Article II-52 of the EU Charter (Scope and interpretation of rights and principles):

'The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States'.

This outcome seems, contrary to the attempts by the UK government, if anything to have diluted the legal force of the explanations. The additional sentence added to the Preamble by the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe was quite strong: "...the Charter will be interpreted... with due regard for the explanations...". In comparison, the new Article II-52(7) added by the IGC seems weaker: "The explanations... providing guidance in the interpretation... shall be given due regard...". So "will be interpreted" becomes "shall be given due regard". Article II-52(7) takes precedence over the Preamble. Moreover, the text of new Article II-52(7) of the Charter makes no reference to the updated explanations.

The aftermath of the European Council summit of 17-18 June reflected the habitual spin tactics adopted by the New Labour government. In his press conference of 18 June 2004 at the end of the meeting, Tony Blair announced:

'…the Charter of Rights is expressed specifically in such a way that it means that the industrial relations law of our country cannot be altered by the European Court of Justice through the Charter of Fundamental Rights'.

Whatever the impact of the spinning exercise in the domestic context of public opinion in the UK, and its consequences for the referendum, it is unlikely to influence opinion outside UK political circles, even less so in the courts of the UK when the Charter is invoked, and least of all in the most important forum deciding the legal effect of the Charter: the European Court of Justice.

On the last day of the European Council summit the Financial Times of 18 June 2004 (p. 6) reported an interview with the President of the European Court of Justice, Vassilios Skouris. The report quoted the judge as saying that the draft constitution 'will bring new areas and new subjects under the court’s jurisdiction', such as the charter. The report continued:

'Mr Skouris also called for the charter on fundamental rights to be made legally binding within the constitution - a move EU leaders are likely to make today.

‘A complete catalogue of fundamental rights will simplify things in the interest of legal certainty’, he said. The UK has been considering a compromise to the constitution text that could give the charter legal force over EU institutions but not over national laws. However, many lawyers doubt if the legal impact of the charter can be ringfenced in this way. Mr. Skouris could not give assurances that the charter would not have an impact on UK law'. [3]

The attempt by the New Labour government to 'protect' the UK’s restrictive labour laws from the fundamental rights proclaimed in the European Constitution failed. The fallback of reliance on the 'explanations' to mitigate the consequences of the Charter is similarly unlikely to have the effect desired. There will be no 'protecting' UK labour laws, frequently condemned by the supervisory bodies of the ILO and the Council of Europe for violations of international labour standards, from the impact of the fundamental trade union rights guaranteed by the EU Charter.

The economic, political and social integration of Europe

The EU Constitution is the latest in a long line of Treaties defining the legal framework for the integration of Europe.

The legal form of this integration began with the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty in 1957. As its title indicates, the legal framework of the EEC Treaty aimed primarily, if not exclusively, at European economic integration. For workers, this was closely limited to free movement among the Member States making up the common market.

This focus on a particularly narrow view of economic integration in terms of a common market was always contested. The legal framework of the EEC Treaty was first changed by the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, in which the '1992 Programme' sought to make the 'Single European Market' more effective, but also extended the social content of the market to include, importantly, health and safety of workers. The attempt to adopt a more comprehensive framework for labour and social protection in the EC was reflected in the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989, which was adopted by all Member States except for the UK.

It was the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 which transformed the common market conception of the EC into a political and social entity: the EU. The TEU enormously expanded the social competences of the EU to include individual employment protection (e.g. regulation of working conditions), and collective labour rights (e.g. information and consultation). It also specified a formal procedure guaranteeing a role for the social dialogue between the EU social partners in making these regulations. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 took up the growing concern with the high levels of unemployment during the 1980s and 1990s and inserted a new Employment Title into the Treaty, expanding the role of the EU in the employment policies of the Member States. At the European Council summit at Nice in December 2000, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including fundamental rights of labour, was proclaimed.

The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe adopted on 18 June 2004 is the culmination of this historical process of European integration. It is important to understand how it changes the existing Treaties, and the significance of its being a 'constitution'

Since 1979, for the past 25 years, a quarter of a century, British governments have provided the most consistent and effective opposition to the extension of rights for workers and trade unions in the EU’s legal framework. Despite this, it is important to realise that UK governments have not completely succeeded in preventing the EU from extending rights to workers and trade unions.

Despite the rearguard battles of UK governments since 1979, the EU has developed a 'social model' key elements of which are enshrined in the EU Constitution. One fundamental quality underpins its value as far as the EU, and the UK in particular, is concerned. As a Constitution, it fixes near enough in stone the underlying values, objectives and policies of the EU.

This has been an overlooked quality of EU labour regulation. However much the UK (but also other Member States) fought to resist EU labour standards, once these were adopted it was almost impossible to repeal them or regress from them. Now the EU Constitution makes these and other gains as near permanent as can be.

Once (and if) the EU Constitution is ratified, the UK and the other Member States will be committed to a 'social model' which was the achievement of generations of struggle. Just as no future Conservative (or New Labour government) can take away labour rights in Directives, the EU Constitution locks the UK (and other) governments into a European social model. It makes it less easy to give in to the pressures of globalisation and some politicians’ inclinations towards liberalisation of markets at the expense of workers and others. The EU Constitution formally binds EU Member States to fundamental social values, labour standards, employment rights and trade union freedoms.

The trade union movement should campaign in favour of the European social model by supporting ratification by Member States of the EU Constitution, and then making sure they respect it in practice.

The UK trade union movement and the EU constitution

By proclaiming hostility to EU employment rights for workers, the New Labour government has gone out of its way to make it difficult for the British trade union movement to support the EU Constitution. Outraged reaction by trade union leaders is the understandable and justifiable response (Derek Simpson and Tony Woodley in the Guardian, 30 June 2004; Brendan Barber and John Monks in Tribune, 25 June 2004).

There are good reasons for supporting the EU Constitution, not because of, but despite the claims of the New Labour government. These reasons emerge when the general claims for the EU Constitution are examined, and the small print is scrutinised.

Two general claims will be examined:

• the EU Constitution lays the foundation for a European social model;

• the specific contribution of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Part II of the Constitution.

The New Labour government asserts that the small print of amendments it promoted, not least at the Intergovernmental Conference of 17-18 June 2004, will 'protect' the UK’s low labour standards. This small print will be scrutinised.

A. The European Constitution and the European Social Model

The European social model embodied in the EU Constitution is of central importance not least because of the clear contrast it presents compared to the American experience. While there may be no or little military competition in a uni-polar world dominated by the USA, the economic [4] and political stature of the EU makes the European economic and social model the subject of considerable attention elsewhere.

The EU model of employment and industrial relations is determined by the organisational forms of workers and employers at EU and national levels; specifically, their interactions in a variety of ways and at different levels, often characterised as 'social partnership'. Perhaps the most familiar is collective bargaining between an employer and a union at sectoral level in most countries, though also at company or enterprise level. But in the EU, this is only one of three institutional forms of interaction. The other two are processes at national level (macro-level) and at the workplace (micro-level). It is the existence of all three levels and their inter-relationship which define the specific character of the European model of employment and industrial relations.

Contrasting the presence and role of trade unions and workers' representative organisations in the USA with European experience illustrates the singularity of the European model of employment and industrial relations. Its manifestation, in all its diversity, at both EU and Member State levels, in the form of macro-level national dialogue, collective bargaining at intersectoral and sectoral levels, and collective participation in decision-making at the workplace is the most salient quality distinguishing the European model of employment and industrial relations.

Critical to the success of this specific EU model of employment and industrial relations is collective organisation in the form of collective organisations of workers and employers, the central actors in a 'social partnership' model. This defining feature of the European model implies substantial trade union membership, a pre-condition for the emergence of social partnership.

The European Constitution includes provisions which lay the foundation for the European social model. Part I of the draft Constitutional Treaty, Title VI: 'The Democratic Life of the Union', includes:

Article I-47: The social partners and autonomous social dialogue

'The European Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at Union level, taking into account the diversity of national systems; it shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy. The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment shall contribute to social dialogue'.

As important as these institutional safeguards of the social partners in the European social model are the rights enshrined in Part II of the Constitution, the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

B. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The legal context of the Charter: social rights are fundamental rights

There is a general consensus that perhaps the most important quality of the EU Charter is that it breaks new ground by including in a single list of fundamental rights not only traditional civil and political rights, but also a long list of social and economic rights.

The EU Charter includes provisions, among them fundamental trade union rights, which are at the heart of labour law in Europe. [5] It has the potential to renew labour law in the Member States and at EU level. [6] The Charter has already been cited in over 50 cases before the European courts. The potential of the trade union and labour rights in the EU Charter will be apparent when they are compared with Member State laws which restrict or inhibit the rights of workers and their representatives to information and consultation (Article 27), to join trade unions (Article 12) and to have unions recognised for the purposes of collective bargaining, and to take strike action (Article 28).

Legal effects of the EU Charter as part of the EU Constitution

What are the potential legal effects of the EU Charter as part of the EU Constitution?

First, as with equal pay for men and women (Article 141 EC), the European Court of Justice could attribute binding direct effect to those provisions of the Charter which were considered sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.

Secondly, the European Court of Justice has developed the doctrine of indirect effect, which requires national courts to interpret national laws consistently with EC law. This doctrine would apply with great force to the rights guaranteed in a Charter incorporated into the Treaty.

Thirdly, the violation by a Member State of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Charter in the Treaty would very likely constitute a breach of EU law giving rise to the principle of State liability developed by the European Court.

A minimum standard is not the lowest standard. The European Court’s formulation of fundamental rights need not adopt the lowest common denominator or minimum standard.

A standard common to the Member States. Instead, interpretation of the fundamental trade union and labour rights in the EU Charter will look to the legal and constitutional practices protecting these rights in the laws of the Member States. The Court's approach should be to adopt a formulation which includes fundamental trade union rights recognised in all, or a majority of Member States.

International labour standards. The European Court of Justice would also be able to draw upon a range of sources, including international law, in particular, ILO Conventions and Council of Europe measures.

The role of the European Court of Justice

The Charter would be part of a European constitution with potentially powerful legal effects, including direct effect and supremacy. The European Court of Justice becomes a central player in the enforcement of the EU Charter. The Court will decide disputes where Member States are charged with failing to implement, or allegedly violating rights in the EU Charter.

The incorporation of the EU Charter into the primary constitutional law of the EU will have an impact on the Member States, bound by the Charter through the doctrine of supremacy of EU law.

Two specific methods of using the EU Charter to deliver rights at work may be indicated: (i) as an independent legal source of rights at work (e.g. through the doctrines of 'direct' and 'indirect' effect); (ii) as a basis for challenging national law which incorrectly or inadequately transposes EU law providing rights at work.

An example of its potential is the use of Article 31(2) of the Charter in the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-173/99 (BECTU), a complaint against the UK’s implementation of the Working Time Directive as regards the provisions for paid annual leave. Upholding the complaint, he stated that in interpreting the directive: [7] ‘the relevant statements of the Charter cannot be ignored; in particular, we cannot ignore its clear purpose of serving, where its provisions so allow, as a substantive point of reference for all those involved -- Member States, institutions, natural and legal persons -- in the Community context. Accordingly, I consider that the Charter provides us with the most reliable and definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to paid annual leave constitutes a fundamental right’.

The small print: legal effects of the EU Charter

From the beginning, the New Labour government undertook a campaign to dilute so far as possible the content and, in particular, the potential legal effects of the EU Charter as regards its social content. The persistence of this campaign is a testament, albeit a shameful one, to the New Labour government’s determination to try to prevent labour standards and trade union rights being incorporated into the EU Constitution.

The Convention on the Future of Europe established a Working Group II on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Final Report of Working Group II [8] recommended that the EU Charter be integrated into the Treaty. However, the Charter was incorporated with certain 'drafting adjustments' given in Working Group II's final report), though that report insisted that these adjustments 'do not reflect modifications of substance'. Despite this claim, there is no doubt that the proposed 'adjustments' were intended in particular to attack the social rights in the Charter. One example is the "adjustment" in the form of an additional paragraph added to Article 52 (now Article II-52(5) of the Constitution):

"The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by the institutions and bodies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality".

This provision aims to prevent "principles" being interpreted in future as containing elements of positive rights for individuals. The language of the Charter uses the word "rights". By asserting that "principles" are different, the Working Group aimed to open the door to transforming some "rights" into mere "principles".

However, the "adjustment" may not have the effect claimed for it. In particular, many of the provisions in Chapter IV ("Solidarity") of the Charter, Articles 27-38 (including Article 27: Workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking, and Article 28: Right to collective bargaining and action) are formulated as rights, not principles.

The Convention on the Future of Europe made another 'adjustment' to the EU Charter, one not proposed by Working Group II, but inserted by the Praesidium of the Convention in the Preamble to the EU Charter:

'The Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States [9] with due regard for the explanations prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter'.

The Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the EU Charter submitted a final text of 28 September 2000, [10] accompanied by another explanatory text of 11 October 2000, [11] to the European Council at Biarritz on 13-14 October 2000. This latter document comprised 'explanations' to accompany the text of the Charter. These explanations were unambiguously not drafted or approved by the Convention which prepared the Charter, a fact repeatedly emphasised by the Praesidium itself. The EU’s website reproduces the Charter alongside these explanations of the Praesidium. There it is stated categorically twice in footnotes to the text of the Charter:

'These explanations have been prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium. They have no legal value and are simply intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter'.

The 'adjustment' made to the Charter’s Preamble appears intended to attribute a legal value to the explanations disclaimed by their authors. The inspiration and source of this 'adjustment' is yet another concession to those Member States seeking to dilute the potential content of fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU legal order.

The IGC summit of 17-18 June 2004

The European Council summit meeting on 17-18 June 2004 to decide on the draft EU Constitution was the last ditch attempt by the New Labour government to water down the labour standards and trade union rights in the EU Charter. The account of the negotiations left no doubt as to the inspiration for these amendments. The Financial Times reported: 'France and Germany also objected to a UK proposal that the Charter of Fundamental Rights could not be allowed to overturn national legislation in areas such as labour market policy'. The report continued: 'Mr Blair and Gordon Brown, the chancellor, made clear this week that the UK could not sign up to the constitution if it gave the European Court of Justice the right to change UK industrial relations law'. Specifically, 'The charter contains a series of supplementary explanations which ensure none of its provisions can be allowed to alter national laws. British government lawyers say this must be written into the body of the treaty text rather into its preamble - but France and Germany are resisting the move' (18 June 2004, p. 6).

The final outcome was that the Preamble to the EU Charter was amended adding to the above amendment: 'and updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention'. Moreover, there was added another paragraph 7 to Article II-52 of the EU Charter (Scope and interpretation of rights and principles):

'The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States'.

This outcome seems, contrary to the attempts by the UK government, if anything to have diluted the legal force of the explanations. The additional sentence added to the Preamble by the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe was quite strong: "...the Charter will be interpreted... with due regard for the explanations...". In comparison, the new Article II-52(7) added by the IGC seems weaker: "The explanations... providing guidance in the interpretation... shall be given due regard...". So "will be interpreted" becomes "shall be given due regard". Article II-52(7) takes precedence over the Preamble. Moreover, the text of new Article II-52(7) of the Charter makes no reference to the updated explanations.

To these constitutional amendments, the European Council added a 'Declaration for incorporation in the Final Act concerning the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights':

'The Conference takes note of the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter and updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention, as set out below'.

This Declaration, to be incorporated in the Final Act, emphatically merely 'takes note' both of the original explanations and the update.

The aftermath: the legal effect of the EU Charter and the role of the ECJ

The aftermath of the European Council summit of 17-18 June reflected the habitual spin tactics adopted by the New Labour government. In his press conference of 18 June 2004 at the end of the meeting, Tony Blair announced:

'…the Charter of Rights is expressed specifically in such a way that it means that the industrial relations law of our country cannot be altered by the European Court of Justice through the Charter of Fundamental Rights'.

In his statement to Parliament of 21 June 2004 on the EU Constitutional Treaty he was even more explicit:

'In addition, the Charter contains explanations for each Article making it clear, for example, that ‘the… limits for the exercise of collective action, including strike action, come under national laws and practices, including the question of whether it may be carried out in parallel in several member states’ The Treaty requires those explanations to be given due regard by the Courts'.

In fact, of course, the Charter does not contain the explanations Blair refers to. And while they 'shall be given due regard by the courts', the Charter text specifies that they were 'drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation'. They are clearly not of equal status to the text of the Charter.

Whatever the impact of the spinning exercise in the domestic context of public opinion in the UK, and its consequences for the referendum, it is unlikely to influence opinion outside UK political circles, even less so in the courts of the UK when the Charter is invoked, and least of all in the most important forum deciding the legal effect of the Charter: the European Court of Justice.

On the last day of the European Council summit the Financial Times of 18 June 2004 (p. 6) reported an interview with the President of the European Court of Justice, Vassilios Skouris. The report quoted the judge as saying that the draft constitution 'will bring new areas and new subjects under the court’s jurisdiction', such as the charter. The report continued:

'Mr Skouris also called for the charter on fundamental rights to be made legally binding within the constitution - a move EU leaders are likely to make today.

‘A complete catalogue of fundamental rights will simplify things in the interest of legal certainty’, he said. The UK has been considering a compromise to the constitution text that could give the charter legal force over EU institutions but not over national laws.

However, many lawyers doubt if the legal impact of the charter can be ringfenced in this way. Mr. Skouris could not give assurances that the charter would not have an impact on UK law'. [12]

A leading commentator, John Palmer, Political Director of the European Policy Centre, analysing the results of the European Council wrote: [13]

'The treaty also makes clear that the provisions of the Charter of Citizens’ Fundamental Rights will be judiciable in the European Court of Justice - in spite of fierce opposition initially from the British government. These include some highly sensitive issues such as workers’ rights to strike. The text does stipulate that the ECJ must take 'due consideration' of national laws in these areas when reaching judgments. However the final decision on how to balance the contents of the Charter and the 'explanations' of national circumstances will be left to the judges in Luxembourg. Case law seems certain to evolve over the years ahead and it would be surprising if it did not involve in ways which supported the values of the Charter'.

The attempt by the New Labour government to 'protect' the UK’s restrictive labour laws from the fundamental rights proclaimed in the European Constitution failed. The fallback of reliance on the 'explanations' to mitigate the consequences of the Charter is similarly unlikely to have the effect desired. There will be no 'protecting' UK labour laws, frequently condemned by the supervisory bodies of the ILO and the Council of Europe for violations of international labour standards, from the impact of the fundamental trade union rights guaranteed by the EU Charter.

The small print under a magnifying glass

The following are a number of arguments, using textual and systematic (and historical) approaches to interpretation, on the potential effect of the IGC’s amendments to the EU Charter inserted at the behest of the UK government.

This analysis proceeds with awareness of the intentions of the UK government which promoted the amendments of 18 June 2004, but also of those governments which resisted and watered down those amendments.

1. The additional sentence added to the Preamble by the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe was quite strong: "...the Charter will be interpreted... with due regard for the explanations...". In comparison, the new Article II-52(7) added by the IGC seems weaker: "The explanations... providing guidance in the interpretation... shall be given due regard...". So "will be interpreted" becomes "shall be given due regard". Article II-52(7) takes precedence over the Preamble.

2. The IGC's Working Party of Legal Experts recommended the explanations be published only in the "C" section of the Official Journal (CIG 51/03, 25 November 2003, paragraph 7): "...since the text explicitly states that 'the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States with due regard to the explanations prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter', it would be legally inconceivable for the text of such explanations not to be available to those courts and to Union citizens; it is therefore suggested that the explanations be made universally accessible by ensuring that they are published in the 'C' series of the Official Journal of the European Union". This proposal reflects the suggestion "drafted on the responsibility of the Chairman of the Working Party" (the Legal Adviser to the IGC, Mr. Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the Council Legal Service), referred to in the text of the Draft Treaty published "following editorial and legal adjustments by the Working Party of IGC Legal Experts" (CIG 50/03, 25 November 2003, page 1). The "C" series, of course, includes non-binding documents.

It should be noted that in the Working Party this amendment was 'supported by the great majority of delegations (with the German, Austrian, Belgian, Luxembourg and French delegations opposing it, because they feel it raises issues of political desirability)…' (CIG 50/03, 25 November 2003, p. 68, footnote 1).

3. The Preamble refers to "updated" explanations, but Article II-52(7) does not.

4. The IGC's "Declaration for incorporation in the Final Act concerning the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" says only that the IGC "takes note of the explanations".

5. There are no amendments to the substantive text of the Charter rights, only to the Preamble, to the title of the "horizontal" Article II-52, and a new Article II-52(7).

6. The amended Preamble and new Article II-52(7) refer only to "explanations". They do not change the rights in the Charter.

7. These amendments address interpretation questions only. They cannot change the substance of the rights in, or text of, the Charter. For example, the change (already in the draft of 18 July 2003) in the heading of Title VII (the section of the Charter on "horizontal" provisions), from "Scope" to "General provisions governing the interpretation and application of the Charter", and, more specifically after 18 June 2004, also to "horizontal" Article II-52 (from "Scope of guaranteed rights" to "Scope and interpretation of rights and principles") cannot transform "rights" into "principles".

8. It will be necessary to review the "updated" explanations, but, for example, the original "explanation" to Article II-52 (on the EU's website) does not reflect its new title. It begins: "The purpose of Article 52 is to set the scope of the rights guaranteed". It says nothing about interpretation.

9. For example, the often quoted "explanation" to Article 28 (as cited by Tony Blair in his statement to the House of Commons of the UK Parliament on 21 June 2004) states, not as an interpretation but as a prescription, that "national laws and practices" impose substantive limits to the rights declared in the Charter. I argue against this for an "interpretation" of the words "national laws and practices" in Article 28 which does not limit the rights in that Article.

10. The "explanations" have been repeatedly characterised, not least by those who drafted them, and as stated on the EU's website (see my paper, page 25), as of "no legal value". They were not published in the Official Journal alongside the Charter (OJ C 364/21 of 18.12.2000), only on the EU's website.

11. Their legal value has been upgraded at most to the level of "due regard" and "providing guidance". At this point, there are important questions about the transparency and legitimacy of the process which produced the 'explanations'. They were produced by the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter, but without the participation or approval of the Convention. They were given prominence in the Preamble of the Charter by the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe, again without the participation or approval of that Convention.

12. The Charter has been cited repeatedly before the EU courts (over 50 cases); it would be worthwhile looking again at these cases to see if the explanations were ever referred to, and, if so, how. Is there likely to be a radical change in interpretation as a result of the IGC's amendments of 18 June 2004?

An illustration: the right to collective action (Article 28 of the Charter)

There is a clear problem with the Praesidium’s Explanations insofar as they often fail to refer to 'international obligations common to the Member States'. The Preamble states that these are 'in particular' the inspiration and source of the EU Charter’s provisions. In the case of those provisions referring to individual employment and collective labour rights, the absence in the Praesidium’s Explanations of references to the core ILO Conventions which bind all Member States is particularly noticeable, and regrettable.

For example, as previously noted, the Praesidium’s Explanations to Article 28 (Right of collective bargaining and action) state:

'This Article is based on Article 6 of the European Social Charter and on the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (points 12 to 14). The right of collective action was recognised by the European Court of Human Rights as one of the elements of trade union rights laid down by Article 11 of the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights of the Council of Europe]… Collective action, including strike action, comes under national laws and practices, including the question of whether it may be carried out in parallel in several Member States'.

First, there is an obvious contradiction between requiring respect for the ECHR and the assertion that collective action 'comes under national laws and practices'. The contradiction is evident when the European Court of Rights finds a Member State’s law to be in violation of the ECHR, as was recently the case with the UK in respect of Article 11. [14]

Secondly, collective action 'carried out in parallel in several Member States' engages precisely the transnational dimension of collective action in the European single market. Confining it to national laws and practices contradicts a fundamental right of European collective action. It is inevitably addressed at EU level, [15] not least by the European Court of Justice. [16]

However, apart from these references to European international instruments, there are other international obligations binding EU Member States. These are not mentioned by the Praesidium’s Explanations, though the Preamble emphatically states that the Charter reaffirms these obligations. This indicates the incompleteness of the Praesidium’s Explanations, which no doubt explains the admirable caution expressed by that Praesidium with respect to the use to be made of its Explanations.

The Preamble’s reference to international obligations must have important consequences for the interpretation of the EU Charter. For example, trade union collective action has often been restricted, allegedly to protect public and/or essential services. The ILO's Freedom of Association Committee has established international standards on collective action in public/essential services. Relying on Article 28 of the EU Charter (right to collective action), trade unions could promote challenges to more restrictive national laws.

The Constitutional Treaty’s 'adjustment' to the Preamble begins, after the reaffirmation 'in particular [of] international obligations common to the Member States', with the phrase '[i]n this context…'. The Explanations should be read, and the EU Charter interpreted, with full weight attached to this context of the international obligations of the EU and its Member States, not least the United Kingdom.

---

[1] Freedom of association (Article 12), right of collective bargaining and collective action (Article 28), workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), protection of personal data (Article 8), non-discrimination (Article 21), equality between men and women (Article 23), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30).

[2] It is worth noting here that the reference to courts of the Member States is further evidence of the expectation that the Charter will be accorded legal status in disputes before national courts as well as the ECJ.

[3] The report states that the judge 'added that he did not expect a large influx of cases due to the charter and tried to minimise British fears that essential professions, such as policemen, could go on strike: ‘The right of workers to take strike action doesn’t mean that everybody has the right to strike all the time and under any circumstances’, he said'.

[4] The largest single unit in the world economy, before enlargement the EU (12) in 1997 had a nominal GNP of about $6 trillion, compared with $5 trillion for the US and $3 trillion for Japan and a population approaching that of the USA and Japan combined.

[5] Freedom of association (Article 12), right of collective bargaining and collective action (Article 28), workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), protection of personal data (Article 8), non-discrimination (Article 21), equality between men and women (Article 23), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30).

[6] There has been extensive commentary on the labour law dimension of the EU Charter. B. Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights , European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 2002-2003, also available in Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Spanish and Swedish.

[7] Case C-173/99, Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Opinion of the Advocate-General, 8 February 2001; ECJ decision, 26 June 2001, [1991] ECR I-4881.

[8] CONV 354/02, 22 October 2002.

[9] It is worth noting here that the reference to courts of the Member States is further evidence of the expectation that the Charter will be accorded legal status in disputes before national courts as well as the ECJ.

[10] CONVENT 50, CHARTE 4487/00, Brussels, 28 September 2000 (OR. fr).

[11] CONVENT 49, CHARTE 4473/00, Bruxelles, le 11 octobre 2000 (in French).

[12] The report states that the judge 'added that he did not expect a large influx of cases due to the charter and tried to minimise British fears that essential professions, such as policemen, could go on strike: ‘The right of workers to take strike action doesn’t mean that everybody has the right to strike all the time and under any circumstances’, he said'.

[13] Communication to Members S56/04, 'The Constitutional Treaty - Opening the Way to a ‘Core‘ Europe?', 20 June 2004, p. 4.

[14] Wilson and the National Union of Journalists; Palmer, Wyeth and the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers; Doolan and others v. United Kingdom, [2002] IRLR 128, decided 2 July 2002. For a detailed discussion of the potential impact on British labour law of what has been called 'probably the most important labour law decision for at least a generation', see K. Ewing, 'The implications of Wilson and Palmer', [2003] 32 Industrial Law Journal 1-22.

[15] See Council Regulation (EC) No. 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States. OJ L337/8 of 12.12.98 (the "Monti" Regulation").

[16] See Eugen Schmidburger, Internationale Transporte Planzuge v. Republic of Austria, Case C-112/00, 12 June 2003.

TEXT 6

http://www.urfig.org/17%20Constitution%20europeenne%20un%20pas%20en%20avant%20social%20JdM%2028%20septembre%202004%20P%2041.doc

Article paru l’édition du 28 septembre 2004 du Journal du Mardi

Chronique hebdomadaire

CONSTITUTION EUROPEENNE :

UN « PAS EN AVANT » SOCIAL ?

par Raoul Marc JENNAR, chercheur auprès d’Oxfam et de l’Urfig

Le débat sur la Constitution européenne s’amplifie chez les Sociaux Démocrates et les Verts européens. Les partisans du "oui" font flèche de tout bois en faisant dire au traité constitutionnel ce qu’il ne dit pas et taisant ce qu’il dit. Tous invoquent à satiété la position favorable prise - avec l’accord explicite de chaque syndicat membre ? - par le Secrétaire général de la Confédération Européenne des Syndicats, ce proche de Tony Blair, qui a déclaré que « la Constitution représente un pas en avant social ».

Un progrès se mesure par rapport à ce qui existe. En matière sociale, un « pas en avant » doit nécessairement représenter une amélioration. Qu’en est-il de cet acquis que la Constitution améliorerait ?

Dans bon nombre de pays, la Constitution non seulement consacre l’existence de droits individuels fondamentaux issus des réflexions des Lumières et de la Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, mais également une série de droits collectifs dont la proclamation fait devoir aux pouvoirs publics de créer les conditions de leur exercice.

Ainsi par exemple, le droit au travail est érigé en droit fondamental par l’article 23,1 de la Constitution belge, mais également dans la Constitution de l’Espagne (art.35), de la Finlande (art. 18), de la France (Préambule), du Grand Duché de Luxembourg (art. 11,4), de l’Italie (art 35 ), de l’Irlande (art.45,2), des Pays-Bas (art.19), du Portugal (art.58). Depuis 1948, l’article 23 de la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l’Homme consacre également ce droit et il en va de même de l’article 6 du Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels entré en vigueur en 1976.

Dans la Constitution européenne qu’on nous propose, il a disparu ; on l’a remplacé par « le droit de travailler » (art. II, 15) !

D’autres droits sociaux qu’on retrouve dans les mêmes Constitutions nationales, tels le droit à un revenu minimum, le droit à une pension de retraite, le droit aux allocations de chômage, le droit à un logement décent, l’accès égal pour tous à un certain nombre de services et le droit à apprendre tout au long de la vie ne figurent nulle part dans la Constitution européenne et l’Union européenne n’a donc aucune obligation de bonne fin à cet égard.

Quant au droit à la sécurité et à l’aide sociales comme au droit aux soins de santé, déjà consacrés par l’article 25 de la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l’Homme, on les retrouve dans la Constitution de la Belgique (art 23,2), de l’Espagne (art.41 et 43), de la Finlande (art. 19), de la France (Préambule), du Grand Duché de Luxembourg (art. 11,5), de l’Italie (art 38), de l’Irlande (art.45,4), des Pays-Bas (art. 20), du Portugal (art.63 et 64).

Dans la Constitution européenne proposée, ces droits sont actés dans des formules vagues qui n’offrent aucune garantie juridique. Ainsi la Constitution « reconnaît et respecte » (art. II-34) le droit d’accès aux prestations de sécurité sociale et aux services sociaux dans les États où ils existent. Comme pour l’accès aux soins de santé (art. II-35), elle n’impose pas qu’on crée ce droit et n’interdit pas qu’on le réduise ou qu’on le supprime quand il existe. Le texte renvoie explicitement aux règles établies par le droit de l’Union, règles qui jusqu’ici ont le plus souvent servi à démanteler les systèmes de protection sociale.

La formulation « reconnaît et respecte » est un leurre qui n’engage pas les institutions européennes.

La Constitution proposée indique (I-7) que l’Union européenne adhère à la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’Homme. Il n’est pas indiqué qu’elle adhère à la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l’Homme, ni au Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, ni au Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels. La différence ?

La Convention européenne ne créé aucun droit collectif ou social contrairement aux trois autres documents.

La Constitution proposée n’indique pas que l’Union européenne adhère à la Charte sociale européenne signée à Turin le 18 octobre 1961, ni à la Charte communautaire des droits sociaux fondamentaux des travailleurs de 1989. Elle se contente de mentionner ces documents à titre d’exemples, sans affirmer qu’ils engagent l’Union. Elle est muette quant à l’obligation de respecter les conventions sociales de base de l’Organisation Internationale du Travail.

Comme l’observe très justement Serge Regourd, professeur de droit public, le projet de Constitution « remet en cause la logique des “ droits créances ” qui caractérisent nos systèmes nationaux : les libertés ne sont plus conçues en termes de garanties, ou de prestations à la charge de la collectivité publique et dont celle-ci dit assurer la réalisation au bénéfice des citoyens, mais comme de simples facultés que les individus peuvent éventuellement mettre en oeuvre, selon la logique libérale antérieure à l’émergence de l’État-providence.

C’est donc bien d’une régression qu’il s’agit ».

TEXT 7

http://lawzone.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=108887&d=205&h=207&f=259

Draft EU Constitution - new law via the back door?

Aidan Loy reports on how a rapidly approaching constitution for Europe will have employment issues very high on the agenda.

The information contained in this article is based on the law at December 2003

It may not have escaped your notice that the EU’s legislative machine has ratcheted up several gears lately. Quite apart from the usual round of high profile stories (“reform” of the CAP, the Eurostat fraud scandal, competition investigations) the much heralded new constitution for Europe is near to fruition.

A series of intergovernmental conferences (between heads of state/government and foreign ministers) have been scheduled between October and December 2003. The process must be finished, at the latest, by Spring 2004. Italy, currently holding the rotating EU Presidency, would ideally like this concluded by December thereby creating the historical nuance of a second Treaty of Rome. That may be optimistic as some previous conference rounds have lasted for more than a year…

At first blush, this may seem a somewhat dry topic. But the reported intervention of a worried Queen in the UK and the Government’s opposition to those seeking a referendum on the draft serves to underline its relevance domestically.

Past, present and future

The constant evolution of the bodies comprising the EU periodically requires a reordering of arrangements, from its genesis in the Coal and Steel Community, via Euratom (still with us in one form or another), the Single Market, Maastricht and Amsterdam up to Lisbon and Laeken, which proved the spur for the current constitutional exercise. The forthcoming enlargement of the Union – clearly not the last – also dictated some necessary readjustment.

Cue ex-French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing who was appointed to lead the portentously named European Convention on the Future of Europe in December 2001. This was tasked with three objectives:

· proposals to bring citizens closer to the European design and European Institutions

· to propose organisation of politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union

· how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the “new world order”

And this all before lunch, too.

As can be revealed by the howls of outrage mingling with cheers, the success of this depends largely upon where you stand on Europe. Undoubtedly work will progress towards the finalisation of the draft and it is likely that by late spring of 2004 an entirely new document, supplanting the previous treaties, will be in place throughout an enlarged EU. A great deal of this will be relevant to employment law and social policy. In fact, since the 2002 Barcelona summit defence, energy and employment policy have been identified as areas of prime importance to the Commission.

As well as Directives emanating from Commissioner Diamantopoulou’s Directorate, you may be aware of the substantial amount of legislation resulting from the (then) new Labour administration’s adoption of the Social Chapter which had been rejected under Maastricht by the previous Tory administration.

In large part this was due to a belief that the use of the Social Chapter to bring forth primary legislation in employment and social policy was an underhand way to introduce measures seen by the then UK government as likely to burden business, rather than to protect the legitimate interests of employees. With the draft constitution we can expect to hear those arguments again.

Throughout the drafting of the constitution, all parties to the debate did their utmost to have their points of view represented. Debate divided along fairly traditional lines. The submissions by industry - IoD, CBI and UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe) for example – stressed the need for wealth creation and competitiveness above employee and social protection with the broad left advocating further social protection – including a proposal for a right to secondary collective action across national boundaries which was, not surprisingly, not included.

Rights of the Union

However, groups had effectively two bites of the cherry with their pet projects as, in addition, the draft also includes a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. As well as rights to life, privacy, freedom of expression this also includes an anti-discrimination clause and sexual equality including employment and pay together with a specified right to take collective action. Nothing revolutionary there, except that there is a move – currently opposed by the British Government amongst others – to allow the European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction over the charter and to interpret it – and complaints under it – judicially, thereby allowing an expansion of case law on a Union-wide basis on all aspects of the charter.

At the commencement of the convention post-Laeken governments only agreed to the inclusion of the charter on this “non-justiciable” basis. Indeed, as an example, member states deliberately excluded the right to strike from the European Treaty because of a belief that such regulation is best at national level due to the differing systems of industrial relations across the continent. The draft charter seeks to address such concerns by saying that it would “not extend the scope of application of Union law”.

How much comfort that gives to concerned governments remains to be seen. It seems unlikely, bearing in mind the history of human rights legislation deriving from the ECHR that this fertile field for judicial intervention will remain unploughed for long. In that case it is beyond doubt that employment disputes will form one of the most prolific subjects for decision. Concerns have been expressed that incorporating the charter could transfer jurisdiction over fundamental rights from the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg and national courts to the ECJ raising the spectre of conflicting judgements and hence legal uncertainty. To incorporate or not will be one of the battles fought out over the next few months.

Leaving aside such issues, the Constitution includes provisions which will have far reaching influence on the fields of employment and social policy and, hence, law.

The draft defines the Union’s values and objectives. The objectives are a formal statement of that which the Union should be seeking to achieve. The preamble to the social policy objective states:

“The Union and the Member States …shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion.”

And further, that the EU should become a social market economy aiming at full employment. For the first time, “full employment” like a cry from the industrially devastated 1930s, has become adopted as the firm policy of the EU. This is a controversial concept and was ultimately only adopted as part of the consensus because both sides of the argument made it clear that it is capable of different interpretations, and will not be easily attained. However, that does not bode well for translating this laudable goal into action.

The inclusion of the social market reference was particularly galling to some as there was no consensus on that point. In total the objectives encompass full employment and social progress, the fight against social exclusion and discrimination, promoting social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of children’s rights.

To translate such lofty ideals into practical policies would require some form of mechanism… which is exactly what resides within the third title of the draft: “Union Competences and Actions”.

EU member state framework for employment & social policies

A section in the original draft dealt with the co-ordination of the economic policies - both in and out of the euro zone. But it has been amended to include the co-ordination of the employment policies of member states. Thus, employment has been upgraded in its treatment by the EU and is no longer relegated as an area for supporting action but is now within the competence of the EU to co-ordinate member state’s employment and social policies across the piece.

In one view, a sensible attitude to ensuring the full participation of all EU citizens in the operation of the supranational economy, opportunity for all and the (potential) end of social exclusion. Another view is that this will merely mean the imposition of monolithic and expensive social programmes from the centre - a “one size fits all” approach is, to some, an economic Frankenstein’s monster as the imposition of high social costs in some economies could lead to serious distortions. The high social costs in France and Germany reflect high productivity enabling them to provide excellent social protection and excellent export records. Will the same be true of Poland? Slovakia? Hungary? Moreover, such co-ordination will require similar co-ordination of fiscal measures to support it – employment taxes in effect, thereby raising the spectre of tax harmonisation and lifting the debate to the (to some) appalling heights of pan-European taxation and hence to the touchstone debate over nation states and a federal Europe.

Incidentally, the dread “f” word of federalism appears nowhere in the 260 page draft constitution. Some would say this underlines the status of the document and that it is not a blueprint for a super state. Others might suggest some presentational sleight of hand.

That is one of the greatest difficulties in seeking to assess the likely impact of this document. The EU already contains many polarised viewpoints and settled agenda and seeing the likely outcome is not easy. Clearly, there is a lot to be thrashed out between now and April and it is difficult to see how any agreement can be reached unless “red lines” are crossed.

But what effect will any of this have on employment? Well, in the first instance, not a lot. But if the charter is incorporated and the ECJ enters the fray of litigation directly and the additional competencies and objectives are put into dynamic action as part of the ongoing social programme, then we can expect to see a raft of new legislation dealing with all of these areas, buttressed by new case law. As the competencies potentially affect the whole area of employment and social protection then it is likely that all of those areas already legislatively visited at least once (dismissal, collective action, equality and discrimination etc.) will find themselves again the objects of legislative and judicial scrutiny with the likely effect of new laws and new rulings. It is unlikely that this area of law, already becoming centre stage throughout Europe, will be inhibited in its growth and application by the adoption – in whatever final form – of the Constitution.

Watch this space – we may well be about to live in even more interesting times.

Aidan Loy, IBB Solicitors

Date: 23-Dec-2003