Master d’Etudes Politiques

en

Administration et entreprises en France et en Europe

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RESEARCH-DOSSIER

Food Security and EU Exterior Trade Relations:              The “Hormones” Case

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brünhild LE BAILLY                                             Valentine GIRARD                                       

 

Introduction

 

Part I. The Hormones Beef Case and an overview of the EU trade relations

 

Text 1: Chronology: US Disputes with EU over Bananas, Beef Hormones

July 5, 2000

http://www.useu.be/issues/chron0705.html

 

Text 2: WTO Case File: the Beef Hormone Case

Monday, November 22, 1999

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/case22.shtml

 

Text 3: The Citizen’s Guide to Trade. Environment and Sustainability

Trade Case Study: Beef-Hormone Dispute

January 24, 2001

http://www.foei.org/trade/activistguide/hormone.htm#lmportant%20points%20arise%20from%20this

 

Text 4: The EU's relations with the United States of America

EU-US Summit, Queluz May 31, 2000

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/summit_05_00/hormone_case_summary.htm

 

Text 5: Business: The Economy battle over beef hormones

UK, Thursday, May 13, 1999

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/342310.stm

 

Text 6: US-European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges

May 21, 2002

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10866.pdf

 

Text 7: The Regulation of Food Safety and the Use of Traceability/Tracing in the EU and USA: Convergence or Divergence?

March 19, 2004

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/speeches/speech168_en.pdf

 

 

Part II. The EU exterior trade relations: analysis and consequences

 

Text 8: The commercial conflict between the United States and the European Union

http://www.strategicsinternational.com/enuseurop.hm

 

 

Text 9: Viande aux hormones: premier débat à la Commission

May 17, 1999

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press23_fr.html

 

Text 10: Commission adopts White Paper on Food Safety

Brussels, January 12, 2000

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/pre…

 

Text 11: EU Scientists confirm health risks of growth hormones in meat

April 23, 2002

http://www.organicconsumers.org/toxic/hormone042302

 

Text 12: EU to WTO: US, Canada sanctions illegal

Monday, November 8, 2004

http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/reuters_eubeefban_11082004.pdf

 

 

Conclusion

 

Glossary

 

Useful Links

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

Food safety is a topic of major importance to the Community and to its trading partners and therefore it is in our all interests to foster a general understanding of the EU exterior trade policy. Recent debate on this subject has often been marked by emphasis on the differences – some real, others borne of misunderstanding. It is therefore a good example to talk about the discussion with a view to finding the common ground that exists between the EU and the US over the Hormones Beef Conflict; and, probably even more important, for better defining any significant differences and the reasons for them.

Since the early seventies the European Union has officially banned the use of synthetic growth stimulators. Despite of the ban, the use of those illegal products has been very popular especially for the production of veal and beef. The use of for instance clenbuterol seemed to be very profitable. Government-studies in the Netherlands claimed that the income for a farmer could raise about $ 100 to $ 200 per animal. The profits of the trade in the illegal growth-stimulator clenbuterol are higher than the profits in trading heroin or cocaine - and the risks for the trader are a lot less, a Dutch prosecutor stated at court, where traders and users of clenbuterol were convicted to fines and imprisonment.

Due to the high profits the trade in illegal hormones and other growth stimulators is in hands of criminal organizations. Statistics hardly mention the illegal use of natural hormones in Europe. Although farmers and government inspectors are certain they are used. The problem is that it is very hard to proof for a criminal court the natural hormones are used. No scientist is able to certify that the amount of natural hormones found in an animal are certainly and without any doubt the effect of injections or implantations. Only when implantations or injection-spots are found on the meat, the proof is given.

This is as it should be: science has been the basis for national and international regulation for many years all over the world. With the increase of international trade during the second half of the last century, the need has arisen for a generally acceptable measure to establish both a high level of safety and fair trading practices in international commerce. Science, with its hard earned reputation for objectivity, has been increasingly relied upon in international standards and agreements, amongst others in those regulating trade. On the other hand, science has limits. For example, it takes time to generate the experience, the raw data, which will permit reliable scientific analysis of innovation to be done.

However, legalizing hormones would not make an end to the malpractices. The EU is convinced that legalizing hormones is the wrong way. "Even an American procedure at the panel of the World Trade Organization wouldn't change our minds", the Austrian commissioner Franz Fischler said. The European Parliament in Strasbourg is outspoken against legalization.

As it is, the Hormones Beef Case shows the rift between the EU and US in dealing with trade issues according to differing conceptions, personal reasons…

List serves item, 29 May 96:

About the EU beef ban: The European Union doesn't want to import beef that is produced in a way that is considered unsafe by the public nor in an illegal way according to European law. As a politician said: it is not because the meat is unsafe to eat, but it is because my voters don't want it.

 

Then one can wonder if the dialogue between the two blocs has been efficient to reach a consensus and what has been the situation so far.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Part I. The Hormones Beef Case and an overview of the EU trade relations

 

Text 1: Chronology: US Disputes with EU over Bananas, Beef Hormones

July 5, 2000

 

Link

 

http://www.useu.be/issues/chron0705.html

 

Source

 

This is a chronology paper, which shows the way the EU, and the united States are working together in the trade field. It therefore brings the readers an impartial and realistic view on transatlantic trade relations at that time.

This document appears to be a relevant basis for a further reflection on EU/US economic relations.

 

Summary

 

This document is an overview of the Beef Hormones Case, which comprises a summary, and a chronology of the latter.

 

French summary

 

Ce document est une vue d’ensemble de l’affaire du bœuf aux hormones qui comprend un résumé et une chronologie.

 

 

 

CHRONOLOGY: U.S. DISPUTES WITH EU OVER BANANAS, BEEF HORMONES

 

 Date: July 5, 2000

 

Summary:

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is expected to announce within days revisions to its list of products from the European Union (EU) subject to retaliatory tariffs in disputes over bananas and hormone-treated beef.

Such revisions are required under the "carousel" provision of the Africa-Caribbean trade bill passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton in May.

Except in certain circumstances, the provision requires USTR to change twice a year the products subject to retaliatory tariffs in cases when a losing party fails to implement a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement ruling in favor of the United States -- as in the bananas and beef hormones cases.

The EU requested June 5 consultations in the WTO over the carousel provision, which its representative argued violates the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding because such retaliation is not approved by WTO members.

BEEF HORMONES CASE

1985-1988 : The EU adopts, without a sound scientific basis, a directive prohibiting imports of animals and meat from animals produced with hormones to stimulate growth in 1985 and readopts it in 1988.

May 1996 : The United States challenges the EU ban on imports of hormone-treated beef under the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism.

August 18, 1997 : A WTO panel rules that the EU ban violates the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).

January 16, 1998 : The WTO Appellate Body upholds the panel decision.

May 1998 : The WTO grants the EU until May 13, 1999, to comply with the ruling.

May 1999 : The deadline for EU compliance expires. The United States seeks WTO authorization to impose retaliatory tariffs.

July 26, 1999 : The DSB authorizes U.S. retaliatory tariffs amounting to $116.8 million a year, the level of damage to U.S. producers calculated by arbitrators.

 

Commentary

 

The 1990s appear to be a decade of rupture between the US and the EU. Indeed, many of their current disputes have their origins there and as both of them cannot find an agreement, consequently they both asked the WTO to intervene.

This Beef Hormones dispute reveals the trade war the UE and the US are facing today. It is a good starting point as it gives the guidelines of a deeper reflection on our subject[1].
Unable to support the ban by a scientific risk assessment, as current rules require, but with strong consumer backing, Brussels wants a strengthening of the "precautionary principle" in the forthcoming global trade negotiations.

Meanwhile, the standoff in the hormones case has inevitably added to criticism that the WTO is trying to undermine environmental and food safety standards.

 

 

 

 

 

Text 2: WTO Case File: the Beef Hormone Case

Monday, November 22, 1999

 

Link

 

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/case22.shtml

 

Source

                    

This document is a well-structured article written by a journalist, Mickael Paulson, a Washington correspondent.

This is an American source, which is in fact interesting since it gives us an American analysis of the situation from which we can expect a better knowledge of the players involved, such as the US interest groups.

 

Summary

 

The documents analyses the issue on the growth hormones beef ban in establishing a chronology of the case and also sets out the different stages of this conflict to highlight the interests at stake.

 

French Summary

 

Ce document analyse le problème de l'interdiction du bœuf aux hormones de croissance en établissant une chronologie de l'affaire et établit par ailleurs les différentes étapes du conflit pour mettre en lumière les intérêts en jeu.

 

 

WTO CASE FILE: the Beef Hormone Case
Monday, November 22, 1999

 

By MICHAEL PAULSON
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER
WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT

 

At stake: Whether the countries of the European Union must accept

American beef produced with growth hormones.

 

Background: As much as 90 percent of U.S. beef is produced with the aid of growth hormones, a federally approved and monitored treatment that enables ranchers to produce meatier and leaner cows. Hormone-treated beef is now shipped to 138 countries, but since 1989 the countries of the European Union have refused to accept beef with hormones. The Europeans have attributed their refusal to accept the beef to consumer concern about the potential human health impacts of hormone-treated beef; the Americans allege that the Europeans are really just trying to protect European beef producers.

 

How the WTO got involved: In 1995, in one of the first cases before the WTO, the United States challenged Europe's right to ban U.S. beef. Before the establishment of the WTO, the United States had been imposing duties against European products in retaliation for the beef ban.

 

What the WTO said: The WTO ruled in 1997 that the beef ban was not based on scientific evidence, as required under international trade rules. The ruling was upheld on appeal in 1998.

 

Result: The European Union, as is its right under international trade law, has continued to refuse to accept U.S. beef. The United States, as is its right, was therefore entitled to impose retaliatory tariffs worth $117 million a year, which is the estimated value of the lost U.S. beef exports. In July the United States imposed 100 percent duties on a variety of European products, including European pork and French mustard, truffles, Roquefort cheese and fruit juices.

 

How the United States sees it: The case is a major irritant in U.S.-European relations, which are generally strong but are strained by a variety of disputes over agricultural exports.

 

How U.S. interest groups see it: U.S. cattle producers see the case as a mixed bag; on the one hand, the United States won, but on the other hand, U.S. producers still don't have access to European consumers. Consumer groups in the United States are generally sympathetic to the Europeans, viewing their ban on U.S. beef as a legitimate example of a domestic consumer protection measure that should be honoured.

 

Postscript: The United States and Europe are trying to negotiate a way out of this dispute, pressured by cattle ranchers in the United States and Roquefort producers in France.

 

Commentary

 

Since its inception in 1995, more than 312 disputes have been raised under the WTO Dispute Settlement System. Despite the obvious success of this system, several shortcomings call for a revision under the auspices of the Doha Development Round.

We can analyse one of the most prominent trade disputes between the EU and the USA, which we call “mini trade wars”: the Hormones Case.

The economic analysis revealed several flaws and peculiarities: As a rule, retaliatory tariffs are detrimental to welfare of the retaliating country and amount to “shooting oneself in the foot”. Large countries can only win trade wars. The WTO arbitrator’s estimation of the trade loss in case of non-compliance never translates into equivalent damage to economic welfare. A mechanism to control the collection of retaliatory tariff revenues is missing, as is a system to compensate the firms suffering the damage. The major conclusion therefore is that tariffs are very bad instruments for countermeasures. The sanctions mechanism of the Dispute Settlement System should be improved, maybe based on a mechanism of direct transfers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Text 3: The Citizen’s Guide to Trade. Environment and Sustainability

Trade Case Study: Beef-Hormone Dispute
January 24, 2001

 

Link

 

http://www.foei.org/trade/activistguide/hormone.htm#lmportant%20points%20arise%20from%20this

 

Source: identifications and analysis

 

This text was found on the site of “Friends of the world” which is a federation of autonomous environmental organizations from all over the world. It has members in 70 countries and campaigns on the most urgent environmental and social issues of our day, while simultaneously catalysing a shift toward sustainable societies.

This federation is based in Netherlands and tries to make the people understand why the world trade system has to change to encourage environmental protection and a fair share of the world's wealth for everyone, mostly by testifying about big current issues as shown in this text.

 

Summary in French

 

Un différent oppose Etats-Unis et Canada à l’Europe à propos du commerce de viande de bœuf aux hormones: l’Europe veut en interdire l’importation sur son territoire pour raisons sanitaires et l’exportateur s’en plaint à l’OMC convaincu d’un protectionnisme économique calculé et déguisé en principe de précaution. Un jugement est porté accusant l’Union européenne, laquelle fait appel et obtient une décision qui satisfait les deux camps, l’un voyant dans cette décision la possibilité de rendre crédible ses préjugés en matière de risque sanitaire et l’autre l’interprétant comme un ultimatum donné à l’Europe pour justifier de réalités scientifiques sans lesquelles le camp des exportateurs aurait raison.

            Ces déboires juridiques ont révélé l’importance du principe de précaution, la place de l’opinion publique fortement prise à partie par le camp européen et le risque que font encourir aux populations et aux consommateurs les enjeux incommensurables de la sphère économique.

 

Summary in English

 

        A major conflict opposes Europe to Northern America about hormone meat trade. The European Union reject importation of such product as it contains health risks for it public. American camp argues that European governments hide behind precaution to practice disloyal trade behaviour. Such a conflicts has revealed, after many juridical steps, the importance of American trade lobbies and the law place of public opinion and health consideration in the world economic organisation.

 

Glossary

 

Sustainability: durabilité

Ban: interdiction

Evidence: preuve

To undertake: entreprendre, s’engager à

Potted: en conserve

To fatten: engraisser

Rate: taux, valeur

Regulation: règlement

To update: mettre à jour

Occurring: en cours, se produire, existant

Basically: au fond, fondamentalement, à la base

Standards: normes

Controversially: discutable, controversé, qui a beaucoup fait parler de lui

Relevant: pertinent, approprié

Leverage: levier, prise

Proceeding: poursuite, procédure

To lodge a complaint: porter plainte

Board: conseil d’administration

Panel: jury, expert

Ruling: au pouvoir, règlement, gouverner, commander

To appeal: faire appel

To lift: lever

To be targeted: être pris pour cible

Retaliatory: en représailles

Merely: purement

Comprehensive: complète

Inconsistent: incompatible, pas cohérent

Override: passer outre à

Significant: significatif, important

Vindication: justification

 

Text

 

The dispute between the EU and the USA & Canada over the EU's ban on cattle products produced using growth hormones shows the conflicts between health concerns and the trade system. More specifically, it is an example of the conflict between balancing the need for precaution and the demands of the public with international trade rules. 

The long-term health effects of eating beef products produced using growth hormones are uncertain. The EU maintains it has a right to ban production and imports of these products. The USA maintains there is no scientific proof that such products pose a danger to human health. The WTO maintains that a risk assessment - involving an analysis of the available scientific evidence - that conforms with its procedures must be undertaken before action can be taken.

 

 

Potted history...

Since the 1970s, the US meat industry has been using hormones to improve the growth or fattening rate of animals to save farmers time and money. Since 1981 the European Union has been restricting the use of growth hormones within the EU and also restricting the import of meat and meat products derived from cattle given these hormones (other than for veterinary reasons). At various times since then, the EU regulations have been updated or amended - mainly to include more hormones - but basically they have remained the same. The latest amendment was in April 1996. The hormones involved include the naturally occurring hormones oestradiol-17., progesterone and testosterone and the synthetic hormones trenbolone acetate, zeranol and melengestrol acetate (MGA).

In 1995 the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) - the international food standards body - controversially adopted standards accepting residue levels of these hormones in meat. At the time there was a great deal of disagreement amongst Codex members on the issue and it took the US Chair of the relevant committee to force a secret ballot (not normal Codex practice) which went in favour of adopting the standard by just four votes (33 in favour, 29 against, 7 abstentions). This overturned an earlier vote against the US position. The internationally, and WTO, accepted Codex standard gave the USA the kind of leverage it needed to initiate WTO proceedings. This is because the TBT Agreement requires that internationally accepted standards must be used where they exist, and the SPS Agreement explicitly refers to Codex for the establishment of international food standards.

In 1996 the USA, subject to strong lobbying from Monsanto and farming interest groups, lodged a complaint with the WTO and a Panel was formed in May of that year (Micky Kantor, the then US Trade Representative was responsible for initiating the action in the WTO; he is now a board member of Monsanto). Canada also lodged a complaint and the same Panel was used to adjudicate. The Panel reported in August 1997, ruling against the EU on a number of counts and the EU appealed in September 1997. In January 1998, the Appellate Body issued a report modifying the Panel's findings but still ruling against the EU ban. The EU is now in the process of trying to make the ban compatible with the World Trade Agreement (WTA) while the USA is still trying to force the EU to lift the ban. Meanwhile the WTO has authorised the US to impose trade sanctions to the sum of $116 million (and Canada to the sum of C$11 million). Various sectors have been targeted, for example mustard and Roquefort cheese in France, which have sparked off strong retaliatory actions from French farmers (see FOEI briefing, Seattle Series - The World Trade System: Winners and Losers).

 

Reasons for the ban...

The main reason for the EU ban is a fear that the hormones are dangerous and may cause health problems to those who ingest them. The ban has, however, proved controversial because of differing opinions on whether the forbidden products are safe for human consumption and also the allowance by the EU of the hormones into other parts of the food chain. Also, a second reason for the ban, according to EU officials, is that consumers in the EU have expressed a strong preference to eat hormone free meat regardless of its safety. Finally, there is an argument for a ban on animal health/husbandry grounds (i.e. pushing animals to grow faster than they would naturally).

 

The arguments...

There are three central arguments in this case: 1) The uncertainty or certainty surrounding the science; 2) The legitimacy of EU public demand; 3) Whether the EU ban is discriminatory - i.e. merely an attempt to protect its own farming industry.

In the United States, the FDA has approved the use of most hormones for controlled use. According to the USA, the EU has also conducted a comprehensive study, which shows that there is no risk attached to hormone treated animals. There does, however, seem to be a certain amount of doubt concerning both the effects on cattle of the hormones and the possible link to human breast and colon cancer. The EU has therefore been arguing that it should be allowed to invoke the Precautionary Principle in this case, meaning it could take action in the face of scientific uncertainty. The USA has been arguing that no such scientific uncertainty exists so the EU ban is illegal.

Also important is whether, regardless of the science, the EU should be allowed to implement a ban based on the will of its people. As one author puts it,

“...surely, if European consumers and governments are opposed to hormone-treated food and want to promote more organic methods of raising cattle, they should have the absolute right to do so”.1

However, in terms of the WTA, this is the most cut and dried issue as banning a product purely on the basis of public demand is prohibited no matter how strong the public opinion. 

Finally, the question of discrimination. The EU argues that the ban is non- discriminatory as it is applied to all producers. EU farmers are prohibited from using the hormones in certain circumstances and exporters such as Australia, Argentina, New Zealand and Brazil have all agreed to ship hormone-free meat to the EU. That said, some argue that an important factor in this equation is that the EU beef industry is not as competitive as in the USA and, given past levels of support for the agriculture industry in the EU, this ban is seen by the USA as thinly disguised protectionism. The EU sees the ban as a fair requirement on all farmers whereas Americans see the ban as 'Fortress Europe' trying to protect the interests of its farming industry.

 

The rulings...

The case dealt with a combination of two of the Annexed agreements to the WTA; the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In plain English, the SPS agreement concerns food safety and animal and plant health regulations and the TBT concerns standard setting. The SPS permits regulation but only if it is non-discriminatory (i.e. based on the WTA's rules of National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation status) and if it is based on an adequate risk assessment conducted using current scientific evidence. The TBT requires that internationally accepted standards must be used where they exist.

In August 1997, the Panel report concluded that the EU had violated the SPS Agreement because:

it had maintained sanitary measures not based on a risk assessment (it rejected the EU's use of the Precautionary Principle);

it had adopted arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions on the level of sanitary protection in different situations resulting in discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade;

it had maintained sanitary measures not based on existing international standards without justification.

The EU appealed in September 1997. On 17th January 1998, the Appellate Body issued a report significantly modifying the Panel's decision, ruling in favour of the EU on several points.

Like the Panel, the Appellate Body ruled that the EU could maintain higher food standards than those of Codex as long as it provided scientific evidence. However, the Appellate Body still maintained that the EU measures were inconsistent with the risk assessment procedures of the SPS agreement. 

Again the EU referred to the Precautionary Principle (PP), arguing that it is an accepted general customary rule of international law and thus should be applied in the assessment of risk. However, according to the Appellate Body,

“The status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners regulators and judges...We consider...that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract question.”2

For various reasons, including the fact that the SPS Agreement contains no specific mention of the PP, the Appellate body ruled that the PP does not override the risk assessment clauses in the SPS Agreement.

The EU also objected to the Panel's selection of two experts, one of whom had links with the pharmaceutical industry. This was rejected by the Appellate Body.

Also significant was the Appellate Body's vindication of the reasons behind the standards. It said,

“We are unable to share the inference that the Panel apparently draws that the import ban on treated meat and the Community-wide prohibition of the use of the hormones here in dispute for growth protection purposes in the beef sector were not really designed to protect its population from the risk of cancer, but rather to keep out US and Canadian hormone-treated beef and thereby to protect the domestic beef producers in the European Communities.”3

The Appellate Body  therefore rejected the US claim that the EU import ban was a purely 'protectionist' measure.

One of the most unusual parts of the decision is the implication in part of the report that the EU would be justified in banning beef if the hormones were not administered in accordance with good animal husbandry. This point could be of much wider significance because it relates to a process and production method (PPM) rather than the actual product itself. It remains to be seen whether this is interpreted as allowing discrimination on the grounds of PPMs within the World Trade Agreement.

 

Everyone's a winner?

After the Appellate Body ruling, the US claimed victory and called for the EU ban to be lifted within the 15 month adjustment period set by the arbitrator (expiring on 13th May 1999). The EU claimed victory saying the ban could be kept if the EU could provide an adequate assessment of the risks. The EU also claimed as a victory the ruling that it would be allowed to maintain higher standards than required by the Codex Alimentarius Commission if its standards were scientifically based. At the time of writing the EU has still not lifted the ban. In response, the USA imposed trade sanctions.

The 'beef-hormones' case is of great political significance. This is because, first, the continuing trade battle between the EU and USA is seen as a threat to the trade system. Second, the 'beef-hormones' case is being seen as a 'dry-run' for a potential dispute over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) where the same issues of scientific uncertainty, corporate interest and public taste would once again arise.

 

Important points arising from this case:

·        The failure of the WTA to take account of the precautionary principle.

·        The difficulty of reconciling democratic decisions based on public concern with international trade law.

·        The power and influence of the US biotechnology industry.

·        The need for an 'adequate' risk assessment before implementing sanitary measures. Although the SPS sets out a procedure for risk assessment, ultimately the legal 'adequacy' of the risk assessment can only be really determined by the WTO in retrospect.

·        Food standards (covered by both the SPS and TBT Agreements) higher than international standards can be used but only with scientific justification.

·        The Appellate Body's potential acceptance of discrimination on the grounds of process and production methods (PPMs).

·        The USA (as well as the EU) maintains an import ban on meat from countries it believes have incidences of foot and mouth disease. This disease affects the animal's (sheep, pigs and cattle) health and reduces its value. There is a certain double standard in operation for the USA to, on the one hand ban beef imports that may or may not pass on foot and mouth disease to US cattle, while on the other complain about the EU's ban on hormone treated beef which may or may not affect human health and be detrimental to injected cattle.

 

 

Translation

 

Le guide du commerce du citoyen.

Environnement et développement

Etude de cas sur le commerce : le conflit du bœuf hormones

 

Le différent qui oppose l’Europe d’un côté et les USA et le Canada de l’autre à propos de l’interdiction de la viande de bœufs élevés aux hormones de croissance révèle les conflits entre les affaires de santé et le système de commerce. Plus spécifiquement, c’est un exemple du conflit entre l’équilibre des besoins en matière de précaution et les demandes de la population et les règles du commerce international.

Les effets à long terme sur la santé de la consommation de viande de bœufs élevés aux hormones de croissance sont incertains. L’Union européenne maintient qu’elle a un droit d’interdire la production et l’importation de ces produits. Les USA maintiennent qu’il n’y a pas de preuve scientifique que de tels produits causent un danger à la santé humaine. L’OMC maintient qu’une évaluation du risque (comprenant une analyse des preuves scientifiques disponibles) conforme à ses procédures doit être entreprise avant qu’une action puisse être mise en œuvre.

 

Une histoire en boîte...

 

Depuis les années 1970s, l’industrie de la viande américaine utilise des hormones pour augmenter la croissance du taux de graisse des animaux pour que les fermiers économisent du temps et de l’argent. Depuis 1981 l’Union européenne a restreint l’usage des hormones de croissance dans l’UE et a aussi restreint l’importation de viande de bétail nourri avec ces hormones (pour d’autres raisons que des raisons vétérinaires). A plusieurs périodes depuis, le règlement de l’UE est mis à jour ou amendé (principalement pour inclure plus d’hormones) mais au fond, il est resté le même. Les derniers amendements ont été faits en avril 1996. Les hormones concernées contiennent naturellement les hormones existantes oestradiol-17, progestérone et testostérone et des hormones synthétiques trenbolone acétate, zéranol et mélengestrol acétate (MGA).

En 1995 la très controversée commission alimentaire Codex (Codex) (l’organe de normes alimentaires internationales) a adopté des normes autorisant certains degrés de résidus de ces hormones dans la viande. A cette période, il y avait un important désaccord parmi les membres de Codex sur ce problème ce qui a amené la chaire américaine du comité approprié à faire un vote secret (ce qui n’est pas une pratique normale de Codex) qui fut en faveur de l’adoption de normes par quatre voix seulement ( 33 pour, 29 contre, 7 abstentions). Ce retournement de situation a occasionné un vote prématuré contre la position américaine. L’acceptation par la communauté internationale et l’OMC des normes Codex a donné aux USA l’occasion dont ils avaient besoin pour initier des poursuites contre l’OMC. C’est parce que les accords TBT estiment que les normes internationalement acceptées doivent être utilisées là où elles sont nécessaires et les accords SPS se réfèrent explicitement à Codex pour l’établissement de normes internationales alimentaires (Ndlr : SPS signifie « accord sur les mesures sanitaires et phytosanitaires » et concerne la sécurité alimentaire et la régulation de la santé chez les animaux et les plantes : ils permettent la régulation mais seulement si elle n’est pas discriminatoire et basée sur une analyse adéquate du risque conduite par des preuves scientifiques récentes et TBT signifie « accord sur les barrières techniques au commerce » et il concerne les normes en place et nécessite que les normes internationalement acceptées soient utilisées où elles existent).

 

En 1996 les USA proposent à des lobby importants de Monsanto et de groupes de fermiers, de porter plainte à l’OMC. Un jury fut formé en mai de la même année ( Micky Kantor, le représentant américain du commerce d’alors a initié cette action à l’OMC, il est maintenant membre du conseil d’administration de Monsanto). Le Canada a aussi porté plainte et le même jury a été formé pour adjuger. Le jury a fait un compte rendu en Août 1997 et a statué contre l’UE par un certain nombre de voix et l’UE a fait appel en septembre1997. En janvier 1998, l’organe d’appel a établit un rapport modifiant les conclusions du jury mais statuant toujours contre l'interdiction de l'UE. L'UE est maintenant en train de tenter de rendre compatible l’interdiction avec les accords d’échanges mondiaux alors que les Etats-Unis essaient toujours de lui faire lever l’interdiction. Au même moment l’OMC a autorisé les USA à imposer une sanction commerciale d’une somme de 116 million de dollars (et le Canada de 11 million de dollars). Divers secteurs ont été pris pour cible, la moutarde et le roquefort en France par exemple, qui ont entraîné de fortes actions de représailles de la part des fermiers français.

 

Les causes de l’interdiction...

 

La raison principale de l’interdiction européenne est la peur que les hormones soient dangereuses et puissent causer des problèmes de santé à ceux qui en ingurgiteraient. L’interdiction s’est cependant avérée controversée car des opinions différentes ont été émises sur le fait de savoir si les produits interdits sont sains pour la consommation par les hommes ou non et aussi sur l’autorisation donnée par l’UE d’utiliser des hormones à d’autres endroits de la chaîne alimentaire. Une deuxième cause de l’interdiction, selon les officiels européens, est que les consommateurs dans l’Union ont exprimé une forte préférence pour la viande sans hormones, sans considérer l’aspect sécuritaire. Finalement il y a une forte tendance pour l’interdiction d’  « animaux artificiels » (c’est à dire poussés à grandir plus vite qu’ils ne devraient le faire naturellement).

 

Tout le monde est gagnant ?

 

Après la décision de l’organe d’appel, les USA ont crié victoire et ont appelé l’UE à lever l’interdiction dans les quinze mois de la période d’ajustement mise en place par les arbitres (qui expire le 13 mai 1999). L’UE a crié victoire disant que l’interdiction pourrait persister si elle pouvait fournir les analyses de risque adéquates et parce qu’elle permettait de maintenir des normes de protection plus élevées que celles requises par la commission Codex sur l’alimentation si la nécessité de ces normes étaient scientifiquement prouvées. A ce jour, l’UE n’a toujours pas levé la sanction. En réponse, les USA imposent des sanctions commerciales.

 

Les arguments...

 

Il y a trois arguments centraux dans ce cas :

1)      l’incertitude ou la certitude qui entoure la science ;

2)      la légitimité de la demande du peuple européen ;

3)      la question de savoir si la demande européenne est discriminatoire (c’est à dire qu’elle est simplement une tentative de protéger sa propre industrie fermière).

Aux Etats-Unis, la FDA a approuvé l’utilisation de la plupart des hormones de façon contrôlée. Selon les USA, l’UE a aussi conduit une étude complète qui montre qu’il n’y a pas de risque lié aux animaux traités aux hormones. Il semble, cependant, y avoir un certain nombre de doutes concernant à la fois les effets des hormones sur le bétail et sur le lien possible avec le cancer du sein et du colon chez les hommes. L’UE a donc argumenté qu’elle devrait être autorisée à invoquer le principe de précaution dans ce cas, ce qui voudrait dire qu’elle peut agir malgré l’incertitude scientifique.

Les USA ont répondu que rien dans le monde de la science n’était moins incertain que cela et que donc l’interdiction européenne était illégale.

 

Un autre point important est de savoir si indépendamment des sciences, l’UE pourrait être autorisée à mettre en place une interdiction basée sur la volonté de son peuple. Comme l’a dit un auteur,

 

« ...certainement, si les consommateurs et les gouvernements européens sont opposés à la nourriture traitée aux hormones et veulent promouvoir des méthodes organique d’élevage des troupeaux, ils devraient avoir le droit absolu de le faire. »

Cependant, en terme de commerce international, c’est le moindre des soucis étant donné que l’interdiction d’un produit uniquement sur la base d’une demande populaire est interdit qu’elle que soit l’importance de l’opinion publique.

Finalement, la question de la discrimination : l’UE dit que l’interdiction n’est pas discriminatoire. Car elle est appliquée à tous les producteurs. Les fermes européennes n’ont pas le droit d’utiliser d’hormones dans certaines circonstances et les exportateurs comme l’Australie, l’Argentine, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Brésil se sont tous mis d’accord pour expédier de la viande sans hormones à l’UE. Cela dit, certains affirment qu’un facteur important de l’équation est le fait que l’industrie du bœuf européen n’soit pas aussi compétitive que celle des américains et considérant les subventions apportées à l’agriculture dans l’UE, cette interdiction est vue par les américains comme un protectionnisme finement déguisé. L’UE voit  cette interdiction  comme une requête légitime pour tous les fermiers alors que les Etats-Unis la voient comme le signe d’une « Europe forteresse » essayant de protéger les intérêts de son industrie fermière.

 

La réglementation...

 

Le cas a mis en jeu une combinaison de deux accords annexés au commerce international, l’accord sur les mesures sanitaires et phytosanitaires (SPS) et l’accord sur les barrières techniques au commerce (TBT). Plus simplement, les accords SPS concernent la sécurité alimentaire et la régulation de la santé chez les animaux et les plantes et les TBT concernent les normes en place. Les SPS permettent la régulation mais seulement si elle n’est pas discriminatoire ( c’est à dire basée sur les règles WTA du traitement national et des statuts des nations les plus favorisées) et si elle est basée sur une analyse adéquate du risque conduite par des preuves scientifiques récentes. Les TBT nécessitent que les normes internationalement acceptées soient utilisées où elles existent.

 

En août 1997, le rapport du jury a conclu que l’UE avait violé les accords SPS parce que :

 

-         Elle a maintenu des mesures sanitaires qui ne sont pas basées sur des analyses de risque (il a rejeté l’utilisation par l’UE du principe de précaution) ;

-         Elle a fait des distinctions arbitraires et injustifiées sur le plan de la protection sanitaire dans des situations différentes ce qui a eu pour effet de produire une discrimination ou une restriction déguisée au commerce;

-          Elle a maintenu des mesures sanitaires qui n’étaient pas basées sur des normes internationales existantes sans justifications.

 

L’UE a fait appel en septembre 1997.le 17 janvier 1998, l’organe d’appel a rendu un rapport qui a changé de façon significative la décision du jury, statuant en faveur de l’UE sur plusieurs points. Comme le jury, l’organe d’appel a décrété que l’UE pouvait maintenir une législation alimentaire plus élevée que celle de Codex si elle fournit des preuves scientifiques. Cependant, l’organe d’appel maintient que les mesures de l’UE n’étaient pas cohérente avec les procédures d’analyse de risque des accords SPS.

Encore une fois, l’UE se référait au principe de précaution, disant que c’était une coutume générale acceptée du droit international et qui devrait donc être appliquée dans l’analyse du risque. Cependant, selon l’organe d’appel, « les statuts du principe de précaution dans la loi internationale continuent d’être le sujet du débat dans les académies, les législateurs en exercice et les juges... Nous considérons... qu’il n’est pas nécessaire et probablement imprudent pour l’organe d’appel dans cet appel de prendre position dans cette question importante mais abstraite. »

Pour des raisons diverses, dont le fait que les accords SPS ne contiennent pas de mention spécifique à propos du principe de précaution, l’organe d’appel a décrété que le principe de précaution ne passe pas outre les clauses de l’analyse du risque dans les accords SPS.

L’UE a aussi objecté la sélection de deux experts par le jury, l’un d’entre eux ayant des liens avec l’industrie pharmaceutique. Ce fut rejeté par l’organe d’appel. La justification de l’organe d’appel au-delà des normes était elle aussi impressionnante. Il a dit, « nous ne sommes pas capables de partager les conclusions apparemment tracées par le jury qui disent que l’importation de viande traitée est interdite et que l’utilisation d’hormones  sur la communauté en général est interdite. La mesure européenne n’était pas réellement destinée à protéger sa population du cancer mais plutôt à rejeter le bœuf aux hormones américain et canadien et par-là de protéger les producteurs de bœuf ressortissants de la communauté européenne. 

L’organe d’appel a donc rejeté la réclamation américaine disant que l’interdiction européenne sur l’importation était une mesure purement protectionniste.

La partie la  plus inhabituelle de la décision est le fait que dans une partie du rapport il soit dit que l’UE pourrait interdire le bœuf si les hormones n’étaient pas administrées en accord avec de bons croisements. Ce point pourrait s’avérer d’importance majeure parce que cela relève de tout un processus et d’une méthode de production (PPM), plus que d’un produit en lui-même. Reste à voir si ce sera interprété comme une discrimination autorisée sur le plan des PPM selon les accords mondiaux sur le commerce.

 

 

Les points importants soulevés par ce texte :

-         La faille du commerce international dans sa prise en compte du principe de précaution

-         La difficulté à concilier des décisions démocratiques basées sur des affaires publiques et la loi du commerce international.

-         Le pouvoir et l’influence de l’industrie de la biotechnologie américaine.

-         La nécessité d’une analyse « adéquate » du risque avant la mise en place de mesures sanitaires. Bien que le SPS établisse une procédure pour l’analyse du risque, finalement, l’adéquation légale de l’analyse du risque ne peut être déterminée que par l’OMC rétrospectivement.

-         Les normes alimentaires (couvertes à la fois par les accords SPS et TBT ), plus élevées que les normes internationales peuvent être utilisées mais uniquement avec des justifications scientifiques.

-         L’acceptation potentielle de la discrimination par l’organe d’appel  au point de vue des procédures et des méthodes de productions (PPM).

-         Les USA tout comme l’UE maintiennent une interdiction sur l’importation de viande des pays qu’ils croient pouvoir avoir des risques de vache folle. Ces maladies affectent la santé des animaux (moutons, porcs, bétail) et réduit leur valeur. Il y a un certain double jeu de la part des USA: ils interdisent d’un côté l’importation de bœufs qui sont susceptibles (mais pas de façon certaine) de transmettre la maladie de la vache folle aux troupeaux américains et de l’autre se plaignent de l’interdiction de l’UE d’importer des bœufs traités aux hormones qui sont susceptibles (mais pas de façon certaine) d’affecter la santé humaine et être préjudiciable aux troupeaux européens.

 

Commentary

 

The diversity of sources testifying in favour of the ban leads us to believe in an international manipulation to encourage trade more than health. This text does not mention any affects on children, it is written in a clever way and conduce to reflection. This analysis, made without exaggeration by an autonomous federation, rising the problem of public opinion across Europe and its inefficiency in the juridical process (it is not taken in account by WTO decisions), offers once again a interesting view of the case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Text 4: The EU's relations with the United States of America

The 2000 Queluz EU-US Summit

May 31, 2000

 

Link

 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/summit_05_00/hormone_case_summary.htm

 

Source

 

One can find this document on EUROPA, the portal site of the European Union:  http://europa.eu.int/.

It is a memo, an official report on the 2000 Queluz EU-US Summit, which highlights the way the EU, and the US work together in the trade field. It therefore brings the readers an impartial and realistic view of current transatlantic trade relations.

 

Summary

 

This is an official report which contains some background documents that give us an overview of the Hormones beef case and that remind us the rules of the WTO dispute settlement all along the process.

 

French summary

 

Ce rapport officiel contient des documents contenant des informations contextuelles qui nous donnent ainsi une bonne vue d’ensemble de l’Affaire du bœuf aux hormones et qui nous rappellent les règles de résolution de conflit au sein de l’OMC et ce, tout au long de la procédure.

 

The EU's relations with the United States of America

The 2000 Queluz EU-US Summit
May 31, 2000

 

Background Documents

 

The "hormone" case: Background and history

MEMO/00/27 - Brussels, 24 May 2000

 

 

WTO Dispute Settlement and Appellate Body Findings

 

In 1996, the US and Canada held formal consultations in the framework of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism with the EU regarding its legislation covering the ban on hormones (17 beta-oestradiol, progesterone, testosterone, zeranol, trenbolone and melengestrol acetate) for growth promoting purposes in livestock. Following requests from the two countries, WTO panels were set up to assess the conformity of the EC measures with its WTO obligations. The reports from these panels were delivered in August 1997. The EC measures were found not to be in conformity with a number of WTO rules. The EU objected to the conclusions of the panels in September 1997, which were consequently submitted for review to the Appellate Body.

On 13 February 1998 the report of the Appellate Body was adopted which in particular found that the Community had provided "general studies which do indeed show the existence of a general risk of cancer; but they do not focus on and do not address the particular kind of risk at stake here - the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential of the residues of those hormones found in meat derived from cattle to which the hormones had been administered for growth promotion purposes … those general studies are in other words relevant but do not appear to be sufficiently specific to the case at hand."

The Appellate Body clarified, however, that a WTO Member:

1        Has the right to choose the level of health protection it deems appropriate;

2        Is not obliged to assess risk in a quantitative form in order to be able to take measures;

3        Is not obliged to follow majority and mainstream scientific views minority views can also be taken into account.

It also overruled the earlier Panel ruling that the EC had not been consistent in the level of protection it had set for hormones used for growth promotion on the one hand and naturally occurring hormones on the other.

The report mentioned Article 5.7, which deals with measures taken when scientific information is insufficient. This article permits members to take measures, but they must be provisional and based on pertinent information. Members are obliged to seek the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and to review the measures within a reasonable period of time.

The Appellate Body recommended that the EC bring its measures into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement.

On 29 May 1998 the Arbitrator granted the Community a "reasonable period" of 15 months from the adoption of the recommendations to implement those recommendations that is, until 13 May 1999.

 

Scientific Response to the Appellate Body Ruling

 

Following the indications of the WTO Appellate Body, the Commission launched in early 98 a series of 17 studies concerning the issues the Appellate Body indicated as relevant to improve and complement current knowledge. They concern toxicological aspects, residue analysis, abuse and control aspects and environmental aspects.

In response to the WTO Appellate Body's main concern about the need for a comprehensive risk assessment the Commission mandated the Scientific Committee of Veterinary measures relating to Public Health (SCVPH) at the end of 1998 to deliver an assessment of the risk to human health arising from the use of the six hormones as growth promoters, in particular from residues in meat and meat products.

The SCVPH adopted its opinion in April 99, concluding that for all six hormones endocrine, developmental, immunological, neurobiological, immunotoxic and carcinogenic effects could be envisaged. For 17ß Oestradiol the SCVPH concludes that there is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that it has to be considered a complete carcinogen, but it was not possible to quantify the risk. For the other five hormones the available information is incomplete and does not allow a quantitative estimate of the risk, however a risk to consumers was identified. Of particular relevance to the SCVPH is that even exposure to small traces in meat carries risks. No threshold levels can be defined for any of the six substances. Of the various susceptible risk groups’ prepubertal children is the group of greatest concern.

The opinion of the SCVPH was elaborated in full awareness of the 17 ongoing studies and with direct scientific feedback from the experts involved. However, the SCVPH was not involved in the setting up and management of the studies. The Commission intends to allow completion of the few still ongoing from the 17 scientific studies, and will keep the SCVPH fully informed of progress and results. It is important to note that in the meantime the SCVPH has concluded that very significant gaps in current knowledge exist.

The results of the 17 studies have been or are being made available to the scientific community as they come forward. These results are expected to be made publicly available by the scientists concerned through presentations and publication in scientific journals following the normal peer review process, which may take several months.

 

Legal response to the Appellate Body Ruling

 

The US, on 17 May 1999, had requested the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO to authorise the suspension of the application to the EC and its Member States of tariff concessions covering trade in an amount of US$ 202 million per year. A similar request was made by Canada on 20 May 1999 for an amount of CDN$ 75 million per year. The EC objected to the level of suspension proposed by the US and Canada, and, on 12 July 1999, the WTO Arbitrator determined that the level of nullification or impairment suffered by the US and Canada was US$ 116.8 million per year, and CND$ 11.3 million per year, respectively.

The US suspended the application of tariff concessions by imposing a 100% ad valorem rate of duty on mainly agricultural products from 29 July 1999. On 1 August 1999, Canada also imposed 100% ad valorem tariffs on, in particular, beef and pork products.

 

Latest Scientific Review and Commission response

 

Since adoption of the SCVPH opinion on 30 April 1999, some new reports have been published on this subject. In the light of this information, the Commission asked the SCVPH to either confirm that there is no recent scientific information that would lead it to revise its previous opinion, or to revise the relevant parts of the opinion as necessary. On 3rd May 2000, the SCVPH delivered an opinion that recent scientific reports did not provide convincing data and arguments requiring a revision of the conclusion drawn in their opinion of 30 April 1999.

In the light of that opinion, the Commission concluded that it would not be appropriate to lift the existing ban on the use of growth promoting hormones for meat production.

Furthermore, the Commission considers that the strength of the evidence as presented in the opinion of 30 April 1999 against 17ß oestradiol is strong enough to justify a permanent ban on its use for any purposes for farm animals. For the other hormones, the SCVPH has outlined areas where more information is required. For this reason, the Commission considers that a provisional ban will be in compliance with the ruling of the Appellate Body, while recognising the need to seek further information and to review the measures in the light of future evidence.

 

Commentary

 

Transatlantic relations have been in crisis for some time. Disagreements between the EU and the US have dramatically increased and escalated into a trade war. Furthermore the current EU-US partnership does not enable serious discussions about how to deal with these differences of policy and conception between them.

The result of reading this document is to bear in mind a forceful and convincing portrayal of how the major powers are dealing with this most fundamental and complex problem affecting international trade today.

Related Issue

 

Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue continues efforts to promote EU-US economic ties:

http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/FD/d-us20040930_002/d-us20040930_002en.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Text 5: Business: The Economy battle over beef hormones

UK, Thursday, May 13 1999

 

Link

 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/342310.stm

 

Source

 

The British Broadcasting Corporation has broadcast news for more than 80 years-its first news radio bulletin was broadcast in 1922.

It appeared to be a powerful force in the 20th century, providing entertainment, education and information, and captivating millions of viewers and listeners at home and abroad, describing it as « innovative, progressive and pioneering ». This source of information appears to be relevant, impartial and clear as it presents each interested party arguing. Therefore the information that can be found is reliable[2].

 

Summary

 

The EU is not likely to lift its ban on hormones beef and is active to encourage the European countries to stand united facing the US namely to have a common policy and it managed to influence a country such as the UK.

BBC News Online presents arguments from both sides of the safety debate.

 

French summary

 

L’UE n’est pas susceptible de lever son interdiction du bœuf aux hormones  et milite pour convaincre les pays européens à ne faire qu’un, face aux EU, c’est-à-dire, à avoir une politique commune et elle a rallié à sa cause un pays comme le Royaume Uni.

Les nouvelles de la BBC en ligne présentent des arguments des deux côtés sur le débat sécuritaire.

 

Glossary

 

To meet a deadline (v.): respecter un délai

To stand firm (v.): tenir bon

Carcinogenic (adj.): cancérigène

The main thrust (n.): l’idée générale

Err on the side of caution : pécher dans le sens de la prudence, par mesure de prudence

The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (n.): l’Accord Sanitaire et Phytosanitaire

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n.): l’Accord sur les Tarifs Douaniers et le Commerce

Compounds (n.): composés

Food additives (n.): additifs

To comply with (v.): se conformer à

Unwillingness (n.): reticence

 


Business: The Economy

Battle over beef hormones


 

Thursday, May 13, 1999 Published at 10:54 GMT 11:54 UK


The European Union (EU) has refused to meet the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) deadline for lifting its ban on imports of hormone-treated beef from the US. It imposed the ban due to concerns over the potential risk to human health of the growth-promoting hormones. BBC News Online presents arguments from both sides of the safety debate.

 

The National Consumer Council in the United Kingdom supports the EU's concerns.


« We believe the EU should stand firm on this issue in the interests of consumer health and safety.

There are a number of concerns linked to the use of hormones as growth promoters, including reports that they may lead to cancer.

Scientists have argued that any increase in the level of hormones, above that which occurs naturally in humans, carries a potential risk of carcinogenic effects.

The risks associated with 'cocktails' of different hormones are also unclear. Different scientists take differing views. But what is certain is that the safety of hormones in beef, and other meat products, has been called into question.

Under such circumstances, we should apply the 'precautionary principle', already widely adopted in international treaties.

The main thrust of the precautionary principle is that, where an activity poses a serious risk to human health, precautionary measures should be taken - even if certain cause and effect relationships are not scientifically proven.

In short, we should err on the side of caution where there is a potentially serious risk. This principle is recognised in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

We believe that the health and safety of consumers should be the prime consideration - and is reason enough for the ban to stay.

No international trade agreement or law prevents governments from protecting their consumers against potentially serious threats to health, as long as they can point to scientific evidence to justify their actions.

The EU can do so in this case. Consumers are extremely concerned about food safety - and where safety is in question, governments should act to protect them. »

 

 

The United States government attacks the EU's concerns.


« We have been seeking a solution to this issue for over a decade. We have informed the EU of our willingness to be flexible on examining solutions to their concerns.

However, the dispute cannot be resolved until US beef obtains access to the EU market. Over four decades of scientific research has found no justification for continuing the EU's ban.

Study after study over the last four decades has confirmed that the proper use of these compounds, according to approved registered labels, poses no risk to human or animal health.

The EU's own Scientific Conference on Growth Promotants held in 1995 reached the same conclusion.

Most recently, in its 1999 meeting, the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) of the World Health Organisation and Food and Agriculture Organisation reconfirmed the safety of certain growth hormones when administered to cattle in accordance with good veterinary practices.

JECFA concluded that there is no need to establish maximum residue levels for the hormones Estradiol, progesterone, and testosterone because the presence of residues would not present a health concern.

This is but the latest in a long series of similar findings. The EU already presented these arguments to an impartial WTO dispute-settlement panel in 1997. It lost.

It then appealed that decision to the WTO and lost again last year. The EU, having failed in every step of the WTO process, appears to be once again searching for a way to avoid its international obligations.

The major premise of the EU's effort seems to be the potential for risk assuming the hormones might be abused. In the United States, use of these approved compounds is carefully licensed and regulated.

Scientific consensus has already answered the debate over public health and safety. The issue is the EU's refusal to comply with the WTO rulings and its unwillingness to honor its international obligations. »

 

French version

 

Commerce: La querelle économique sur le bœuf aux hormones

 

Face à face

 

L’Union européenne (UE) a refusé de respecter le délai de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) pour lever son interdiction des importations américaines de bœuf traité aux hormones. Elle a pris une telle interdiction à cause de préoccupations concernant le risque potentiel pour la santé de l’homme d’hormones favorisant la croissance. Les nouvelles de la BBC en ligne présentent des arguments des deux côtés sur le débat sécuritaire.

 

Le Conseil National des Consommateurs aux Royaumes Unis soutient les préoccupations de l’UE.

 

« Nous croyons que l’UE devrait tenir bon sur cette question dans les intérêts de la sécurité et de la santé du consommateur.

Il y a un nombre d’inquiétudes liées à l’utilisation des hormones comme accélérateurs de croissance, incluant des rapports qu’elles pourraient causer un cancer.

Des scientifiques ont soutenu que toute augmentation du taux d’hormones, au-dessus de celui que l’on trouve naturellement chez l’homme, entraîne un risque potentiel d’effets cancérigènes.

Les risques associés aux ‘cocktails’ de différentes hormones sont par ailleurs flous. Différents scientifiques ont des avis différant. Mais ce qui est certain est que la sûreté du bœuf aux hormones et d’autres produits de viande ont appelé à se poser des questions.

Sous de telles circonstances, nous devrions appliquer le ‘principe de précaution’, déjà largement adopté dans les traités internationaux.

L’idée générale du principe de précaution est que, où une activité pose un sérieux risque pour la santé de l’homme, des mesures préventives devraient être prises - même si certaines relations de cause à effet ne sont pas scientifiquement prouvées.

En bref, nous devrions pécher dans le sens de la prudence où il y a un risque potentiellement sérieux. Ce principe est reconnu dans l’Accord Sanitaire et Phytosanitaire de l’Accord Général sur les Tarifs Douaniers et le Commerce (GATT).

Nous croyons que la santé et la sécurité des consommateurs devrait être la considération première - et est une raison suffisante pour maintenir l’interdiction.

Aucun accord commercial international ou loi n’empêche les gouvernements de protéger leurs consommateurs contre des menaces potentiellement sérieuses envers la santé, aussi longtemps qu’ils puissent montrer une preuve scientifique pour justifier leurs actions.

L’UE peut le faire dans ce cas là. Des consommateurs sont extrêmement soucieux de la sécurité alimentaire - et où la sécurité est en question, les gouvernements devraient agir pour les protéger. »

 

Le gouvernement américain s’attaque aux préoccupations européennes

 

« Nous avons cherché à trouver une solution à ce problème pendant plus d’une décennie. Nous avons informé l’UE de notre consentement à être flexible quant à l’examen des solutions à leurs préoccupations.

Cependant, le conflit ne peut être résolu jusqu’à ce que le bœuf américain obtienne l’accès au marché européen. Plus de quatre décennies de recherches scientifiques n’ont trouvé aucune justification à l’interdiction de l’UE de perdurer.

Étude après étude sur les quatre dernières décennies a confirmé que l’utilisation normale de ces composés, selon des labels agréés et déposés, pose aucun risque pour la santé de l’homme ou de l’animal.

La propre Conférence Scientifique Européenne sur les Accélérateurs de Croissance tenu en 1995 est arrivé à la même conclusion.

Plus récemment, au cours sa rencontre en 1999, le Comité d’Experts Associés sur les Additifs (CEAA) de l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé et de l’Organisation Alimentaire et de l’Agriculture a confirmé à nouveau la sûreté de certaines hormones de croissances quand elles sont administrées au bétail conformément aux bonnes pratiques vétérinaires.

Le CEAA a conclu qu’il n’y avait pas besoin d’établir de taux maximal de résidus pour les hormones Estradiole, progestérone et testostérone car la présence de ces résidus ne devrait pas présenter de préoccupation pour la santé.

Ce n’est autre que le dernier d’une longue série de conclusions similaires. L’UE a déjà présenté ces arguments à un panel impartial de règlement de conflit de l’OMC en 1997. Elle a perdu.

Elle a alors fait appel de la décision à l’OMC et a perdu à nouveau l’an dernier. L’UE, ayant échoué à toutes les étapes du processus de l’OMC, apparaît être une nouvelle fois à la recherche d’un moyen d’éviter ses obligations internationales.

Le prémisse majeur des efforts de l’UE semble être le potentiel de risque supposant que les hormones puissent être abusées. Aux États Unis, l’utilisation de ces composés agréés est prudemment autorisée et régulée.

Un consensus scientifique a déjà répondu au débat sur la sécurité et la santé publique. Le problème est le refus de l’UE de se conformer aux décisions de l’OMC et sa réticence à honorer ses obligations internationales. » 

 

Commentary

 

The EU's ban on hormone treated beef has triggered retaliation from the US, and French President Jacques Chirac's solution, an international food safety board, has raised bitter US opposition.

 

Although even European scientists claim that - when used properly - natural hormones are no threat to the public health, European Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler still opposes the use of natural hormones in beef. And he refuses to allow US meat on the European market.

The most important reason to confront the US is that consumers and farmers in Europe don't want steak with hormones. There is no scientific proof that the so-called natural hormones - that are synthetically produced - could damage the public health. But the public opinion in Europe - especially in the northern European countries - is firmly against any use of artificial growth stimulators, although they might not harm the human health at all.

 

UK Consumer does not want hormones in their beef

The fact is that the consumer here does not want hormones in their beef. In the UK we have a particularly fussy customer who insists on the very highest standards of animal welfare, environmental awareness and most of all NOTHING added to the "natural" diet of a beef animal. Most farmers in Northern Ireland operate under a "Farm Quality Assurance Scheme" which insists that the animals diet must be grass based.

Inspectors make unannounced checks to make sure you are not feeding animals any supplements that they might consider inappropriate. They also check on the welfare if the animals and the environmental friendliness of the farm. Because we have this system in Northern Ireland our beef is very popular all over Europe (particularly in Holland) were it is marketed under the "Greenfield’s label".

We export 80% of our beef so naturally our beef industry is in deep crisis. It is the view of most farmers here that since the market is already saturated there would be little advantage in increasing supply with hormones when consumers do not want it. The people who run the quality scheme have said that even if the EU allow hormones to be used any one doing so will be removed from the scheme. Obviously hormone beef can be produced cheaper and therefore could be seen as representing unfair competition.

 

There is no credible scientific evidence that any of the US-used growth promotants (please note they are not hormones) cause any problems in beef. It's a commonly held view in the US that the UK was just using this trumped up issue to protect their beef market from US imports.

 

 

 

Text 6: US-European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges

May 21, 2002

 

Link

 

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10866.pdf

 

Source

 

This is an official document from the website: http://fpc.state.gov

As it is, it gives us an official analysis of the Transatlantic trade relations with its issues and policy challenges which is useful to make us understand what there is at stake in that field for the future and to know to what extent it is important.

 

Summary

 

This document from the state government shows the tension between European and American governments has gotten continually worse since the emergence of various trade conflicts.

Despite the polite tone held in conflict settlement, the growing divergence could easily devolve into a trans-Atlantic trade war and create critical problems for the current global business[3]. 

 

French summary

 

Ce document officiel du gouvernement montre que les tensions entre les gouvernements des deux blocs n’ont cessé de croître depuis l’émergence de conflits commerciaux variés.

Malgré un ton convenu adopté lors d’un règlement de conflit, la divergence croissante entre les deux rives de l’Atlantique a pu facilement dégénérer en une guerre commerciale et créer de sérieux problèmes pour le commerce actuel mondial.

 

 

U.S.- European Union Trade Relations: Issues and

Policy Challenges

Updated May 21, 2002

 

Issue Brief for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Order Code IB10087

Raymond J. Ahearn

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

 

 

 

 

U.S.-European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges

 

Summary

 

The United States and the European Union (EU) share a huge and mutually beneficial economic partnership. Not only is the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship the largest in the world, it is arguably the most important. Agreement between the two economic superpowers has been critical to making the world trading system more open and efficient. Given a huge level of commercial interactions, trade tensions and disputes are not unexpected. While trade tensions in the past have tended to ebb and flow, some observers believe that this year’s threat of a trade war is more serious than before. A dispute over steel trade is the proximate cause of rising trade tensions, but other high-profile disputes involving tax breaks for U.S. exporters and the treatment of genetically engineered (GE) products lurk in the background.

Resolution of U.S.-EU disputes has become increasingly difficult in recent years. Part of the problem may be due to the fact that the U.S. and the EU are of roughly equal economic strength and neither side has the ability to impose concessions on the other. Another factor may be that many bilateral disputes now involve clashes in domestic values, priorities, and regulatory systems where the international rules of the road are inadequate to provide a basis for effective and timely dispute resolution. In order to build a smoother relationship, Brussels and Washington may have to resolve a number of these disputes and avoid an outbreak retaliatory actions this year. The agreement to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO trade ministerial held last November in Doha, Qatar has facilitated this effort. But the recent passage of U.S. legislation increasing farm spending could complicate efforts to move the Doha Round forward and thwart the new round’s potential beneficial impact on resolving other disputes. The two sides now must deal with the fall-out from the Bush Administration’s March 5, 2002 decision to impose temporary tariffs of up to 30% on approximately $8 billion in steel imports. Reacting angrily to this action, the EU on March 27, 2002 announced provisional tariffs of its own on steel. More provocatively, the EU took initial steps under an untested provision of the WTO to impose retaliatory tariffs by June 18, 2002 on U.S. exports without an explicit authorization to act. If Brussels pursues this course, U.S. - EU trade tensions are likely to escalate and potentially more explosive disputes involving the U.S. foreign sales corporation tax benefit for exports and the EU’s policy towards approval of new GE products could become more difficult to manage.

The major U.S.-EU trade and investment policy challenges can be grouped into six categories: (1) avoiding a “big ticket” trade dispute associated with steel or the tax breaks for U.S. exporters; (2) resolving longstanding trade disputes involving Airbus production subsidies and beef hormones; (3) dealing with different public concerns over new technologies and new industries (4) fostering a receptive climate for mergers and acquisitions; (5) strengthening the multilateral trading system; and (6) reaching understandings on foreign policy sanctions that have a trade impact.

 

Resolving Longstanding Disputes

 

The United States and EU are engaged in long-running disputes involving aerospace production subsidies and trade in beef that has been treated with hormones. While neither of these disputes is currently on the front burner, some efforts at resolution are likely to continue this year.

 

Beef Hormones

 

The dispute over the EU ban, implemented in 1989, on the production and importation of meat treated with growth-promoting hormones is one of the bitterest disputes between the United States and Europe. It is also a dispute that on its surface involves a relatively small amount of trade. The ban affected an estimated $100- $200 million in lost U.S. exports –less than one-tenth of one percent of U.S. exports to the EU in 1999.

The EU justified the ban to protect the health and safety of consumers, but several WTO dispute settlement panels subsequently ruled that the ban was inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. The SPS Agreement provides criteria that have to be met when a country imposes food safety import regulations more stringent than those agreed upon in international standards. These include a scientific assessment that the hormones pose a health risk, along with a risk assessment. Although the WTO panels concluded that the EU ban lacked a scientific justification, the EU refused to remove the ban primarily out of concern that European consumers were opposed to having this kind of meat in the marketplace.

In lieu of lifting the ban, the EU in 1999 offered the United States compensation in the form of an expanded quota for hormone-free beef. The U.S. government, backed by most of the U.S. beef industry, opposed compensation on the grounds that exports of hormone-free meat would not be large enough to compensate for losses of hormone-treated exports. This led the way for the United States to impose 100% retaliatory tariffs on $116 million of EU agricultural products from mostly France, Germany, Italy, and Denmark, countries deemed the biggest supporters of the ban.

The U.S. hard line is buttressed by concerns that other countries might adopt similar measures based on health concerns that lack a legitimate scientific basis according to U.S. standards. Other U.S. interest groups are concerned that non-compliance by the EU undermines the future ability of the WTO to resolve disputes involving the use of SPS measures.

Recent occurrences of “mad cow disease” in several EU countries and the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom and three other EU countries have contributed to an environment that is not conducive to resolving the meat hormone dispute.

The EU has recently indicated its intention to make the ban on hormone-treated meat IB10087 05-21-024 Prepared by Charles E. Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division. CRS-9 permanent, while at the same time expressing some openness to renewing discussions about a compensation arrangement, which would increase the EU’s market access for non-hormone, treated beef from the United States. In discussions held June 11, 2001, the EU rejected a U.S. industry proposal for expanded access to the EU market for hormone-free beef for a period of 12 years. In response, the EU countered with a 4-5 year period for compensation. The compensation talks have since languished. But a February 20, 2002 EU Standing Veterinary Committee proposal to repeal the requirement that 20% of beef imported from the U.S. be tested for the presence of hormones could remove an important obstacle in the compensation talks by making it easier for U.S. non-hormone beef producers to take advantage of any improved market access conditions.

In pursuing compensation talks, the Bush Administration is faced with a divide industry position. The American Meat Institute and the American Farm Bureau prefer carousel retaliation to settle the dispute while the American Cattlemen’s Beef Association supports efforts to gain increased access for non-hormone treated beef in exchange for dropping the retaliatory tariff on EU exports. Thus far, EU offers of compensation for lost U.S. meat exports in lieu of lifting the ban have been rejected by the United States.

The Bush Administration has maintained that it would not use so-called “carousel” retaliation (rotating the products subject to retaliation) while the negotiations for compensation are on-going. Some observers speculate that both the EU and the U.S. have made a political decision to handle the dispute by insisting that they are making progress toward a resolution. This arguably could shield USTR from congressional and private sector pressures to apply the carousel provision against the EU. Resolution of the dispute could remove a critical irritant to the overall U.S.-EU trade relationship. How it is resolved could also have important implications for future WTO disputes involving the use of SPS measures to restrict trade.

 

(For further discussion, see CRS Report RS20142, The European Union’s Ban on Hormone-Treated Meat.)

 

Commentary

 

While no case has yet caused serious controversy, several issues are proving tough to resolve. Some have mistaken argued that this divergence is illusory but the divergence we see today is no mere fad or fashion - it is substantial and dangerous.

The smooth functioning of the WTO's dispute settlement system is essential to maintaining the credibility of the organisation and the world trading rules it upholds.
By obliging governments to settle disputes within a fixed time-frame according to agreed principles, the system is designed to defuse potential trade wars and curb bullyboy tactics by the powerful.

 

It should be relevant also to notice that the EU Directorate General responsible for health and consumer safety is constantly faced with the challenge of balancing the freedom and rights of individuals, industry and organisations with the need to reduce the real and potential adverse effects of products and processes on human, animal or plant health or the environment.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Text 7: The Regulation of Food Safety and the Use of Traceability/Tracing in the EU and USA: Convergence or Divergence?

March 19, 2004

 

Link

 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/speeches/speech168_en.pdf

 

Source: identifications and analysis

 

         This text is the speech made by David Byrne, the European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection during a Food Safety Conference which took place in Washington DC in March 2004. It happens after an analysis made for several years about risk perception, the last conference concerning this subject having been led in Brussels the year before. David Byrne speak as a specialist: he had managed with this subject and studied it for a long time and experienced the mad cow disease and GMOs which we can affirm are the most important cases of fear concerning food in public opinion implying governments’ decisions. As the conference is not dealing with the hormone case and the audience is not the European parliament (he addresses himself to American people), the author tries to be neutral and to explain public reaction.

 

Summary in French (5-15 lines)

 

            La perception du risque est un élément majeur du traitement d’une crise, alimentaire notamment. Cette perception est un facteur totalement irrationnel, les réactions des populations étant plus largement liées au secteur émotionnel (dans lequel le rôle des media est important) qu’à des apports scientifiques.

            L’élément essentiel de cet exposé est de montrer combien la perception du risque, largement liée à la culture, diffère d’un côté et de l’autre de l’Atlantique, s’agissant de sécurité alimentaire. Aux vues des déroulements successifs de la crise de la vache folle et des OGMs, on peut nettement conclure à une réactivité excessive des populations européennes, comparativement à la neutralité des américains dans ce domaine.. Cette réactivité et ces réactions en générales sont liées aux rapports de confiance pré-existant d’une population vis-à-vis de son gouvernement et de la délicatesse de la délégation de responsabilité dans ce domaine (l’homme est naturellement plus sensible aux conséquences des risques pris POUR lui (par un tiers, en l’occurrence le gouvernement, en son nom) que PAR lui, de façon consciente).

            Ainsi, difficile à prévoir tant les conclusions des scientifiques sont éloignées des réactions de l’opinion publique, elle-même différant selon les lieux, la perception des risques et donc la gestion de ceux-ci doivent largement être adaptées au contexte culturel de chaque pays, la culture européenne nécessitant apparemment un management du risque très « précautionneux ».

 

Summary in English (1-5)

 

            The risk perception is different whether the crisis happens in a country or in another. This is due to the abstract character of risk perception, linked to emotional field and provoking irrational reactions.

            Governments have to take that into account to adopt adapted measures, knowing that media have a big role and that human beings have natural reactions they have to know. Concerning the BSE and GMOs crisis for example, European and American public reacted in opposed ways. That is why it is interesting to exchange points of view on this subject with both American and European audience.

            We so have to consider such cultural differences to adapt and understand our policies.

 

Glossary

 

Prior :antérieur, précédent (ici préalable)

Regard : respect, estime, considération

Indiscriminate : qui manque de discernement, qui ne distingue pas

Thinly : maigrement, pauvrement

Cowardice : lâcheté

Harmful : nuisible

Sufficient : suffisant

Data: donnée

Available: disponible

Scope: portée

Achieve: atteindre, obtenir

Assessment: évaluation, jugement

Provisional: provisoire

Ensure: garantir

Pending: en attendant

Comprehensive: complète

Further: supplémentaire, autre, nouveau, davantage

Endorse: endosser, appuyer

Relevant: pertinent

Wide: vaste

Conflicting: contradictoire

To come to the fore: se faire remarquer

To collapse: s’effondrer

 

Text

 

Introduction

 

 The profile of risk and risk-related issues has risen markedly in the last 15 years. There has been a growing recognition of the importance of proper risk management and increasing interest in how this can be best used in relation to governance.

Of the various components of risk analysis – assessment, management and communication – where the perception of risk fits in is perhaps the most difficult aspect to understand and evaluate. The way that individuals, groups and societies react when faced with risk situations can often be difficult to predict – and indeed may appear irrational.

With a view to furthering our understanding of risk perception, the European Commission hosted a major conference in Brussels in December of last year, which attracted a wide range of participants from different backgrounds to try to get to the heart of the matter.

I am delighted to have the opportunity today to widen the discussion in a trans-Atlantic forum. I am sure that there is much than we can learn from each other. One of the particular issues highlighted by our Brussels conference was the differing attitude to specific risks, which may arise, in different societies and cultures. The contrast in public attitudes to GM foods and BSE are two good examples of divergent perception between Europe and the United States.

I will touch on both of these issues in the course of this address – in the context of explaining the European Union’s broad approach to issues of risk, in particular in the field of food safety.

Risk Perception

But first – a few words in general about risk perception. We do not habitually seek out the safest route as we go about our daily lives. Some risks we regard as inevitable, part and parcel of everyday life. Some risks we actively choose for the value they add to life. There is a risk attached to almost everything we do. Even inactivity carries risk. Zero risk does not exist.

Allow me to mention briefly a few specific factors.

Risks taken by individuals that are under their personal control appear to be more readily acceptable than those, which are outside their control.

Linked to this is the question of who decides on the risk. Individuals seem more comfortable with risks they decide to take on their own rather than risks, which are decided on their behalf – by Governments, for example.

Citizens tend to be more concerned about accidents for which, despite being relatively rare, the chances of survival are slim (such as plane crashes), while more common and random events (such as car accidents) for which the chances of survival are higher are of apparently less concern.

And benefit. What’s in it for me? Why should I be asked to take a risk, however small, if I cannot see any tangible benefit from doing so? This strikes an obvious chord with the GM debate in relation to food, a subject which continues to attract significant attention, at least in so far as perceptions in the EU are concerned.

 

GM foods

 

Despite repeated scientific assurance about the safety of consuming genetically modified food products, European public attitudes towards GM foods have, to date, shown few if any signs of a thaw. The science-based message simply fails to get across, or if it does, it is ignored.

European citizens have, by and large, made up their minds. Further attempts at public persuasion might even prove to be counter-productive if citizens feel they are being leant on or otherwise coerced into changing their views.

Against this background the European policy response was essentially twofold. First we ensured that a rigorous risk assessment and approval procedure was put in place. Second, we introduced a requirement for the clear labelling of GM products. This will enable European consumers to exercise choice over whether or not they choose to buy GM products.

I know that many on this side of the Atlantic take issue with this approach, but I maintain that it is entirely appropriate – and indeed the only tenable way forward in the circumstances, given the weight of public resistance to GM. I acknowledge that friends in the US find the European public’s attitude to GM difficult to understand. However, our consumers demanded clear labelling and traceability as essential prerequisites.

Perhaps attitudes will ameliorate over time and with clear choice available. Indeed the availability of GM foods with real benefits could help. But despite the protestations of the biotech industry there appears to be no immediate evidence of any short to medium term benefits.

 

Trust and transparency

 

The public’s reaction to GM is only one example of how Europe’s consumers seek verifiable and trustworthy information about food. It raises the whole question of public trust in relation to governments and public institutions.

The structures of European democracies have shown a marked shift in recent years with the rise of the stakeholder society. At a time when interest and involvement in politics at citizen level appears to be receding, strenuous efforts have been and continue to be made to engage citizens in the processes and decisions, which ultimately affect them. To make them feel they are part of the political process and not just the recipients of the decisions of others.

Clearly there is a need to develop trust. The food safety agencies, which have been established in many European countries, serve as good examples. These agencies create a credible and visible distance between different government structures with the broad aim of increasing transparency, which, in turn, bolsters public acceptance and confidence.

 

European Food Safety Authority

 

It was also necessary to reinforce trust in the pan European system of food safety. In this regard, I established the European Food Safety Authority. This provides independent scientific risk assessment in respect of food safety questions, and communicates risk information to the public.

 

Because of the legal structure in the EU, and in line with CODEX guidelines, risk management responsibilities have not been delegated to EFSA. These remain with the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament as appropriate.

You will hear more later today about EFSA from its Executive Director Geoffrey Podger.

 

Role of the media

 

The communication of risk to the public is of crucial importance. Of course, the media plays a major role in how the public perceives risk.

The problem for public authorities becomes one of how to transmit clear and accurate risk messages against the backdrop of certain sections of the media apparently intent on maximising hysteria.

 

BSE

 

One lesson we can learn from past experience is that conflicting messages are a major cause of destabilising consumer confidence in times of difficulty. Take the BSE crisis for example, which emerged in Europe from the mid-1990s. Indeed, BSE is an issue that has recently come to the fore in the United States.

One of the aftershock effects of the UK government’s announcement of a possible link between BSE and new variant CJD in 1996 was a fragmentation of messages from public authorities and the media right across Europe – which led to chaos, confusion and a meltdown in public confidence, which went far beyond the question of beef from just one country.

The beef market collapsed. People felt they had been misled.

When stringent measures were introduced to close off the possibility of potentially infected meat entering the food chain public confidence in beef gradually began to return.

Four years after the UK announcement, a similar crisis re-emerged in Germany. When BSE was finally discovered, as scientifically predicted, once again public confidence plummeted.

And in France a second BSE crisis arose in late 2000 when French citizens realised the extent of BSE. History was re-writing itself in terms of the “communications gap”.

The clear lesson is that a transparent and consistent approach to risk communication is vital in gaining and maintaining public confidence and trust.

It is interesting to compare the US public reaction to BSE with the European examples I have described. The benign reaction of the US beef market and the apparent lack of widespread public concern following the discovery of the US BSE case just before Christmas shows a stark contrast in public reactions to BSE in Europe.

Why should this be the case?

Are US consumers in general prepared to tolerate the risk of BSE? Contrast this with the ultra-precautionary approach of some of the main trading partners of the US. Here we have further evidence of global divergences in risk perception and consequent risk management measures.

 

Reform of the EU food safety system

 

In Europe the reaction to the succession of BSE-related crises, together with a number of other high profile food scares, had a profound affect on overall confidence in the European food industry’s ability to deliver safe food.

Despite the fact that such incidents only affected certain sectors, the entire industry suffered. A few rotten apples had effectively contaminated the whole barrel.

Regaining public trust in the European food supply therefore became a major challenge for me when I took up my position as European Commissioner with responsibility for food safety in September 1999. I embarked on a thorough root-and-branch reform of our systems to ensure that risks to the public were minimised.

But, as I have said, zero risk is an impossible dream. We needed to ensure, visibly, that where potential or actual problems are discovered, these could be quickly and effectively eliminated.

Traceability

We do not have time this morning to go into all of the details as to how we set about restoring confidence. The creation of EFSA was, as I have indicated, a crucial element.

But with the food chain we needed to ensure that if something went wrong it could be quickly identified and put right. Mandatory recall (a key feature of our General Food Law) would not work without mandatory traceability, which we also introduced for the first time right across Europe.

On the US side there was still the tendency to stick with voluntary recall and trace-back approaches. But in the intervening couple of years the US food industry was struck by the “Starlink” GM contamination of foodstuffs which, in the absence of mandatory trace-back mechanisms, caused significant damage in terms of confidence and costs.

Now you have had your first finding of BSE. This has fuelled demands for trace-back of related cattle. Moreover, it has brought to the fore the whole notion of mandatory animal identification, which has been an essential feature of the European, approach to animal health and public health for so many years.

A key element in improving the safety of the food chain has been the strengthening of our traceability measures. Too often when food crises occurred it proved extremely difficult and expensive to trace and withdraw the offending products. “Starlink” is the classic example.

So we have put a system of traceability in place that I term a “one up one down approach” – requiring each operator to know the step before him in the food chain and the step after. This system of tracing goods in the food chain is not new. Many firms already had a similar system in place.

The difference in the EU from next year is that all producers will, by law, have to have such a system in place. To enable the EU of 25 Member States to have a fully integrated common market in food such a legislative system is essential.

We have witnessed animal feed contamination where huge amounts of stocks had to be destroyed, and trade disrupted, because adequate traceability provisions were not in place.

These types of occurrences provoke enormous concerns among consumers. Ensuring the confidence of EU consumers necessitates such systems to facilitate withdrawal of goods that can be traded through the 25 Member States.

5

In the United States, it is interesting to note a degree of increasing convergence with Europe, albeit coming from a different political direction – that of the threat of bioterrorism (an area incidentally where the public perception of risk is probably higher in the US than it is in Europe).

US systems for the registration of exporters and the prior notification of imports are motivated by a desire to protect American citizens from the threat of deliberately contaminated food and food products. There is a marked similarity to European systems in this regard.

It seems to me that in traceability (no more so than in many other areas) there is greater convergence than one might otherwise think.

 

The precautionary principle and risk

 

Let me now turn to the question of precaution, as it is sometimes called here in the US, or the precautionary principle as it is called in the EU.

I have made it known on many occasions since the beginning of my mandate that I am no fan of the indiscriminate use of precaution. Precaution in this sense can be a thinly disguised trade protection measure, not to mention a badge of political cowardice.

To govern its use in the food arena, we now have legislation in the European Union – Article 7 of our General Food Law1.

It is clear from this important Article that the principle can only be considered when certain pre-requisite conditions are satisfied. These are:

�� There are potentially harmful effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process that have been identified;

�� That scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty;

�� There has to be an objective evaluation of available scientific data and other information before any decision is made to invoke the precautionary principle.

 

It is not a joker or wild card that can be played at any moment as a pretext for unjustified measures.

The second part of the Article provides the scope and limitations for the use of the precautionary principle. It provides that precautionary measures “shall be proportionate and no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of health protection chosen in the Community, regard being had to technical and economic feasibility and other factors regarded as legitimate in the matter under consideration”.

1 Regulation (EC) No 178.2002, Article 7:

a) In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment.

b) Measures adopted on the basis of paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of health protection chosen in the Community, regard being had to technical and economic feasibility and other factors regarded as legitimate in the matter under consideration. The measures shall be reviewed within a reasonable period of time, depending on the nature of the risk to life or health identified and the type of scientific information needed to clarify the scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment.

6 7

Those measures are to be reviewed within a reasonable period of time, depending on the nature of the risk to life and health identified and the type of scientific information needed to clarify the scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment.

I would like to stress that precautionary measures are by their nature provisional. Work must be put in place to identify new scientific data through research, data collection or other activities with clear responsibility for gathering this information being allocated so that the measure can be reviewed at the earliest opportunity.

The European Court2 has endorsed the philosophy behind the principle and its application, and has clarified the steps that need to be followed. A public authority cannot take a purely hypothetical approach to risk and may not simply base decisions on “zero risk”. Existing relevant scientific data must always be evaluated before the precautionary principle is invoked.

 

Conclusion

 

It is clear to me that both Europe and the US have very safe food chains. I made that clear to Secretary Veneman in my discussions with her yesterday.

Sometimes we have our differences about how things should be done.

Therefore it is crucially important to have greater common understandings of how our populations perceive risk. Diverging perceptions may ultimately influence how our respective regulatory regimes respond to given risks. Different responses to the same risk. Perhaps irrational, but understandable.

We are living through what we call “globalisation”, significantly driven by multi-national corporations and trade liberalisation. It is vital, therefore, for all of us to reach better appreciations of why we might agree on assessments of particular situations, whereas our risk management approaches might be different.

Equally, we should be conscious of divergences in risk assessments and their potential consequences.

It has become increasingly clear that risk perception plays an important role in the mechanics of risk management, and that approaches to risk management require further development for more effective policy making and, ultimately, better governance.

One of the messages that rang out loud and clear from our conference last December in Brussels was the stark contrast in the way scientists look at risk compared with citizens either individually or collectively in society.

The scientific approach is rational and methodical. It deals with probabilities and population averages – a logical and theoretical approach, free from emotional distortion. This is of course very useful. However what it misses is the “human factor” and the wide variety of influences, which shape human behaviour.

One delegate put it most succinctly – people behave according to perceptions, not facts.

In conclusion, may I thank the European Policy Centre, the Atlantic Council and the Grocery Manufacturers of America for helping organise this event. My gratitude is also due to the European Commission Delegation here in Washington.

I look forward to whatever perceptions or facts we can glean from this conference.

 

 

Translation

 

La régulation de la sécurité alimentaire et l’usage de la traçabilité aux Etats-Unis et aux USA: convergence ou divergence?

Introduction

La gestion des problèmes liés aux risques et aux risques associés a pris une large ampleur durant les quinze dernières années. On a constaté une reconnaissance croissante de l’importance du management du risques et un intérêt grandissant dans son utilisation optimale dans les relations de gouvernance.

Au sein des diverses composantes de l’analyse des risques (évaluation, management et communication) la perception du risque est certainement l’aspect le plus difficile à comprendre et à évaluer. La façon dont les individus, les groupes, les sociétés réagissent face à des situations à risque peut être délicate à prévoir et de fait peut paraître irrationnelle.

En vue de faire promouvoir notre compréhension de la perception du risque, la Commission européenne a organisé une conférence majeure à Bruxelles en décembre de l’année dernière qui a attiré une foule de participants venus de tous les horizons pour tenter de traiter de cette question sur le fond.

Je suis heureux d’avoir l’opportunité aujourd’hui de lancer la discussion au sein d’un forum transatlantique et je suis sûr que nous pourrons apprendre beaucoup les uns des autres.

L’une des problématiques particulière soulevée lors de nos conférences brusséloises était celle de l’attitude divergente face à des risques spécifiques dans différentes sociétés et différentes cultures.

Le contraste dans les attitudes du secteur public face aux OGMs et à la maladie de la vache folle sont deux exemples frappants de ces divergences de perception entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis.

Je vais aborder ces deux problèmes au cours de cet exposé (en expliquant l’approche frontalière européenne face à la problématique du risque, particulièrement en matière de sécurité alimentaire).

La perception du risque

Mais tout d’abord, quelques mots sur la perception du risque en général. Nous n’adoptons pas des comportements quotidiens totalement sécurisés. Nous considérons certains risques comme inévitables, comme faisant partie intégrante de notre vie quotidienne. Il y a même certains risques que nous prenons de façon délibérée pour le « plus » qu’ils apportent à la vie. Pratiquement tout ce que nous faisons comporte des risques. Même l’inactivité comporte des risques. Le risque zéro n’existe pas.

Permettez-moi de mentionner brièvement quelques facteurs probants.

Les risques pris par des individus avertis apparaissent comme plus acceptables que ceux qui sont pris indépendamment de leur consentement.

La question de « qui décide du risque » est liée à cela. Les individus semblent plus à l’aise vis à vis des risques qu’ils prennent par eux-mêmes que vis-à-vis des risques qui sont pris pour eux en leur nom (par les gouvernements par exemple).

Les citoyens ont tendance à se sentir plus concernés par des accidents pour lesquels les chances de survie sont mince (comme les accidents d’avion) et moins par des événements plus courants et dus au hasard (comme des accidents de voiture) pour lesquels les chances de survie sont plus grandes.

Et qu’est-ce que j’en retire ? Quel est l’intérêt pour moi ? Pourquoi me demanderait-on de prendre un risque si petit soit-il si je ne vois pas de raison tangible d’en tirer profit ? Cela crée une tension évidente dans le débat sur la nourriture OGM, un sujet qui continue d’attirer l’attention de manière significative du moins concernant la perception européenne.

La nourriture OGM

Malgré les affirmation répétées des scientifiques sur la sûreté des produits alimentaires génétiquement modifiés, l’attitude des européens vis à vis des aliments génétiquement modifiés montre de timides signes d’amélioration s’il en est. Les messages des scientifiques ont tout simplement du mal à passer ou s’ils passent, ils sont ignorés. Les citoyens européens, de façon générale, se sont fait leur idée. Des atteintes supplémentaires à la persuasion du public pourraient même avoir un effet contraire si les citoyens sentent qu’on essaie de les persuader ou qu’on les contraint de changer de point de vue.

Face à cette situation, la réponse politique de l’Europe se devait d’être double. D’une part nous nous sommes assurés qu’une gestion rigoureuse des risques et une procédure d’approbation seraient mises en place. D’autre part, nous avons introduit une requête pour un label clair sur les produits OGMs. Ce pour permettre aux consommateurs européens de choisir délibérément si oui ou non ils achètent des produits OGMs.

Je sais que beaucoup, de ce côté de l’Atlantique abordent le problème en ces termes, mais je maintiens que c’est entièrement approprié (et c’est aussi le meilleur moyen dans de telles circonstances de mesurer le degré de résistance du public aux produits OGMs).     J’admets que certains amis aux USA ont du mal à comprendre l’attitude des européens. Cependant, nos consommateurs demandent un label clair et la traçabilité des produits comme des pré-requis essentiels.

Peut-être les comportements vont-ils s’améliorer avec le temps et avec la mise à disposition d’un choix clair. De même, l’accessibilité de nourriture OGM avec des bénéfices réels pourrait aider. Mais malgré les protestations de l’industrie de la biotechnologie, il paraît n’y avoir aucune perspective de bénéfice à court ou moyen terme.

Confiance et transparence

 

La réaction du public aux OGMs n’est qu’un exemple de la façon dont les consommateurs européens traquent les informations vérifiables et dignes de confiance sur la nourriture. Cela soulève toute la question de la confiance des citoyens dans leur relation aux gouvernements et aux institutions publiques.

Les structures de la démocraties européennes ont montré un changement marquant ces dernières années avec la montée de la société civile. Au moment ou l’intérêt et l’implication dans la politique au niveau des citoyens apparaissent comme récessive, des efforts énergiques ont été et continuent d’être faits pour engager les citoyens dans les processus et les décisions qui les affectent. pour leur faire comprendre qu’ils font partie du processus de décision et qu’ils ne sont pas seulement les cibles des décisions d’autrui.

En clair, il y a une nécessité : développer la confiance. Les agences de sécurité alimentaire qui ont été implantées dans de nombreux pays européens servent d’exemple. Ces agences créent une distance crédible et visible entre différentes structures gouvernementales avec l’objectif élargi  d’accroître la transparence et qui, en retour, obtiennent l’acceptation et la confiance du peuple.

L’autorité de sécurité alimentaire européenne

 

Il était aussi nécessaire de renforcer la confiance dans le système pan européen de sécurité alimentaire. A cet égard, j’ai mis en place l’Autorité Européenne de Sécurité Alimentaire(AESA). Ceci permet des évaluations du risque scientifiques indépendantes dans le respect des questions de sécurité alimentaire et la communication d’informations au public sur le risque.

A cause de la structure législative de l’Union européenne, et en accord avec les lignes directives de CODEX, la responsabilité du management des risques n’a pas été déléguée à l’AESA. Comme convenu avec la Commission, le Conseil des ministres et le Parlement européen. Vous aurez l’occasion d’en savoir plus sur l’AESA plus tard dans la journée au cours de l’intervention de son directeur exécutif, Geoffrey Podger.

 

Le rôle des media

 

La communication sur le risque au peuple a une importance cruciale. Evidemment, les media jouent un rôle majeur dans la perception du risque par la population.

Le problème pour les autorités publiques devient celui de savoir comment transmettre un message clair et approprié sur un risque à certains media notoirement enclins à maximiser l’hystérie.

 

 La maladie de la vache folle

            L’une des leçons que nous pouvons tirer de l’expérience passée est que les messages contradictoires sont une cause majeur de déstabilisation de la confiance des consommateurs en période difficile. Prenez la crise de la vache folle par exemple, qui a émergé en Europe au milieu des années 90s. En réalité, la vache folle est un problème qui n’est apparu que récemment aux Etats-Unis.

            L’un des effets secondaires de l’annonce du gouvernement anglais d’un lien éventuel entre la maladie de la vache folle et sa nouvelle variante en 1996 était la fragmentation entre les messages des autorités publiques et des media a travers l’Europe (qui a mené au chaos, à la confusion  et à une chute de la confiance populaire qui a été plus loin que la question du bœuf dans un seul pays).

            Le marché du bœuf s’est effondré. Les gens se sont sentis trompés.

Lorsque des mesures rigoureuses ont été introduites pour fermer la possibilité pour la viande potentiellement infectée d’entrer dans la chaîne alimentaire, la confiance populaire par rapport au bœuf est revenue petit à petit.

            Quatre ans après l’annonce du gouvernement anglais, une crise similaire a refait apparition en Allemagne. Quand la maladie de la vache folle a finalement été découverte, comme prévu par les scientifiques, une fois encore la confiance populaire a dégringolé.

            Et en France, une seconde crise de la maladie de la vache folle a émergé à la fin de l’année 2000 quand les citoyens français ont réalisé l’étendue de la maladie. L’histoire s’est réécrite d’elle-même quant à l’« échec de la communication ».

            La leçon est très claire : une approche transparente et consistante de la communication du risque est vitale pour gagner et maintenir la confiance du peuple.

            Il est intéressant de comparer la réaction de la population américaine à la maladie de la vache folle avec l’exemple européen que je viens de décrire. La réaction bénigne du marché du bœuf américain et l’inexistence apparente de considération publique étendue suite à la découverte de la maladie aux USA juste avant Noël montre un contraste marqué vis-à-vis de la réaction à la maladie en Europe.

            Pourquoi un tel contraste ?

            Les consommateurs américains sont-ils préparés à tolérer le risque de vache folle ? Comparez cela à l’approche ultra- précautionneuse de quelques principaux partenaires commerciaux des Etats-Unis ; nous avons là de nouvelles preuves des divergences globales dans la perception du risque et des conséquences des mesures prises dans le management du risque.

 

La réforme du système de sécurité alimentaire européen

 

En Europe, la réaction suite à la crise de la vache folle et à d’autres crises paniques liée aux aliments a profondément affecté la confiance générale dans l’habilité des industries européennes alimentaires à vendre des produits sûrs.

Malgré le fait que de tels incidents ont affecté uniquement certains secteurs, toute l’industrie en a souffert. La            pomme pourrie a contaminé tout le panier.

Regagner la confiance du peuple dans les produits européens devint alors un challenge majeur pour moi quand je suis devenue commissaire européen responsable de la sécurité alimentaire en septembre 1999. Je me suis embarqué sur une réforme complète, « de la tête aux pieds » pour s’assurer que les risques pour le peuple seraient minimisés.

Mais comme je l’ai déjà dis, le risque zéro est un rêve impossible. Nous devions s’assurer, notoirement que là où des problèmes potentiels ou réels étaient soulevés, ils pouvaient être rapidement et effectivement éliminés.

La traçabilité

Nous n’avons pas le temps ce matin d’entrer dans les détails tels que la façon dont nous allons restaurer la confiance. La création de l’AESA, comme je l’ai indiqué, était un élément crucial.

Mais avec la chaîne alimentaire nous devions nous assurer que si quelque chose n’allait pas, ce pourrait être rapidement identifié et arrangé. Le rappel mandataire (un élément essentiel de notre loi générale sur l’alimentation) ne saurait fonctionner sans le mandat de la traçabilité, que nous avons également introduit pour la première fois en Europe.

Du côté américain, il y avait toujours la volonté de se tenir au rappel volontaire et à l’approche a posteriori (Ndlr : contrôle concret).

Mais pendant les deux années en question, l’industrie alimentaire américaine était mise à mal par la contamination OGM des aliments qui, en l’absence de mécanisme de contrôle impératif, a causé des dommages significatifs en terme de confiance et de prix.

            Maintenant vous avez vos premières conclusions en ce qui concerne la vache folle. Ceci a multiplié les demandes de traçabilité des troupeaux concernés. De plus, ceci a permis l’élaboration d’un système d’identification des animaux qui est à la base de l’approche européenne de la santé des animaux et de la santé publique pour les années à venir.

Un élément essentiel dans l’amélioration de la sécurisation de la chaîne alimentaire fut la solidité de nos mesures en terme de traçabilité. Trop souvent quand apparaît une crise alimentaire, il s’avère extrêmement difficile et coûteux de retrouver et retirer le produit en cause. “Starlink” est l’exemple classique.

Nous avons donc mis en place un système de traçabilité que j’appelle “l’approche par le haut et par le bas” (qui demande à chaque opérateur de connaître l’étape du cheminement de l’aliment d’avant et d’après la sienne). Ce système de suivi des aliments n’est pas nouveau. De nombreuses firmes avaient déjà mis en place ce système.

La différence dans l’Union européenne pour l’année prochaine c’est que tous les producteurs devront selon la loi avoir mis en place ce système. Un tel mécanisme législatif est essentiel pour que l’Union européenne à 25 ait un marché commun de l’alimentaire intégré.

Nous avons appris une contamination de nourriture pour animaux qui a nécessité la destruction d’un stock énorme et des interruptions dans le commerce car les dispositions de traçabilité adéquates n’étaient pas mises en place.

Ce genre d’événement provoque des inquiétudes énormes auprès des consommateurs. Accroître la confiance des consommateurs nécessite un tel système pour faciliter le retrait d’aliments qui peuvent être suivis à travers les 25 Etats membres.

Aux Etats-Unis il est intéressant de noter une convergence grandissante avec l’Europe de la part de diverses tendances politiques: dans le traitement de la menace bioterroriste (un domaine où, exceptionnellement, la perception du risque est probablement plus importante aux Etats-Unis qu’en Europe).

Les systèmes américains d’enregistrement des exportations et les notifications préalables aux importations sont motivées par un désire de protéger les citoyens américains de la menace de produits alimentaires délibérément contaminés. En ce sens, il y a une similitude notoire avec les systèmes européens.

Il me semble que concernant la traçabilité (pas plus cependant que dans beaucoup d’autres domaines), il y a une convergence plus grande qu’on ne pourrait croire.

Le principe de précaution et le risque

Laissez-moi à présent aborder la question de la « précaution », comme c’est souvent appelé ici aux USA, ou du principe de précaution, comme on dit en Europe.

Je l’ai fait savoir à plusieurs reprises depuis le début de mon mandat, je ne suis pas fan d’un usage sans discernement du principe de précaution. Ce principe peut être en un sens un fin déguisement de mesures protectionnistes, pour ne pas avoir à afficher un signe de lâcheté politique.

Pour faire face à cette pratique dans le domaine alimentaire, nous avons maintenant une législation européenne : article 7 de la loi alimentaire générale.

Il est clair dans cet important article que le principe de précaution ne peut être pris en considération que si certaines conditions préalables sont remplies. Celles-ci sont les suivantes :

- Il y a des effets potentiellement nuisibles dérivant d’un phénomène, produit ou procédé qui ont été identifiés.

- Les évaluations scientifiques permettent d’établir un risque avec une certitude suffisante.

- Il doit y avoir un évaluation objective de données scientifiques disponibles et des autres informations avant qu’une décision soit prise pour invoquer le principe de précaution.

On ne peut pas demander un joker à aucun moment comme prétexte à des mesures injustifiées.

La seconde partie de l’article décrit la portée et les limites de l’usage du principe de précaution. Il indique que les mesures de précautions « doivent être proportionnées et ne doivent pas restreindre le commerce au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre le plus haut niveau de protection de la santé décrété par la Communauté, considérant la faisabilité technique et économique et d’autres facteurs considérés comme légitimes selon le cas ».

Dans des circonstances spécifiques au cours desquelles en suivant l’évaluation d’informations disponibles, des effets potentiellement nuisibles pour la santé seraient remarqués, mais que des incertitudes persistent au niveau scientifique, des mesures provisoires de management du risque nécessaires pour garantir le plus haut niveau de protection selon la Communauté peuvent être adoptées en attendant de plus amples informations pour une évaluation plus complète du risque.

Les mesures adoptées sur la base du paragraphe 1 doivent être proportionnées et ne doivent pas restreindre le commerce au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre le plus haut niveau de protection de la santé décrété par la Communauté, considérant la faisabilité technique et économique et d’autres facteurs considérés comme légitimes selon le cas. Les mesures doivent être ré-examinées dans une période de temps courte, qui dépend de la nature du risque identifié pour la vie ou la santé et du type d’information scientifique nécessaire pour clarifier l’incertitude et pour effectuer une évaluation plus complète des risques.

            J’aimerais insister sur le fait que les mesures de précaution sont, par leur nature même, provisoires. Des travaux doivent être menés pour identifier de nouvelles données scientifiques par la recherche, la collecte de données ou d’autres activités avec des responsabilités claires pour recueillir ces informations doivent être révélées de telle sorte que les mesures puissent être remaniées au plus vite.

La Cours européenne a appuyé la philosophie du principe et ses applications, et a clarifié les étapes à suivre. Une autorité publique ne peut pas prendre une approche purement hypothétique du risque et ne devrait pas simplement baser ses décisions sur le “risque zéro”. Les données scientifiques pertinentes existantes doivent toujours être évaluées avant d’invoquer le principe de précaution.

Conclusion

Il est clair selon moi que l’Europe comme les USA ont des chaînes alimentaires très sûres. Je l’ai clairement fait savoir à la Secrétaire Veneman au cours de ma discussion avec elle hier.

Parfois nous avons différentes opinion s’agissant de la façon dont les choses doivent être faites.

Cependant il est éminemment important d’avoir une meilleure compréhension commune sur la façon dont les populations perçoivent le risque. Des perceptions divergentes pourraient finalement influencer la réponse de nos systèmes de régulation respectifs aux risques. Des réponses différentes aux même risques. Peut-être irrationnelles mais compréhensibles.

Nous vivons ce que nous appelons la « globalisation », significativement dirigée par des corporations multinationales et la libéralisation des échanges. Il est dès lors vital pour nous tous d’atteindre une appréciation meilleur de la raison pour laquelle nous devons nous mettre d’accord sur l’évaluation des situations particulières, bien que nos approches du management soient différentes.

Egalement nous devons être conscients des divergences dans l’évaluation du risque et ses conséquences potentielles.

            Il est apparut de plus en plus clair que la perception du risque prend un rôle important dans les mécanismes de management du risque, et que les approches du management du risque nécessite un développement plus poussé pour la mise en place de politiques plus efficaces et enfin pour une meilleure gouvernance.

L’un des messages qui s’est profondément et clairement fait retentir lors de notre conférences au mois de décembre dernier à Bruxelles était le triste contraste dans la façon dont les scientifiques voyaient le risque en comparaison avec les citoyens individuellement ou collectivement dans la société.

L’approche scientifique est rationnelle et méthodique. Elle se fait selon des probabilités, des moyennes de population : une approche logique et théorique, sans déformation émotionnelles. C’est évidemment très utile. Cependant ce qu’il manque c’est le « facteur humain » et la grande variété d’influences qui façonne le comportement humain.

Un délégué l’a dit plus succinctement : les gens se comportent selon leur perception, pas selon des faits.

En conclusion, laissez-moi remercier le Centre de Politique Européenne, le Conseil de l’Atlantique et l’industrie américaine de distribution pour l’aide qu’ils ont apporté à l’organisation de cet événement. Ma gratitude vient aussi de la délégation européenne de la Commission de Washington.

J’attends tous les points de vue ou remarques que l’on pourrait retirer de cette conférence.

 

Commentary

 

            This conference is a great event, as Mr. David BYRNE says because it deals with a general subject (the perception of risk) and allows a real discussion without passion between America and Europe. It permits the European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection to develop an argue, without mentioning the Hormone case directly, to explain why we must adapt policies to the populations. Some interesting analysis is made about human natural behaviours facing risk (he explains how acceptation of risk depends on who take the risk for who else).

            More than a scientific explanation about risks around hormones, which would only lead to a disagreement, more than an accusation on US behaviour, this speech must have had an important impact to justify EU political measures and to make American people admit what they call a “disguised protectionism”.

            Finally, with it peaceful tone and its anthropological appearance, this speech is a huge message to non respect of cultural differences and imposing supremacy, in order to make legitimise a precautionary (or interested?!) protectionism.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Part II. The EU exterior trade relations: analysis and consequences

 

Text 8: The commercial conflict between the United States and the European Union

 

Link

 

http://www.strategicsinternational.com/enuseurop.hm

 

Source

 

This document appears to be interesting since it is a paper written by a professor at the Paris V University so we can expect to see another point of view concerning the EU/US situation. It is factual but also critical which is what makes it all the move interesting.

 

Summary

 

This paper deals with the typology of commercial conflicts between the US and the EU and also sets out these causes. It also gives the readers an overview of the main fields of conflicts.

The two blocs had a common interest in an opening international trading system but today we can wonder if they still share the same commitment to liberal values when we see such serious opposition around this economic model[4].

 

French summary

 

Cette étude traite de la typologie des conflits commerciaux entre les EU et l’UE et  en établit par ailleurs leurs causes. Elle donne aussi aux lecteurs une vue d’ensemble des principaux terrains de conflits.

Les deux blocs avaient des intérêts communs dans l’ouverture d’un marché international mais aujourd’hui on peut se demander s’ils partagent le même engagement envers des valeurs libérales quand on voit une opposition aussi sérieuse dans une approche économique.

 

 

The commercial conflicts between the United States
and the European Union

 

By: Fereydoun A. KHAVAND, Professor at the Paris V University

 

The United States and the European Union represent among themselves alone, about 50% of the world economy and 40% of international exchanges. Some 20% of the exports of the European Union are to the United States and 19% of its imports come from there. The Europe of the fifteen is the most important host territory in the world for American merchandise, services and capital. The trans-Atlantic exchanges therefore constitute the main engine of international trade relations.

This immense transatlantic partnership is, however, regularly shaken by commercial tensions. Everything seems to indicate that these exercise an increasing influence on the evolution of international relations, in particular since the breaking down of the bipolar system and the disappearance of the Soviet threat. In order to face the multiplication of commercial conflicts, the United States and the European Union have put into place appropriate mechanisms in the context of their own economic diplomacy. Before examining these mechanisms, it is necessary to study the characteristics of the commercial conflicts.

 

The typology of commercial conflicts
The spectacular proliferation of conflict in international commercial relations is one of the consequences of economic globalisation. Indeed, the explosion of international exchanges can but accentuate the friction between States worrying about protecting their interests in the context of international circulation of material and non-material goods. The causes of the frictions are numerous and their management is one of the major challenges of multilateral commercial diplomacy during the XXIst century’s first decades. Most international commercial conflicts find their origins in problems associated with market access, in the defence of commercial issues and in practices considered anti-competitive.

 

The main fields of conflict
The failure of the WTO's third mini serial conference at Seattle (30th November till 3rd December 1999) was essentially due to misunderstandings between the Americans and the Europeans, in particular in the agriculture sector: the Europeans want to preserve agricultural "specificity", whereas the Americans consider agriculture as "a sector amongst others". Certainly, the European Union in 1992 accepted the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and the progressive reductions in exportation subsidies. Even so, it refuses the total elimination of these subsidies. The Europeans are not hostile to the liberalisation of the commerce in agricultural products, based on one condition, that this liberalisation will not threaten the "multifunctionality" of agriculture (its function of protecting the environment, preservation of rural employment and production of high quality food products).

 

The "banana war", it too, has seriously poisoned Euro-American commercial relations. In 1997, the WTO dispute settlement office condemned the European Union to modify the organisation of its banana market, which was privileging banana importation from its former colonies, to the detriment of American firms implanted in five countries of Latin America. Faced with prevarication in Brussels, the Americans took severe sanctions against European imports.

The ORD equally condemned measures taken by the European Union forbidding importation of "hormone-fed" beef coming from the United States. In order to "punish" the European attitude concerning this file (as with that of the banana) the Americans installed a mechanism of "revolving commercial sanctions" which consisted in renewing every six months the list of sanctioned products. This system, baptised the "carrousel", leads to exercising a more important pressure on the whole of the European economy.

 

These conflicts and many more have poisoned commercial relations between the United States and the European Union. They have also been very tough with the WTO’s dispute settlement system.

It is necessary to specify that this system has not succeeded in putting an end to the unilateral commercial practices of the States. The dispute settlement mechanism is an essential element for ensuring the security and the foreseeable planning of the multilateral commercial system. The members of the WTO engaged themselves to not act in any unilateral manner when that would mean that commercial regulations would be broken. This engagement was aiming at limiting the use of unilateral measures, especially on the part of the United States across section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. The United States consider that the application of unilateral measures by means of section 301 still remains possible in a number of sectors which are not at all or very little affected by the obligations created by the WTO. This position can only weaken the system. American unilateralism, one already knows, manifests itself also in the United States' laws of an extraterritorial quality. In these two domains, the WTO still has not taken any sanctions against the United States and hence clearly manifests the weakness and inefficiency of the organisation.

 

Commentary

 

This article shows how tense are the current EU/US trade relations: it is quite pessimistic about the resolution of the dispute.

As we can see in this case, in some strategic sectors each party wants to protect its own interest. These disputes are extending and have long-standing, it may have therefore serious consequences on EU-US cooperation. The EU tends to maintain a strong position in fact of the inflexible America[5].

Sanctions are supposed to last only until the offending country complies with the rules. The EU has pledged to obey the rules - eventually - but in the hormones case, Brussels now appears to be pinning its hopes on rule changes that would allow it to keep its decade-old ban on beef treated with growth hormones.

 

Related Issue

 

Who's afraid of the GMOs? EU-US Trade Disputes over Food Safety and Biotechnology:

Institute for International Studies Standford University, March 11th 1999

www.standford.edu/-jostling/usc.pdf[6]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Text 9: Viande aux hormones: premier débat à la Commission

May 17, 1999

 

Link

 

 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press23_fr.html

 

Source 

 

This press article was found on the official site of the European Union: Europa. It is in the part corresponding to the dictatorate-general in charge of health and consumer protection. These indications should be enough to justify the text’s position. But, even if such a source gives an European view on the subject, in so far as it is an official site, it also guarantees the information to a certain degree: the EU cannot lie officially.

 

Summary in French

 

Le comité scientifique des mesures vétérinaires en rapport avec la santé publique a révélé que la viande de bœuf aux hormones présentait un risque pour la santé notamment des enfants, ce qui conforte l’Union européenne dans sa décision de ne pas lever l’interdiction sur l’importation de viande bovine des USA.

 

Summary in English

 

The Scientific Committee on veterinary measures related to public health found out that hormone beef had consequences on human health, specifically for children. This has allowed the Commission to maintain its ban in a legitimate way.

 

Text 

 

Viande aux hormones premier débat à la Commission

 

La Commission européenne a discuté des résultats de l'analyse de risques consacrée à la viande bovine aux hormones par le comité scientifique des mesures vétérinaires en rapport avec la santé publique

La Commission estime qu'il n'est plus envisageable de lever l'interdiction pesant sur la viande bovine aux hormones étant donné que l'analyse de risques a révélé que les hormones pouvaient présenter un danger pour la santé. La semaine prochaine, la Commission examinera, à la lumière de ces nouvelles connaissances scientifiques, comment s'acquitter des obligations qui lui incombent dans le cadre de l'OMC. La Commission s'est montrée très préoccupée par la volonté américaine de minimiser le danger identifié par les scientifiques. Elle ne conçoit pas que les États-Unis n'aient pas fait preuve d'un plus grand sens des responsabilités face aux découvertes probantes du comité scientifique précité: «l’oestradiol 17 bêta est capable d'engendrer et de favoriser le développement d'une tumeur». Cette attitude est d'autant plus incompréhensible que ce sont les enfants qui constituent le groupe de population le plus exposé.

Emma Bonino, commissaire chargé de la politique des consommateurs, a déclaré: «les consommateurs européens attachent énormément d'importance à ces preuves scientifiques car elles montrent que la Commission a eu raison de défendre avec acharnement l'interdiction de la viande aux hormones. Nous disposons maintenant d'arguments scientifiques pour défendre notre position.»

 

Publié le 17/05/99

 

Translation 

 

Hormones meat : first debate at the Commission

 

The European commission discussed the results of the risk assessment on hormones beef performed by the Scientific Committee on veterinary measures related to public health.

The Commission esteem that it is no more conceivable to lift the ban on the hormone beef since the risk assessment revealed that hormones could present a risk for health. Next week the Commission will examine, up to these new scientific evidences, how to honour its WTO obligation. The Commission showed itself very concerned about the American will to minimise the danger identify by scientists. It does not understand that USA did not show more responsibility towards relevant discoveries of the above-cited scientific comity: “17 beta oestradiol can generate and promote the growth of tumors”. Such a behaviour is the more incomprehensible as children are the population group most at risk.

Emma Bonino, the Consumer Policy Commissioner, stated: “European consumers give a lot of weight to these scientific evidences because they prove that Commission was right to hardly defend the ban on hormones meat. We now have scientific basis to defend our position.

 

Released on 17/05/99

 

Commentary 

 

            At a time when public health seemed less important in the debate than respecting WTO agreements, the free trade fad had reached such a level that no one could be heard on hormones without thinking about American interests and respect of non-protectionist agreements. US paranoia led to minimise real health risks and diplomatic, economic and political issues hide human health problems. That’s why scientific evidence was so welcomed by the Commission: it gave a logic more than a politic basis to the ban. The “children” dimension was also important in so far as it was true (scientists really discovered them, the only question is which one: those who were paid by Europe or those who were paid by the US: this is certainly where we could find the solution to the case, it’s too bad that we study politics and not science, and so are unable to verify!) and as it could help the US authorities to react.

            But before verifying by our own means whether this data is true or not, like clever politicians, we can just notify the fact that children have always had a huge impact on the public: the commissioner could have used this information to defend a political position, even if the ban was in fact not justified.

 

 

 

 

 

Text 10: Commission adopts White Paper on Food Safety

Brussels, January 12, 2000

 

Link

 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press37_en.html

 

Source

 

We can find this document on EUROPA, the portal site of the European Union http://europa.eu.int/.

It is an official paper coming from the Press releases division and as a matter of fact the information are quite reliable.

 

Summary

 

Adopted in Brussels in 2000, the White Paper sets out a « Farm to table » legislative action program. The European Commission adopted it to achieve the highest standards of food safety in the EU.

Thus the White Paper envisages the establishment of a European Food Authority, which will concentrate on risk assessment and risk communication and would operate a rapid alert system. The Authority is expected to be in place by 2002.

The main principles of food safety are:

 

Ÿ         Responsibility of feed manufacturers, farmers and food operators

Ÿ         Traceability of feed, food and its ingredients

Ÿ         Proper risk analysis through a) risk assessment (scientific advice and information analysis), b) risk management (regulation and control) and c) risk communication

Ÿ         Application of the precautionary principle, if appropriate

 

Both the Commission and the new European Food Authority will also promote a dialogue with consumers to keep them well informed and involved.

 

French summary

 

Adopté à Bruxelles en 2000, le Livre Blanc établit un programme d’action législative « du producteur à l’assiette ». La Commission européenne l’a adopté en vue d’atteindre les normes les plus élevées de sécurité alimentaire dans l’UE.

Ainsi le Livre Blanc envisage l’établissement d’une Autorité Alimentaire Européenne qui se concentrera sur l’évaluation et la communication du risque et qui opérerait un système d’alerte rapide. On attend la mise en place de l’Autorité courant 2002.

Les principaux principes de la sécurité alimentaire sont:

 

Ÿ         La responsabilité des fabricants de nourriture, des fermiers et des opérateurs de l’alimentation,

Ÿ         La traçabilité de l’alimentation, des aliments et de ses ingrédients,

Ÿ         L’analyse appropriée du risque au travers a) d’une évaluation du risque (avis scientifique et analyse de l’information), b) d’une gestion du risque (régulation et contrôle) et c) d’une communication du risque,

Ÿ          l’application du principe de précaution, si approprié.

 

La Commission européenne et la nouvelle Autorité européenne Alimentaire promouvront tous les deux un dialogue avec les consommateurs pour les garder impliqués et bien informés.

 

Glossary

 

White Paper on Food Safety (n.): Livre Blanc sur la Sécurité Alimentaire

Retailing (n.): commerce de bétail

A remit (n.): une attribution

A port of call (n.): un arrêt

Prescriptive (adj.): normatif

To bear testimony (v.): rendre témoignage de

To discount (v.): négliger

To overlap (v.): avoir des points communs, se chevaucher

Provision for sth : (prises des) dispositions nécessaires pour assurer qch

Contaminant (n.): polluant

Residue (n.): résidu

To set out (v.) : établir

A key policy (n): une politique prioritaire

Comprehensive (adj.) : complet

The storage (n.) : le stockage

To encompass (v.): couvrir, englober

A loophole (n.): une lacune

To enact (v.) : adopter

To enhance (v.): améliorer

To bring forward (v.): presenter

Awareness (n.): conscience

To restore confidence (v.): restaurer une confiance

 

Commission adopts White Paper on Food Safety and sets out a "Farm to Table" legislative action programme

 

Brussels, 12 January 2000

 

The European Commission adopted today a White Paper on Food Safety. The central goal of the European Commission is the achievement of the highest possible level of health protection for the consumers of Europe's food. The White Paper sets out a radical reform plan: a major programme of legislative reform is proposed to complete the EU´s "farm to table" approach as well as the establishment of a new European Food Authority. Achieving the highest standards of food safety in the EU is a key policy priority for the European Commission and the White Paper bears testimony to this priority. The guiding principle throughout the White Paper is that food safety policy must be based on a comprehensive, integrated approach. The Commission also decided today on allocation of food safety and industrial policy responsibilities.

The White Paper was presented today by David Byrne, Health and Consumer Protection Commissioner, and Erkki Liikanen, Enterprise and Information Society Commissioner. It represents the culmination of three months extensive work by the Commission since its appointment last September and builds on the consultation arising from the Commission's Green Paper on Food Law published in 1997.

 

Commenting on the launch, David Byrne said "This is a major initiative designed to promote the health of Europe's consumers by the establishment of world class food safety standards and systems. The proposals in the White Paper on Food Safety are the most radical and far-reaching ever presented in the area of food safety. They are, I believe, an essential prerequisite for Europe to have the highest possible standards in respect of food safety. Consumer confidence has been badly affected by the various food alerts and crises of recent years and months. I believe that our proposals in the White Paper should fundamentally address consumers' legitimate concerns in this regard with a view to restoring and maintaining confidence in food safety."

 

Erkki Liikanen said: "Today's initiative is aimed at achieving a double objective. By restoring and maintaining the confidence of European consumers in the safety of food in the EU, the programme launched by this White Paper will not only effectively increase the quality of the everyday-lives of Europeans, it will also boost the competitiveness of the European food industry."

 

Major White Paper Initiatives

 

1. A European Food Authority

 

The White Paper envisages the establishment of a European Food Authority based on the principles of the highest levels of independence, of scientific excellence and of transparency in its operations. Therefore the Authority must be guided by the best science, be independent of industrial and political interests, be open to rigorous public scrutiny, be scientifically authoritative and work closely with national scientific bodies

.

The White Paper clearly identifies many weaknesses in the present system, which it envisages would be addressed in the context of establishing a European Food Authority. Among the weaknesses identified are, lack of scientific support for the system of scientific advice, inadequacies in monitoring and surveillance on food safety issues, gaps in the rapid alert system and lack of coordination of scientific cooperation and analytical support.

 

The tasks of the authority will essentially concentrate on risk assessment and risk communication. Risk management, -including legislation and control, should remain the responsibility of the European institutions, which are accountable to the European public.

 

However, future extension of the competencies of the Authority should not be discounted in the light of experience of the Authority's operation, confidence gained, and the possible need to change the Treaty.

 

It is envisaged that the tasks of the Authority will comprise:

 

Establishment of risk assessments through scientific advice: The scope of issues will include all matters having a direct or indirect impact on consumer health and safety arising from the consumption of food. Thus it will cover primary food production (agricultural and veterinary aspects), industrial processes, storage, distribution and retailing. Its remit will encompass both risk and nutritional issues. The Authority will also cover animal health and welfare issues, and will take into consideration risk assessments in other areas, notably the environmental and chemical sectors where these overlap with risk assessment in relation to food. The work currently carried out by the five Scientific Committees concerned with food safety will be a core part of the new Authority. However, he current system of the organisation of the EU´s Scientific Committees will be reviewed in the light of decisions taken about the structure of the Authority after consultations and detailed feasibility studies.

 

Information gathering and analysis: There is a pressing need to identify and use the information currently available throughout both the Community and worldwide on food safety issues. The Authority will be expected to take a proactive role in developing and operating food safety monitoring and surveillance programmes. It will need to establish a network of contacts with similar agencies, laboratories and consumer groups across the European Union and in third countries.

 

Communication: The Authority will need to make special provision for informing all interested parties of its findings, not only in respect of the scientific opinions, but also in relation to the results of its monitoring and surveillance programmes. The Authority must become the automatic first port of call when scientific information on food safety and nutritional issues is sought or problems have been identified. A highly visible Authority with strong pro-active presence on food safety matters will be a key element in restoring and maintaining confidence among European consumers.

 

Rapid Alert: The White Paper foresees that the Authority would operate the rapid alert system. The rapid alert system will be significantly strengthened as part of this process and will include rapid alert for animal feed problems.

 

The White Paper is not prescriptive about all of the details concerning a Food Authority at the European level, and the Commission, therefore, has not yet proposed concrete resource figures for the Authority. However, it is clear that the efficacy of the Authority will ultimately depend on the adequacy, in terms of both size and quality, of the human, financial and physical resources allocated. It is also implicit that the location of the Authority should allow it to interact easily with all players in the risk analysis process.

 

It is envisaged that the Authority should be in place by 2002 once the necessary legislation has been enacted. Before finalising its proposals the European Commission is inviting all interested parties to give their views on the European Food Authority by the end April. A definitive legislative proposal would then be brought forward by the Commission in September of this year.

 

2. Food Safety Legislation

 

The White Paper proposes an action plan with a wide range of measures to improve and bring coherence to the Community's legislation covering all aspects of food products from "farm to table". It sets out over 80 separate actions that are envisaged over the period ahead and intends to close identified loopholes in current legislation. The new legal framework will cover animal feed, animal health and welfare, hygiene, contaminants and residues, novel food, additives, flavourings, packaging and irradiation. It will include a proposal on General Food Law, which will embody the principles of food safety such as

 

·                  responsibility of feed manufacturers, farmers and food operators,

 

·                  traceability of feed, food and its ingredients,

 

 

·                  proper risk analysis through a) risk assessment (scientific advice and information analysis), b) risk management (regulation and control) and c) risk communication,

 

·                    and the application of the precautionary principle if appropriate.

 

3. Control of implementation of legislation

 

A comprehensive piece of legislation is proposed in order to recast the different control requirements. This will take into account the general principle that all parts of the food production chain must be subject to official controls. There is a clear need or a Community framework of national control systems, which will improve the quality of controls at Community level, and consequently raise food safety standards across the European Union. The operation of such control systems would remain a national responsibility. This Community framework would have three core elements. Operational criteria set up at Community level

Community control guidelines enhanced administrative co-operation in the development and operation of control. Development of this overall Community framework for national control systems would clearly be a task for the Commission and the Member States working together. The experience of the EU´s Food and Veterinary Office (Dublin), which exercises he control functions at Community level, will be an essential element in its development.

 

4. Consumer Information

 

If consumers are to be satisfied that the action proposed in White Paper is leading to a genuine improvement in food safety standards, they must be kept well informed. The Commission, together with the new European Food Authority, will promote a dialogue with consumers to encourage their involvement in the new Food Safety policy. At the same time, consumers need to e kept better informed of emerging food safety concerns, and of risks to certain groups from particular foods. Proposals on he labelling of foods, building on existing rules, will be brought forward.

 

5. International dimension

 

The Community is the world's largest importer/exporter of food products. The actions proposed in the White Paper will need o be effectively presented and explained to our trading partners. An active role for the Community in international bodies will e an important element in explaining European developments in food safety.

 

Conclusion

 

The success of the measures proposed in this White Paper is intrinsically linked to the support of the European Parliament and he Council. Their implementation will depend on the commitment of the Member States. This White Paper also calls for strong involvement of the operators, who bear the prime responsibility for the daily application of the requirements for food safety.

Greater transparency at all levels of Food Safety policy is the thread running through the whole White Paper and will contribute fundamentally to enhancing consumer confidence in EU Food Safety policy

.

Since public awareness of food safety issues has been raised recently through the dioxin and other food scares, it was considered that the Commissioner responsible for Health and Consumer Protection should have overall responsibility for all elements of the food chain. Accordingly, the Commission decided today to transfer all food safety matters to Commissioner Byrne. The Commission also affirmed that Commissioner Liikanen will be fully associated with proposals made in the domain of food legislation having regard to his enterprise and competitiveness responsibilities.

 

 French version

 

La Commission adopte un Livre Blanc sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et établit un programme d’action législative « Du producteur à l’assiette »

 

Bruxelles, le 12 janvier 2000

 

La Commission européenne a adopté aujourd’hui un Livre Blanc sur la Sécurité Alimentaire. L’objectif essentiel de la Commission européenne est l’achèvement du niveau le plus élevé possible de protection sanitaire des consommateurs de produits alimentaires européens. Le Livre Blanc établit un programme radical de réforme: il propose un programme important de réformes législatives pour achever l’approche européenne « Du producteur à l’assiette » aussi bien que l’établissement d’une nouvelle Autorité Alimentaire Européenne. Atteindre les normes les plus élevées de sécurité alimentaire dans l’UE est une politique essentielle, prioritaire pour la Commission européenne et le Livre blanc témoigne de cette priorité. Le principe directeur du Livre Blanc est que la politique de sécurité alimentaire doit se fonder sur une approche complète intégrée. La Commission a également fixé aujourd’hui l’attribution des responsabilités concernant la sécurité alimentaire et la politique industrielle.

 

Le Livre Blanc a été présenté aujourd’hui par David Byrne, le commissaire à la Protection de la Santé et des Consommateurs, et Erkki Liikanen, le commissaire aux Entreprise et à la Société de l’Information.

Cela représente le point culminant de trois mois de travail approfondi de la Commission depuis sa nomination en septembre dernier et qui se base sur la consultation émanant du Livre Vert sur la législation alimentaire de la Commission publié en 1997.

 

Commentant le lancement du Livre, David Byrne a déclaré « C’est une initiative majeure conçue afin d’améliorer la santé des consommateurs des produits européens par l’établissement de normes et de systèmes alimentaires de qualité et de sécurité de référence internationale. Les propositions du Livre Blanc sur la Sécurité Alimentaire sont les plus radicales et les plus étendues jamais présentées dans le domaine de la sécurité alimentaire. Elles sont, il faut croire, un préalable essentiel à l’Europe pour avoir les normes les plus élevées possibles concernant la sécurité alimentaire. La confiance des consommateurs a sérieusement été affectée par les diverses crises et alertes alimentaires au cours des derniers mois et années. Je crois qu’à cet égard, nos propositions dans le Livre Blanc devraient fondamentalement s’adresser aux préoccupations légitimes des consommateurs avec en vue, de restaurer et de maintenir une confiance dans la sécurité alimentaire. »

 

Erkki Liikanen a déclaré: « L’initiative d’aujourd’hui vise à achever un double objectif. En restaurant et en maintenant la confiance des consommateurs européens dans la sécurité des produits alimentaires de l’UE, le programme lancé par ce Livre Blanc ne va pas seulement augmenter efficacement la qualité de la vie quotidienne des Européens, mais va aussi donner un coup de pouce à la compétitivité de l’industrie alimentaire européenne. »

 

 Initiatives majeures du Livre Blanc

 

1. Une Autorité Alimentaire Européenne

 

Le Livre Blanc envisage l’établissement d’une Autorité Européenne de Sécurité Alimentaire fondée sur les principes des niveaux les plus élevés d’indépendance, d’excellence scientifique et de transparence dans ses opérations. Aussi, l’Autorité doit être guidée par la meilleure science, être indépendante des intérêts industriels et politiques, être l’objet d’un examen public rigoureux, faire autorité scientifiquement et travailler étroitement avec les organismes scientifiques nationaux.

 

Le Livre Blanc identifie clairement de nombreuses faiblesses dans le présent système, lesquelles, il envisage, devraient appeler à établir une Autorité Alimentaire Européenne. Parmi les faiblesses identifiées sont, un manque d’aide scientifique pour le système d’avis scientifique, des inadéquations dans le contrôle et la surveillance des problèmes de sécurité alimentaire, des brèches dans le système d’alerte rapide et un manque de coordination d’aide analytique et de coopération scientifique.

 

Les tâches de l’Autorité se concentreront essentiellement sur l’évaluation et la communication des risques. La gestion des risques, incluant la législation et le contrôle, devrait rester de la responsabilité des institutions européennes qui sont responsables envers le public européen. Cependant, une future extension des compétences de l’Autorité ne devrait pas être négligée prenant en compte l’expérience des opérations de l’Autorité, d’une confiance gagnée et du possible besoin de changer le Traité.

 

Il est envisagé que les tâches de l’Autorité comprennent:

 

La mise en place d’une évaluation des risques au travers d’un avis scientifique: la portée des problèmes inclura toute question ayant un impact direct ou indirect sur la santé et la sécurité des consommateurs relative à la consommation d’aliments. Ainsi, cela couvrira la production alimentaire primaire (les aspects agricoles et vétérinaires), les procédés industriels, l’entreposage, la distribution et le commerce de bétail. Son attribution englobera les deux problèmes de risque et de nutrition. L’Autorité couvrira aussi les problèmes de santé et de bien être des animaux et prendra en considération des évaluations de risques dans d’autres domaines, notamment les secteurs de l’environnement et des produits chimiques qui sont liés avec l’évaluation des risques relative à l’alimentation. Le travail, actuellement effectué par les cinq Comités scientifiques concernés par la sécurité alimentaire, sera le noyau dur des opérations de la nouvelle Autorité. Cependant, l’actuel système d’organisation des Comités scientifiques de l’UE sera révisé prenant en compte les décisions prises à propos de la structure de l’Autorité après des consultations et des études détaillées de faisabilité.

 

L’information réunie et l’analyse: il y a un besoin pressant d’identifier et d’utiliser l’information actuellement disponible sur la sécurité alimentaire au sein de la Communauté et du monde entier… On attendra de l’Autorité qu’elle prenne un rôle proactif en développant et en opérant des programmes de surveillance et de contrôle de la sécurité alimentaire et. Il sera nécessaire d’établir un réseau de contacts avec des agences similaires, des laboratoires et des groupes de consommateurs dans toute l’Union européenne et dans les pays tiers.

 

La communication: l’Autorité aura besoin de prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour assurer l’information de ses conclusions à toutes les parties intéressées, pas seulement en ce qui concerne les opinions scientifiques, mais aussi relativement aux résultats de ses programmes de surveillance et de contrôle. L’Autorité doit devenir le premier arrêt automatique quand une information scientifique sur des problèmes de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnels est demandée ou quand des problèmes ont été identifiés. Une Autorité bien en vue, avec une présence proactive forte sur les questions de sécurité alimentaire, sera un élément clef quant à la restauration et au maintien d’une confiance des consommateurs européens.

 

Une alerte rapide: le Livre Blanc prévoit que l’Autorité opèrera le système d’alerte rapide. Le système d’alerte rapide sera renforcé d’une manière significative comme partie de ce processus et inclura une alerte rapide pour les problèmes d’alimentation des animaux.

 

Le Livre Blanc n’est pas normatif pour tous les détails concernant l’Autorité alimentaire au niveau européen et la Commission n’a donc pas encore proposé de chiffres de ressources concrètes pour l’Autorité. Cependant, il est clair que l’efficacité de l’Autorité dépendra en fin de compte de l’adéquation, en termes de taille et de qualité, des ressources humaines, financières et physiques allouées. Il est de même implicite que le siège de l’Autorité devra lui permettre d’interagir facilement avec tous les acteurs dans le processus d’analyse des risques.

 

Il est envisagé que l’Autorité devrait être en place courant 2002, une fois que la législation nécessaire aura été adoptée. Avant de finaliser ses propositions, la Commission européenne invite toutes les parties intéressées à donner leurs avis sur l’Autorité Alimentaire Européenne pour la fin avril. Une proposition législative définitive devrait alors être présentée par la Commission en septembre de cette année.

 

2. Législation de la sécurité alimentaire

 

Le Livre Blanc propose un plan d’action avec une large étendue de mesures afin d’améliorer et d’apporter une cohérence à la législation communautaire couvrant tous les aspects des produits alimentaires du « producteur à l’assiette ». Il établit plus de quatre vingt actions différentes qui sont envisagées pour la période à venir et a l’intention de mettre fin aux lacunes identifiées dans l’actuelle législation. Le nouveau cadre légal couvrira l’alimentation des animaux, la santé et le bien être des animaux, l’hygiène, les polluants et les résidus, les aliments originels, les additifs et les arômes, l’emballage et la radiation. Cela inclura une proposition sur la législation alimentaire générale qui incorporera des principes de sécurité alimentaire tels que:

 

Ÿ         La responsabilité des fabricants d’aliments, des fermiers et des opérateurs de l’alimentation,

Ÿ         La traçabilité de l’alimentation, des aliments et de leurs ingrédients,

Ÿ         L’analyse appropriée des risques au travers a) d’une évaluation des risques (avis scientifique et analyse de l’information), b) d’une gestion des risques (régulation et contrôle) et c) d’une communication des risques,

Ÿ         Et l’application du principe de précaution si approprié.

 

3. Contrôle de la mise en œuvre de la législation

 

Une législation complète est proposée dans le but de remanier les différentes exigences de contrôle. Cela prendra en compte le principe général qui veut  que toutes les étapes de la chaîne de production alimentaire doivent être soumises à des contrôles officiels. Il existe un besoin clair  d’un cadre communautaire des systèmes de contrôle nationaux, qui améliorera la qualité des contrôles au niveau communautaire et qui en conséquence relèvera les normes de qualité et de sécurité au sein de l’Union européenne. L’opération d’un tel système de contrôles devrait relever de la responsabilité nationale. Ce cadre communautaire devrait avoir trois éléments principaux:

 

Ÿ         Des critères opérationnels établis à un niveau communautaire

Ÿ         Des lignes directrices communautaires de contrôle

Ÿ         Une coopération administrative améliorée dans le développement et l’opération de contrôle.

 

Le développement de ce cadre général communautaire des systèmes de contrôle nationaux devrait être clairement une tâche commune à la Commission et aux États membres. L’expérience de l’Office Alimentaire et Vétérinaire de l’UE (Dublin), lequel exerce les fonctions de contrôle au niveau communautaire, sera un élément essentiel dans ce développement.

 

4. Information des consommateurs

 

Si les consommateurs sont à satisfaire, à savoir que l’action proposée dans le Livre Blanc mène à une véritable amélioration des normes de qualité et de sécurité alimentaire, ils doivent être tenus bien informés. La Commission, avec la nouvelle Autorité Alimentaire Européenne, promouvront ensemble un dialogue avec les consommateurs afin d’encourager leur implication dans la nouvelle politique de sécurité alimentaire. Dans le même temps, les consommateurs ont besoin d’être tenus mieux informés des préoccupations émergeantes concernant la sécurité alimentaire et des risques de certains groupes particuliers d’aliments. Des propositions sur l’étiquetage des aliments, basées sur des règles existantes, seront présentées.

 

5. Dimension internationale

 

La Communauté est le plus important importateur/exportateur de produits alimentaires. Les actions proposées dans le Livre Blanc auront besoin d’être présentées de manière efficace et expliquées à nos partenaires commerciaux. Un rôle actif de la Communauté auprès des organismes internationaux sera un élément important dans l’explication des développements européens dans la sécurité alimentaire.

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

La réussite des mesures proposées dans ce Livre Blanc est intrinsèquement liée à l’appui du Parlement européen et du Conseil. Leur mise en œuvre dépendra de l’engagement des États membres. Ce Livre Blanc appelle aussi à une forte implication des opérateurs, qui supportent la responsabilité première de l’application quotidienne des exigences en matière de sécurité alimentaire.

Une  plus grande transparence à tous les niveaux de la politique sur la sécurité alimentaire est le fil conducteur du Livre Blanc tout entier et contribuera fondamentalement à renforcer la confiance des consommateurs dans la politique de l’UE sur la sécurité alimentaire.

 

Depuis une prise de conscience publique de la sécurité alimentaire, suite aux problèmes récemment soulevés avec les peurs de la dioxine et d’autres aliments, il était considéré que le commissaire responsable à la Protection de la Santé et des Consommateurs devrait avoir la responsabilité totale de tous les éléments de la chaîne alimentaire. En conséquence, la Commission a décidé aujourd’hui de transférer toutes les questions de sécurité alimentaire au commissaire Byrne. La Commission a affirmé par ailleurs que le commissaire Liikanen participera entièrement aux propositions faîtes dans le domaine de la législation alimentaire si l’on tient compte de ses responsabilités concernant les entreprises et la compétitivité. 

 

Commentary

 

During his term, Commissioner David Byrne modernised EU food safety legislation and established health and consumer protection as clear priorities for the Union.

 

Achievements in Public Health

Under David Byrne’s guidance, in May 2000, the Commission adopted a health strategy for the EU. This set out a program of European level actions, which the Commission planned to finance, as well as a program of proposed new EU laws, all aimed at protecting and improving the health of EU citizens. It also declared the Commission’s determination to take account of health in all aspects of EU policy-making - from agriculture to external relations. By 2004, much of this program had been achieved. Eager to maintain momentum, Commissioner Byrne published a reflection paper in July this year setting out his vision of how EU health policy should be developed in the coming years. The full text of Mr. Byrne’s paper is available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_overview/strategy/reflection_process_en.htm.

 

Achievements in Food Safety
In January 2000, The White Paper on Food Safety launched the ‘farm to fork’ principle, drawing together for the first time all aspects of food safety throughout the food chain. Out of the 84 initiatives announced in the White Paper, 71 have been completed and 13 are in the legislative process. The European food law, which came into force in 2002, established the requirement for traceability throughout the food chain and gave food and feed operators responsibility for the safety of their products. The food law also established the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).

 

The strategy: from farm to fork Europe’s consumers want food that is safe and wholesome. The concern of the European Union is to make sure that the food we eat is of the same high standard for all its citizens, whether the food is homegrown or comes from another country, inside or outside the EU.


When new members join

When a country prepares to join the EU, it often has to make a major and costly effort to comply with the rules and to upgrade its processing and handling facilities. Often, it will receive financial assistance from the EU to make the necessary changes in good time. In exceptional cases, the EU may allow a transitional period in which to complete upgrading after a country has joined the Union. This is why exceptions – mainly for plants processing meat and fish – currently apply in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

The latest deadline for catching up is December 2007. Meanwhile, food from plants that have still to finish their upgrading can only be sold in the country where it is produced. Consumers in that country can easily recognise these products because they must carry a stamp indicating that they come from facilities not yet complying with EU rules.

 

Related Issues

 

The European Commission’s food safety website:

Europa.eu.int/comm/food/index_en.html

 

The European Food Safety Authority website:

efsa.eu.int

 

The rapid alert system for food and feed website:

europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Text 11: EU Scientists confirm health risks of growth hormones in meat

April 23, 2002

 

Link

 

http://www.organicconsumers.org/toxic/hormone042302

 

Source

 

This document is a press article provided online by the Associated Press: www.organicconcumers.org.

This web site provides an overview of current affairs and keeps consumers well informed. This information is reliable and quite interesting as it gives us specific information as scientific data, technical details and figures. It changes the viewpoint from which we are used to address the Hormones case, namely the strictly legal or political view.

 

Summary

 

This article deals with one of the crucial disputes, which oppose the EU to the US: Food safety. Here, the EU refers to scientific evidence to support its controversial ban.

The US and Canada stand against the UE position but the EU still hopes to re-open a dialogue with both of them, knowing it has made some efforts to find a solution to the conflict.

 

French summary

 

Cet article traite d’un des cruciaux conflits qui opposent l’UE aux EU: la sécurité alimentaire. Ici, l’UE fait référence aux preuves scientifiques pour soutenir son interdiction controversée.

Les Etats Unis et le Canada s’opposent à la position de l’UE mais l’UE espère encore rouvrir un dialogue avec chacun d’entre eux sachant qu’elle a déjà fait des efforts pour trouver une solution au conflit.

 

Glossary

 

To back up (v.): étayer, soutenir

Cattle (n.): bétail, bovin

Spat (n.): querelle

To impose (economic) sanctions (v.): prendre des sanctions économiques

To be stalled (v.): être bloqué, calé

The EU Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Heath (SCVPH): le Comité Scientifique Européen des Mesures Vétérinaires en rapport avec la Santé Publique

The incidence of cancer (n.): la fréquence des cas de cancer

Upheld complaint: griefs jugés fondés

To undertaken (v.): entreprendre

Growth promoters (n.): accélérateurs de croissance

An appraisal (n.): une evaluation

To launch (v.): lancer

Completion (n.): achèvement

Edible (adj.): comestible

 

 

EU Scientists Confirm Health Risks
of Growth Hormones in Meat

 

Associated Press
April 23, 2002

 

EU says new scientific evidence backs up beef hormone fears.

 

New checks by a European Union scientific panel have confirmed that eating beef from cattle raised on growth hormones is a potential health risk, the EU said Tuesday.

 

The latest data backs up the EU's ban on the use of such hormones and a prohibition of imported beef treated with hormones, which has led to a long-running trade spat with the United States and Canada. The North Americans dispute Europe's scientific evidence and allow widespread fattening of cattle with growth hormones.

 

The World Trade Organization in 1997 upheld a U.S. complaint against the EU ban and authorized the United States and Canada to impose about dlrs 124 million a year in sanctions on EU goods.

 

In a statement, the EU said its scientists used latest techniques to review studies undertaken in 1999 and 2000 on the six banned hormones and came to the same conclusion.  "The use of hormones to stimulate the growth of cattle raises a potential risk for consumers' health," it said.

 

In an effort to resolve the trade dispute, the EU has been offering to lower tariffs or raise import quotas on U.S. hormone-free beef exports, but talks are stalled.

 

Brussels, 23 avril 2002

 

Growth promoting hormones pose health risk to consumers, confirms EU
Scientific Committee.

 

The EU Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health (SCVPH) confirmed today that the use of hormones as growth promoters for cattle poses a potential health risk to consumers, following a review of 17 studies and other recent scientific data.
Publishing its third opinion on the risks to human health from hormone residues in beef products, the SCVPH found no reason to change its previous opinions of 1999 and 2000.

 

This latest opinion follows a re-appraisal of 17 studies as well as taking into account the latest scientific evidence available from other relevant sources. The 17 studies were launched by the European Commission to address certain research gaps identified following the ruling of the WTO Appellate Body concerning the scientific basis of the EU import ban on meat and products treated with growth-promoting hormones. The studies addressed toxicological aspects, potential abuse and control problems, as well as environmental aspects of six hormones: oestradiol 17-, progesterone, testosterone, zeranol, trenbolone acetate and melengestrol acetate and their metabolites.

 

Following the completion of all 17 studies, the SCVPH was asked to review its previous opinions on the potential risks to human health from hormone residues in bovine meat and meat products. The Committee confirmed the validity of its previous opinions stating, "no amendments to those opinions are justified".

 

The Committee made particular reference to the disposition of stable lipoidal esters in animal body fats and the dose-dependent increase in residue levels of all hormones in edible tissues.

 

Furthermore, the accumulating evidence confirmed the mutagenic and genotoxic potential of 17 oestradiol. The complex biotransformation of trenbolone, zeranol and melengestrol acetate was identified. Experimental and epidemiological data were evaluated regarding possible consequences for the incidence of cancer from pre- and perinatal exposure to hormones.

 

The final opinion of the SCVPH "Review of previous SCVPH opinions of 30 April 1999 and 3 May 2000 on the potential risks to human health from hormones residues in bovine meat and meat products" is available on the Internet at:

 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scv/outcome_en.html

 

For further background information on the "hormone-case", go to:

 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/him/him_index_en.html

 

 

French version

 

Des scientifiques de l’UE confirment les risques pour la santé des hormones de croissance dans la viande

 

Presse associée

Le 23 avril 2002,

 

L’UE annonce qu’une nouvelle preuve scientifique vient étayer les craintes du bœuf aux hormones

 

L’UE a déclaré mardi, que de nouvelles évaluations par un groupe scientifique de travail de l’Union européenne ont confirmé, que manger du bœuf provenant d’un bétail élevé aux hormones de croissance est un risque potentiel pour la santé.

 

Les dernières données soutiennent l’interdiction de l’UE de l’utilisation de telles hormones et la prohibition de bœuf importé traité aux hormones, ce qui a mené à une querelle commerciale continuelle avec les États Unis et le Canada. Les Nord américains contestent la preuve scientifique des européens et autorisent l’engraissage à grande échelle du bétail avec des hormones de croissance.

 

L’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce a, en 1997, jugé fondés les griefs des EU à l’encontre de l’interdiction de l’UE et a autorisé les États Unis et le Canada à prendre environ 124 millions de dollars par an de sanctions sur les produits européens.

 

Dans une déclaration, l’UE a dit que ses scientifiques ont usé des dernières techniques afin de revoir les études entreprises en 1999 et 2000 sur les six hormones interdites et en sont venus à la même conclusion.

 

« L’utilisation des hormones pour stimuler la croissance du bétail augmente un risque potentiel pour la santé des consommateurs, » a-t-elle déclaré.

 

Dans un effort à résoudre le conflit commercial, l’UE s’est offerte de baisser les tarifs ou d’augmenter les quotas d’importation sur les exportations de bœuf américain sans hormones, mais les pourparlers sont bloqués.

 

Bruxelles, le 23 avril 2002

 

Des hormones favorisant la croissance posent un risque pour la santé des consommateurs, confirme le Comité Scientifique de l’UE

 

Le Comité Scientifique Européen des Mesures Vétérinaires en rapport avec la Santé Publique (CSVSP) a confirmé aujourd’hui que l’utilisation des hormones comme accélérateurs de croissance pour le bétail pose un risque potentiel pour la santé des consommateurs, suivant une révision de 17 études et d’autres données scientifiques récentes.

Publiant sa troisième opinion sur les risques pour la santé de l’homme de résidus d’hormones dans des produits de bœuf, le CSVSP n’a trouvé aucune raison de changer ses précédentes opinions datant de 1999 et 2000.

 

Cette dernière opinion suit une réévaluation de 17 études aussi bien que prend en considération les dernières preuves scientifiques disponibles provenant d’autres sources pertinentes. Les 17 études ont été lancées par la Commission européenne pour aborder certains écarts de recherche identifiés suite à la décision de l’organe d’appel de l’OMC concernant les fondements scientifiques de l’interdiction de l’UE de l’importation de viande et produits traités aux hormones favorisant la croissance. Les études abordent des aspects toxicologiques, des problèmes d’abus potentiel et de contrôle aussi bien que des aspects écologistes de six hormones: l’œstradiol 17-a, la progestérone, la testostérone, la zéolite, la trembolone acétate et la mélengestrole acétate et leurs métabolites.

 

Suivant l’achèvement des 17 études, il a été demandé au CSVSP de revoir ses opinions antérieures sur les risques potentiels pour la santé de l’homme venant des résidus d’hormones dans de la viande bovine et des produits de viande. Le Comité a confirmé la validité de ses opinions antérieures déclarant qu’ « aucunes révisions de ces opinions ne sont justifiées. »

 

Le Comité a fait mention en particulier à la tendance d’esters lipophiles stable dans les graisses du corps de l’animal et de l’augmentation en fonction de la dose des taux de résidus de toutes les hormones dans les tissus mangeables.

 

De plus, l’élément de preuve a confirmé le potentiel mutagénique et génotoxique de l’œstradiol 17-a. La bio transformation complexe de trembolone, de zéolite et de mélengestrole acétate a été identifiée.

Des données expérimentales et épidémiologiques ont été évaluées concernant de la conséquence possible de cas de cancer provenant d’une exposition pré- et périnatale aux hormones.

 

L’opinion finale du CSVSP « Révision des opinions antérieures du CSVSP du 30 avril 1999 et du 3 mai 2000 sur les risques potentiels pour la santé de l’homme provenant des résidus d’hormones dans de la viande bovine et des produits de viande » est disponible sur Internet à:

 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scv/outcome_en.html

 

Pour des informations contextuelles supplémentaires sur l’« affaire des hormones », cliquez à:

 

http://eu.int/comm/food/fs/him/him_index_en.html

 

 

Commentary

       

It is clear the growing rift between European and American approaches and trade relations have arrived at a critical juncture.

We do realize also according to the amounts of the trade sanctions that the major field of EU-US cooperation seems to be economic, which explains the seriousness of the affair.

 

For further information on “mad-cow disease”, you can go to:

http://www.mad-cow.org/~tom/ban_on_US_beef.html

 

Where I found, as below, an extract of what the website provides to the readers, a toxicological aspects of the dispute:

 

Six growth hormones allowed in US
but forbidden in EU

Implantations in ear

Added to cattle feed

Added as Doping Mask

 

 

estradiol 17 beta

 

melengestrol (MGA)

 

procaine

 

 

testosterone

 

 

 

dexamethasone

 

 

progesterone

 

 

 

triamcinolone-acetonide

 

 

zeranol (mycoestrogen)

 

clenbuterol*: angel dust

 

 

 

 

trenbolone (Revalor)

 

[used illegally]

 

 

 

 

Clenbuterol = 4-amino-a-[t-butylaminomethyl]-3,5-dichlorobenzylalcohol
Related beta agonists: clenproparol, broombuterol, mabuterol, salbutamol, mapenterol, cimaterol
prednisolone, triamcinolone acetonide, methylprednisolone
Other synthetic hormones: methylboldenone, estradiolbenzonate, ethinyl-estradiol, methyl-testosterone, medroxyprogestrone, diaethylstilboestrole, delmadinonacetate, chloormadinone, DES

 

Organizations for the protection of animals claim that hormones do harm the animals. At a special conference in Brussels last year they reported that some of the hormones could cause cancer in the animals. The European ministers of agriculture who are working on different laws for what is named ‘animal’s well-being’ take that argument seriously. The well being of animals is a political issue in Europe that has to be taken seriously. Especially in the United Kingdom the public seem to be opposed to any form of industrialized stock rising.

 

Protection from food allergies and food intolerance

The proportion of the population suffering from food allergies or food intolerance (to peanuts or lactose, for example) is increasing. Some 8% of children and 3% of adults now suffer from food allergy or food intolerance. Better labelling helps these people avoid those foodstuffs or ingredients, which provoke a reaction. In the past, it was not compulsory to label components of any compound ingredient making up less than 25% of the final product. From 2005, all ingredients must be listed. There will be a very limited number of exceptions to this rule, but an ingredient known to be a potential source of allergy or intolerance must always be listed.

 

 

Related Issues

 

The European Commission’s agriculture and food website:

europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/foodqual/index_en.htm

 

Consumer Voice (magazine on EU consumer policy):

europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/index_en.html

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Text 12: EU to WTO: US, Canada sanctions illegal

Monday, November 8, 2004

 

Link

 

http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/reuters_eubeefban_11082004.pdf

 

Source

 

The information we can find in this document is easy to understand, knowing that the readers concerned are mainly the citizens and that most of the public is unable to cease all the aspects of the conflict. The contents are correct and reliable and show for once how the EU can react angrily to a decision estimated unfair according to its way of reasoning. The quotations from each side are interesting as it gives to the text a living dimension: it is not only two superpowers in conflict but also two human and cultural divided viewpoint.

 

Summary

 

The European Union has decided to stand firm on this food safety issue in the interests of consumer health and safety and is still opposed to the US and Canada’s decision to impose economic sanctions on its trade exports.

The EU insists this is based on health and personal preference reasons, Americans insist it is a pseudo trade barrier, and each seems to be firmly convinced the other has the illogical position.

 

French summary

 

L’Union européenne a décidé de tenir bon sur cette question de sécurité alimentaire dans les intérêts de la sécurité et de la santé du consommateur et s’oppose toujours à la décision des Etats Unis et du Canada d’imposer des sanctions économiques à ces exportations commerciales.

L’UE insiste sur le fait que ce soit basé sur des raisons de santé et de préférence personnelle alors que les Américains insiste, eux, pour dire que c’est une pseudo barrière douanière et chacun semble être fermement convaincu que l’autre a le mauvais raisonnement.

 

Glossary

 

To be a thorn in sb’s side (v.): être un sujet continuel d’irritation pour qn, une épine dans le pied

Rationale (n.): raisonnement

The US Trade Représentative (n.): le Représentant des EU pour les Négociations Commerciales

To concern about (v.): se soucier

Breeding cattle (n.): élevage du bétail

Inconsistent (adj.): incompatible

Retaliation (n.):  représailles

Compliance (adj.): conformité

Intake (n.): consommation

 

EU to WTO: U.S., Canada Sanctions Illegal

Mon Nov 8, 2004 04:01 PM ET

 

BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The European Union executive asked the World Trade Organization on Monday to rule that it was illegal for the United States and Canada to retain sanctions on EU exports to counter the bloc's ban on hormone-treated beef.

The EU's ban on beef treated with growth hormones -- despite agreements that each side recognizes the other's food as safe -- has long been a thorn in the side of transatlantic food trade ties.

The U.S. sanctions apply to a variety of EU exports, such as Roquefort cheese, mustard, truffles, French hams and soups worth $116.8 million a year. Canada's sanctions are worth $9.5 million a year.

"There is no reason why European companies should continue to be targeted by sanctions when they export to Canada and the United States," EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said in a statement.

"The EU ban on certain growth promoting hormones is now in full respect of our international obligations," he added.

The United States and Canada on Monday showed no signs of stepping back from their sanctions.

"We still don't see how they (the Europeans) are in compliance, because the EU ban remains in place and is still unsupported by any scientific rationale," said Richard Mills, a spokesman for the U.S. Trade Representative in Washington.

Mills said the EU is concerned about hormone levels that "are 50 times less than the acceptable daily intake and they represent a tiny fraction of what occurs naturally in an egg or one glass of milk."

A spokeswoman for Canadian Trade Minister Jim Peterson insisted, "There is no scientific basis for the EU's hormone ban." She added, "Canada intends to continue retaliation" until the EU demonstrates it is complying with the WTO's rulings on the matter.

The EU has banned the use of growth-promoting hormones, arguing too little is known about them to estimate the possible risk to consumers.

But in 1988 the WTO ruled against the EU, saying there was not sufficient evidence to support the ban. The following year the United States and Canada imposed sanctions, citing the lack of scientific evidence that growth hormones were a threat to health. Both countries use hormones in breeding cattle.

Since then the EU has been gathering independent scientific evidence to support its ban and last year changed its rules to include a permanent ban on oestradiol 17B and temporary bans on five hormones, including testosterone and progesterone, that are used in a cocktail given to cattle.

The EU argues that if the United States and Canada disagree with the EU ban on hormone beef, it should refer the dispute to the WTO instead of continuing with unilateral sanctions.

"The EU challenges Canada's and the United States' continued imposition of sanctions against EU exports because of the EU's ban on hormone beef," the EU executive said.

"The EU believes these sanctions are illegal since the EU has removed the measures found to be WTO inconsistent in the WTO dispute on hormone beef dating from 1998," it added.

Under WTO rules, the EU, Canada and the United States have 60 days to discuss the sanctions formally before the case moves to a panel that would issue a binding ruling.

 

(Additional reporting by Richard Cowan in Washington and Gilbert Le Gras in Ottawa)

French version

 

De l’UE à l’OMC: les sanctions illégales des EU et du Canada

Lundi 8 Novembre 2004,

 

Bruxelles (Reuters) - L’exécutif européen a demandé lundi à l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce de déclarer qu’il était illégal pour les États Unis et le Canada de retenir des sanctions sur les exportations de l’UE pour contre attaquer l’interdiction en bloc de bœuf traité aux hormones.

L’interdiction de l’UE de bœuf traité aux hormones de croissance--malgré les accords que chaque côté reconnaît l’alimentation de l’autre comme sans danger--a été à long terme un sujet continuel d’irritation dans les relations étroites transatlantiques du commerce alimentaire.

Les sanctions des EU s’appliquent à une variété d’exportations de l’UE, telles qu’au fromage Roquefort, à la moutarde, aux truffes, aux soupes et jambons français estimées à 116,8 millions de dollars par an. Les sanctions du Canada sont estimées à 9,5 millions de dollars par an.

« Il n’y a aucune raison pour laquelle les entreprises européennes devraient continuer à être la cible de sanctions quand elles exportent au Canada et aux États Unis, » a dit lors d’une déclaration Pascal Lamy, le commissaire au Commerce de l’UE.

Il ajouta que « L’interdiction de l’UE sur certaines hormones de croissance est maintenant, à tous les égards, en respect avec nos obligations internationales. »

Les États Unis et le Canada n’ont montré lundi aucun signe de vouloir revenir sur leurs sanctions.

« Nous ne voyons toujours pas comment (les Européens) peuvent être en conformité, parce que l’interdiction de l’UE reste inchangée et n’est soutenue par aucun raisonnement scientifique » a déclaré Richard Mills, un porte-parole du Représentant des États Unis pour les Négociations Commerciales à Washington.

Mills a dit que l’UE se soucie de taux d’hormones qui « sont 50 fois moindre que la consommation journalière acceptable et qu’ils représentent une infime portion de ce qui se trouve naturellement dans un œuf ou un verre de lait. »

Une porte-parole du Ministre du Commerce canadien, Jim Petterson, a insisté « il n’y a aucun fondement scientifique à l’interdiction des hormones de l’UE ». Elle ajouta, « Le Canada a l’intention de continuer les représailles » jusqu’à ce que l’UE démontre qu’elle se conforme aux décisions de l’OMC sur la question.

L’UE a interdit l’utilisation d’hormones favorisant la croissance, soutenant que trop peu est connu à leur propos pour évaluer le risque possible encouru par les consommateurs.

Mais en 1998, l’OMC s’est prononcé contre l’UE, disant qu’il n’y avait pas de preuve suffisante pour soutenir l’interdiction. L’année qui a suivi, les États Unis et le Canada ont pris des sanctions, citant le manque de preuve scientifique que les hormones de croissance étaient une menace pour la santé. Les deux pays utilisent des hormones pour l’élevage du bétail.

Depuis lors, l’UE a rassemblé des preuves scientifiques indépendantes afin de soutenir son interdiction et a changé ses règles l’an dernier pour inclure une interdiction permanente sur l’œstradiol 17B et des interdictions temporaires sur cinq hormones, incluant la testostérone et la progestérone, qui sont utilisées en cocktail donné au bétail.

L’UE soutient que si les États Unis et le Canada sont en désaccord avec l’interdiction de l’UE du bœuf aux hormones, ils devraient soumettre l’affaire à l’OMC plutôt que de continuer avec des sanctions unilatérales.

« L’UE défie la prise prolongée de sanctions du Canada et des États Unis contre les exportations européennes à cause de l’interdiction de l’UE du bœuf aux hormones » a déclaré l’exécutif de l’UE.

Il ajouta que « L’UE croit que ces sanctions sont illégales depuis que l’UE a supprimé les mesures se trouvant être incompatibles avec l’OMC dans l’affaire de l’OMC sur le bœuf aux hormones datant de 1998. »

Sous les règles de l’OMC, l’UE, le Canada et les États Unis ont 60 jours pour discuter des sanctions officiellement avant que l’affaire ne soit envoyée devant un panel qui devrait rendre une décision contraignante.

 

(Reportage additionnel de Richard Cowan de Washington et Gilbert Le Gras d’Ottawa)

 

Commentary

 

The complaint to WTO "underscores the US government's determination to end this long-standing unfair trade practice and restore access for US meat exporters to this important market" has been stated in an official statement by the US.

Although Argentina, Canada, New Zealand and other beef producing countries protested against the European ban, that also hurts them, only the US lodged a complaint at the WTO.

 

French officials expected the US to react by imposing sanctions after the beef decision, so the move came as no surprise. They add that the decision illustrates their argument that possible health hazards are not sufficiently taken into account by the WTO evaluation process.

One EU study already shows that the risk of cancer exists for one of the hormones in question, the ministry pointed out. As its beef ruling showed, the WTO needs definite scientific evidence that a product is harmful for human health in order to uphold a ban.

Chirac's board would differ in that it would apply what the French call the "principal of caution" which allows banning imports of a food product if there is "reasonable doubt" that it could be harmful to health. International negotiations would have to establish the border between reasonable and unreasonable doubt, once the principal of caution is accepted as valid, the French explain.

 

Canadian beef banned too

The hormonal preparations permitted are used as growth promotants - anabolic agents that increase feed efficiency and accelerate attainment of market weight - being in large part endogenous hormones such as estradiol and progesterone or testosterone. These are implanted subcutaneously in the ear.

 

Related Issue

 

New US-EU trade war looms:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2534179.stm

 

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

            This case finally deals with health and economy. As the organization of our societies shows it, the two do not get along very well: one is life, the other is less important: but which one is which one? This is the whole issue of this case, putting the finger on cultural divergences, leading to opposite political choices and so entering in conflict with world trade laws…mostly put in place by…America.

            In Europe most of the countries set up a social security system, allowing everyone to be helped in case of illness. Health has no price and, at least in ideology, the society tries to consider health more than money. In USA, ones health guarantee is directly linked to ones economical capacity, as assurances are private and public health system does not exist. Economy prime on everything else…even life! That is maybe the reason why American people do not care about eating poison, if it can make their country’s economy feel better! In Europe therefore, the reaction is different and in agreement with priorities explained upper: health is more important than economy and any agreements on trade.

            This very simple view explains why America wants to sell hormone beef to Europe as world trade agreements allow everyone to reach any market and why Europe wants to ban these importations because it considers this meat is a threat to health for consumers.

            But behind this simple little conflict, huge things are at stake. First, everything would be clearer if health was an exact science! But the results of scientists are not all the same and can lead to diverging interpretations. These diverging interpretations are under enormous stakes as this ban deals with a lot of money. That is why justice had to enter the game, America deciding to accuse Europe for protecting its economy and Europe arguing in favor of health. As a very uncertain surprise, American scientists found absolutely no link between hormones and any illness and European scientists discovered that hormones kill children.

            That is why this case is so interesting and revels implication of economy in politics and shows the stakes that are behind the measures taken by governments in our name.

            We could call all together for the public opinion to react and to save us from political madness and incapability but we understand quickly that it is hard to know the truth, that even public opinion can be manipulate and that we depend on media treatment of information and on our own cultural context which make us react instinctively in a way or in an other.

            So as a conclusion more than saying we are all lost and that we could die for eating meat, we should deserve information on food we buy (which is a big issue taken into account by the European commission very seriously) and maybe battle for a fewer impact of economy on politics.

 

Ultimate commentary

 

Food safety is so a top priority in Europe. The EU’s demanding rules have been further toughened since 2000 to ensure that Europeans’ food is extremely safe. The new approach is more integrated: feed and food are carefully tracked from the farm to the fork. EU authorities carefully evaluate risk and always seek the best possible scientific advice before banning or permitting any product, ingredient, additive or GMO. This applies to all feed and food, irrespective of whether it comes from inside   or outside the EU. Safety does not mean uniformity. The EU promotes diversity based on quality. European law protects traditional foods and products from specific regions by ensuring consumers can distinguish them from copies. The European Union is increasingly encouraging its farmers to focus on quality - not just in food but also in the rural environment.
The EU also respects the consumer's right to informed choice. It encourages public debate, it requires informative labelling and it publishes the scientific advice it receives, so that consumers can have confidence in the food they eat.

 

Work to improve food safety is going on all the time, but there has in addition been a major overhaul in the last couple of years. This was a response to headline-hitting food safety scares in the 1990s about such things as ‘mad cow’ disease, dioxin-contaminated feed and adulterated olive oil. The purpose was not just to make sure that EU food safety laws were as up-to-date as possible, but also that consumers have as much information as possible about potential risks and what is being done to minimise them. There is no such thing as zero risk, but the EU does its utmost, through a comprehensive food safety strategy, to keep risks to a minimum with the help of modern food and hygiene standards drawn up to reflect the most advanced scientific knowledge. Food safety starts on the farm. The rules apply from farm to fork, whether our food is produced in the EU or is imported from elsewhere in the world.

 

No matter how rigorous the scientific approach may be, ambiguities and open questions, by the nature of science itself, will often remain. But at the same time, we have to recognise that, as a rule, in order to be effective, a regulatory system has to take decisions aimed at protecting the health of consumer often “here and now”, before scientific controversies can be resolved and the final verdict is in. In other words, we have to recognise what in general and at a specific time science can deliver and what it cannot and therefore when other bases for action can be relied upon.

 

The European and international debate on the ban on hormones beef and food safety have matured markedly over the past year and one can detect a growing understanding and acceptance of precaution in health and environmental protection matters.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Glossary 

 

A

Achieve: atteindre, obtenir

Available: disponible

Assessment: évaluation, jugement

Attempt: tentative

Amongst: parmi, entre

Awareness (n.): conscience

Appraisal (n.): une evaluation

(To) appeal: faire appel

 

B

Ban: interdiction

Back up (v.): étayer, soutenir

Basically: au fond, fondamentalement, à la base

Bear testimony (v.): rendre témoignage de

Be stalled (v.): être bloqué

Be a thorn in sb’s side (v.): être un sujet continuel d’irritation pour qn, une épine dans le pied

Board: conseil d’administration

Breeding cattle (n.): élevage du bétail

Bring forward (v.): presenter

 

C

Contaminant (n.): polluant

Cattle (n.): bétail, bovin

Concern about (v.): se soucier

Carcinogenic (adj.): cancérigène

Compounds (n.): composés

Comply with (v.): se conformer à

Comprehensive (adj.) : complet

Completion (n.): achèvement

Compliance (adj.): conformité

Comprehensive: complète

Cowardice : lâcheté

Controversially: discutable, controversé, qui a beaucoup fait parler de lui

Cattle: troupeau, bétail

(To) collapse: s’effondrer

Conflicting: contradictoire

 

D

Data: donnée

Discount (v.): négliger

 

E

EU Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Heath (SCVPH): le Comité Scientifique Européen des Mesures

Err on the side of caution : par mesure de prudence, pécher dans le sens de la prudence

Encompass (v.): couvrir, englober

Enact (v.) : adopter

Endorse: endosser, appuyer

Enhance (v.): améliorer

Ensure: garantir

Edible (adj.): comestible

Evidence: preuve

 

F

Food additives (n.): additives

(To) fatten: engraisser

Further: supplémentaire, autre, nouveau, davantage

(To come to the) fore: se faire remarquer

 

G

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n.): l’Accord sur les Tarifs Douaniers et le Commerce

Growth promoters (n.): accélérateurs de croissance

 

H

 

Harmful : nuisible

 

I

Inconsistent (adj.): incompatible

Impose (economic) sanctions (v.): prendre des sanctions économiques

Intake (n.): consommation

Irradiation (n.) : radiation

Indiscriminate : qui manque de discernement, qui ne distingue pas

 

K

Key policy (n): une politique prioritaire

 

L

Loophole (n.): une lacune

Launch (v.): lancer

Leverage: levier, prise

(To) lodge a complaint: porter plainte

(To) lift: lever

 

M

Meet a deadline (v.): respecter un délai

Main thrust (n.): l’idée générale

Merely: purement

 

O

Overlap (v.): avoir des points communs, se chevaucher

Occurring: en cours, se produire, existant

Override: passer outre à

 

P

Port of call (n.): un arrêt

Prescriptive (adj.): normative

Provision for sth : (prises des) dispositions nécessaires pour assurer qch

Provisional: provisoire

Pending: en attendant

Prior :antérieur, précédent (ici préalable)

Proceeding: poursuite, procédure

Panel: jury, expert

Potted: en conserve

 

R

Remit (n.): une attribution

Restore confidence (v.): restaurer la confiance

Residue (n.): un résidu

Retaliation (n.): représaille

Retailing (n.): commerce de bétail

Rationale (n.): argument rationnel

Rate: taux, valeur

Regulation: règlement

(To) remain: rester

Relevant: pertinent, approprié

Ruling: au pouvoir, règlement, gouverner, commander

Retaliatory: en représailles

Relevant: pertinent

Regard : respect, estime, considération

 

S

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (n.): l’Accord Sanitaire et Phytosanitaire

Set out (v.): établir

Stand firm (v.): tenir bon

Storage (n.) : le stockage

Spat (n.): une querelle

Sufficient : suffisant

Scope: portée

Significant: significatif, important

Standards: normes

Sustainability: durabilité

 

T

(To be) targeted: être pris pour cible

Thinly : maigrement, pauvrement

 

U

US Trade Représentative (n.): le Représentant des EU pour les Négociations Commerciales

Unwillingness (n.): reticence

Upheld complaint: griefs jugés fondés

Undertaken (v.): entreprendre

(To) undertake: entreprendre, s’engager à

(To) update: mettre à jour

 

V

Vindication: justification

 

W

White Paper on Food Safety (n.): Livre Blanc sur la Sécurité Alimentaire

Wide: vaste

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Useful Links

 

 

Who's afraid of the GMOs? EU-US Trade Disputes over Food Safety and Biotechnology:

Institute for International Studies Standford University, March 11th 1999

www.standford.edu/-jostling/usc.pdf

 

The European Commission’s food safety website:

europa.eu.int/comm/food/index_en.html

 

The European Food Safety Authority website:

efsa.eu.int

 

The rapid alert system for food and feed website:

europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm

 

Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue continues efforts to promote EU-US economic ties:

http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/FD/d-us20040930_002/d-us20040930_002en.pdf

 

The European Commission’s agriculture and food website:

europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/foodqual/index_en.htm

 

Consumer Voice (magazine on EU consumer policy):

europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/index_en.html

 

New US-EU trade war looms:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2534179.stm

 

 

 

Liste de liens de l’ « archive des messages du forum HYGIENE concernant les hormones dans les produits alimentaires »

http://www.liste-hygiene.org/archormones.html

 

« Un à quatre ans ferme pour des trafiquants d’anabolisants pour bovin »

http://www.web-agri.fr/Outils/Fiches/FichesDetail.asp?idRub=51&id=5755

 

 

 

 

 


[1] EU-US Relations in a globalizing world: competition or cooperation? Research-Dossier by S.Biasoli & E.Legeai

[2] EU-US Relations in a globalizing world: competition or cooperation? Research-Dossier by S.Biasoli & E.Legeai

[3] Research-Dossier by Biasoli & Legeai

[4] EU-US Relations in a globalizing world: competition or cooperation? Research-Dossier by S.Biasoli & E.Legeai

[5] Research-Dossier by Biasoli & Legeai

[6] Research-Dossier by Biasoli & Legeai