Web Review

The Peace Process in Colombia

By Liwen Pan and Poyu Lin

Introduction

Every Colombian president since Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) has recognized the need to find a political solution to the insurgency. In 1984, Betancur signed a cease-fire with the FARC and M-19, which lasted for about a year, despite efforts by the armed forces to subvert it.Presidents Virgilio Barco, Cesar Gaviria, and Ernesto Samper all conducted negotiations with various guerrilla groups, leading to the demobilization of the M-19 and several smaller organizations in 1991. But talks with the FARC and the ELN made no headway, as these larger groups refused to settle for amnesty alone, demanding negotiations on a fuller agenda of social and economic reforms.During presidential campaigns in 1998, Pastrana had already met the FARC leader and announced the formula of peace negotiations as his main policy.For the first time the peace process has been both a policy and a priority for the government. However, the process ended with the introduction of Plan Colombia. The recent Colombian president, Alvaro Uribe, adopts a tough position against the rebels.

The peace process in Colombia is not only the longest but also the first in Latin America. While the other countries in the region have achieved negotiated consensus, the situation of Colombia is still floating between negotiations and armed threats. Why the conflicts are so hard to be solved in Colombia? People must have some reasons for fighting against their government. In the case of Colombia, the actions against the government have lasted for over 50 years. The members of the FARC, the major guerrilla group in Colombia, have increased year by year. Political exclusion is possibly an explanation that the supporters of guerrilla groups feel that adopting radical actions is the only way to express their opinions. Nevertheless, the long-term conflicts in Colombia have economic, social and even regional security implications. The drug trade has fueled the intensification of the conflicts and the US intervention has contributed to it as well. The emergence of paramilitary complicates the conflicts more considerably. Besides, the spillover of refugees became neighboring countries' worries. To understand the background of the conflicts, a full-scale observation is required .

The structural design of this work intends to provide comprehensive on-line information concerning the subject. First, analysizing the history of Colombia allows understanding the root of conflicts. In the pages of "Insiders" and "Outsiders", there are some organization profiles and the strategies of actors who are involved directly or indirectly in the conflicts. We also have chosen some analytic papers as supplements to the preceding pages. Finally, a little conclusion presents our reflections and we have listed some related links which could be the resources for further studies.

Making peace with the left-wing guerrillas has been the main policy objective of Colombian government. However, the thought of peace-seeking is based on social welfare of just a result of weighing gains and losses? On the other side, lots of criticism of guerrilla's behaviors in which guerrilla groups are viewed as criminal gangs. Thus, it is doubtful to consider the peace process in Colombia as a passage toward "positive peace". What the government wants is to disarm the insurgent groups and what the guerrillas concern is about their existence. If the main actors don't have intentions to seek for the settlement, the future of Colombian population is anxious.

History

Colombia has been experiencing insurgency backed by guerrilla groups for over 50 years. Political conflicts, assassinations, kidnappings, extortions, drug traffickings and human right violations are not uncommon in Colombia, which makes Colombia one of the most violent countries in the world.

Nowadays, the conflicts in Colombia are not as simple as we thought. It is not only guerrilla groups and Colombian government, but also the paramilitary and drug cartel who have involved in prevailing disorder across the country.Furthermore, the forceful international interventions aimed at conflict resolution make the problem even more difficult to be solved. To understand the circumstances, it is necessary finding the root of all the conflicts. Some researches account it from the official formation of several guerrilla groups in the mid-1960, however, it might need to date back to the peasant armed self-defense movements formed between 1948 and 1958 during the period known as "La Violencia".

"Fifty Years of Violence" by Garry Leech, Colombia Jornal,May 1999

Violence has been marked as a weighty element of Colombia's status. This article attempts to give the explanations by analyzing the history of Colombia. Two sets of causes then are presented. One is the geographic fragmentation and the other is the failure of building effective institutions of government. These causes finally contributed the poverty and inequality which encouraged the emergence of Colombian guerrilla movements.

There are at least three issues should be mentioned and be solved for making Colombia a peaceful country. The first issue is how to defend and even restore human rights as the violence intensifies. The second issue is how to create, strengthen and institutionalize effective democratic governance throughout Colombia. The third and final great issue is how to strengthen and engage civil society in the effort to restore and consolidate peace in the country.

In sum, military solution will not settle the unrest permanently if we understand the root of violence in Colombia. A structural change is needed in order to lead Colombia toward peace.

"Roots of Violence in Colombia" by John H. Coatsworth, Revista(Harvard Review of Latin America, Spring 2003)

Insiders

1. Government

Colombian Administrations' Anti-Guerrilla Strategies (since 1982)
Belisario Betancur (1982-1986)	1982-1985, negotiating strategies were adopted. The cease-fire agreement busted because of the event of Palace of Justice. In 1986, the recurrence of conflicts .
Virgilio Barco (1986-1990)	1986-1988, the government adopted method of coercion (the military method) as their anti-guerrilla strategy. 1989 started negotiating with the M-19 and achieved the success that M-19 would lay down their arms and participate in the upcoming elections.
Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994)	1990-1991, continued the M-19's transition from armed group to political party. 1991-1992, opened up again the negotiations with the remaining guerrilla groups. 1992, returned to a military strategy against the remaining guerrillas.
Ernesto Samper (1994-1998)	Announced the comprehensive peace policy as well as the effective dialogue with all the revolting forces. In 1995, the Samper administration was in difficulties, due to the drug-money scandal known as "Proceso 8,000", his peace attempts thus stagnated.
Andres Pastrana (1998-2002)	During presidential campaigns in 1998, Pastrana had already met the FARC leader and announced the formula of peace negotiations as his main policy.For the first time the peace process has become both a formal policy and a priority for the government . 1998-2002, the peace negotiations fell into deadlock. 2002, military force attacked demilitarized zone,Armed conflict recurrence
Alvaro Uribe (Since 2002)	2002, confidential, direct ceasefire talks with the ELN in Cuba. 2003, President Uribe symbolically launched the "Democratic Security Policy". 2003, an AUC "unilateral ceasefire" accord has been signed.

Colombian President's Office [Spanish]
Ministry of National Defence [Spanish]

Before Pastrana left his presidential office, his tour to United States had some significant meanings. Within the country, Pastrana received the lowest popularity rating in the history of modern Colombia. Internationally, the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center twin towers in New York Colombia had lost the unofficial most favored nation status in Latin America. For these reasons, Pastrana tends to reestablish the relation with Washington by linking the internal armed conflicts to the war on terrorism. In sum, the political reality made Pastrana change his peace route.

"The Pastrana Legacy" by Bert Ruiz, bertruiz.com,January 9, 2002

Alvaro Uribe is the first independent candidate ever elected to the Colombian presidency. Uribe won the presidential race by receiving the support from voters who expect a hardliner on the insurgent issues. It seems that Uribe's election victory is just what Washington has been waiting for since the Washington has already changed their strategies from counter-narcotics to counter-insurgency. After the failure of Pastrana's peace talks with the FARC, Uribe faces the escalating conflicts like every new selected government did in last past twenty years. However, his tough role is bringing the international community's attention to Colombia's problem .

"War or Peace:Colombia's new president must choose between Washington and his own people"
By Ana Carrigan, In These Times,August 2, 2002

On 29 June 2003, President Uribe symbolically launched the Democratic Security Policy in Putumayo province. The objective of Uribe's Democratic Security Policy is considered as a "new" strategy against the insurgent threats by increasing the numbers and capacity of troops and police units and by deploying them across the country to challenge the guerrillas. Nevertheless, many criticisms, whether domestic of international, have been incited followed with his announcement of the policy. Regain the control of the state is an old issue in Colombia, which should be treated seriously, of course. However, in Colombia's case, the inefficiency of government force to maintain national security is probably having linkages with other asymmetric structural issues. Although it is too early to make some final conclusions, the government of Colombia should be carefully avoiding the increasing force encouraged by the Democratic Security Policy to undermine the surviving democracy.

"Colombia: President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy", International Crisis Group, November 13 2003

2.FARC

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia


	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia		Official Site

	Between 1964 and 1966 Manuel Marulanda and other members of the Communist Party of Colombia organized the FARC. Like many movements born in Central and South American during the 60's, the FARC espoused a Marxist ideology. Now they are the oldest surviving guerrilla group in Colombia and the largest in Latin America.		CNN Specials-Colombia: War without end-Organization Profiles-FARC





	The FARC was led by Manuel "Sureshot" Marulanda.Until the 1980s the growth of the FARC was slow, then they started to tax drugs and became the most powerful rebels. However,the FARC did establish a political party, the Patriotic Union (UP), in the late 1980s. But the UP was decimated by right-wing death squads and then they focus on the military route to power.		Colombia's most powerful rebels, BBC 09102003





	Interview with Raul Reyes(a member of the leadership of the FARC). This might be a radical report but it is at least an approach to know their intentions.		Is the Farc a terrorist outfil? Green Left Weekly

3.ELN

National Liberation Army


	Website of the second largest guerrilla organization (ELN) in Colombia.		Revista Insurreccion [Spanish]

	The movement attracted many Catholic priests who adhered to Liberation Theology, starting in 1966 with a handsome young crusading priest from a prominent family, Father Camilo Torres. Some others priests followed in his footsteps after his death. Manuel Perez was one of those priests, who led the ELN until 1998. The ELN doesn't not get their support from drug trade but relies more heavily on kidnapping and extortion. And that may be the reason why they don't enjoy the same explosive military growth as the FARC. The ELN has declared its intention to negotiate with the government and they also laid out some proposals for a peace process, which didn't get the government's attentions.		"Colombia's rebel kidnappers" by Jeremy McDermott,BBC News, January 7 , 2002











	Colombia's second-largest rebel group, the ELN, was organized by intellectuals and students who had studied in Cuba and were influenced by Che Guevara becoming a Christian-Marxism ideology.However, for lack of population support and the conflict between factions, the ELN almost dispersed for a time. In the 1970s, government anti-guerrilla offensives reduced the ELN to only several hundred combatants. But ELN survived from its crisis, became more active in 1980s and reached his high peak in the late 1990s. The ELN's principal strategy is to harass and blackmail the petroleum and energy industries. Since the early 1980s ELN has launched hundreds of bombings of oil pipelines. Being the biggest kidnappings gang in Colombia, ransom money is also a source of its funds. The ELN has an estimated annual income of $150 to 200 million.		Organization Profile:ELN, CNN Speciales-Colombia:War without End, 2000

4.AUC

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

The existence of the paramilitaries and their relationship with the Colombian military has also hindered the peace process. In fact, the FARC had condemned the government's unwillingness to curtail the right-wing paramilitary organization.

	Colombia Libre-AUC's official site	Colombia Libre

	The conception of "Paramilitary" is sometimes difficult to be defined. According to Adam Weiss, the formation of existing paramilitary forces in Colombia can be roughly divided into three periods: official paramilitarism, private paramilitarism, and modern paramilitarism. Hence, the paramilitary forces in Colombia have had close relationship with the Colombian military. Paramilitary then became an integral part of the states counterinsurgency strategy by operating the assistances in tasks such as intelligence gathering, logistical support, and and the assassination of critics and activists seen as threats to the social order. Although the paramilitary groups were declared illegal at the end of the 1980s, lots of evidences imply the widespread complicity between them . Because of their operations, as mentioned above, the paramilitary became a great threat to human rights.Human rights activists claim the paramilitaries are responsible for most of the atrocities committed in Colombia. The human rights violations against civilians carried out by the AUC paramilitaries are among the worst in the world and continue to occur on a large scale throughout Colombia.	Colombia's Paramilitary:Profile of an Entrenched Terror Network by Adam Weiss, Znet, April 22, 2002 Organization Profile: United Self-Defense Forses of Colombia CNN Specials-Colombia: War without End, 2000

Outsiders

1.Regional

Neighboring Countries' Anxiety

For years, it has been claimed that Colombia's conflicts are spilling over its borders, threatening the stability of its neighbors. Countries in the Andean ridge concern about refugee flows, guerrilla and paramilitary incursions, kidnapping and extortion, and infrequent combat. As a matter of fact, the Colombia's conflict is now spreading across its borders. Neighboring countries have increasingly voiced concerns about the cross-border effects.

Ecuador has received Over 12,000 refugees since 1995. Venezuela and Panama have suffered from the same effect to a lesser degree. President Chavez described the situation as a "mini Kosovo". Further, Colombian guerrillas are often reported taking refuge across the border in Venezuela, Panama, and Brazil. Especially the Colombia's border with Panama, perhaps the most lawless of them all, the FARC were using the zone as a rest and recreation area to escape pressure from the Colombian security forces. Venezuela has also become a destination for injured guerrillas and paramilitaries requiring hospital treatment. Brazil has taken the Colombian threat seriously enough to set up a military task force.

Brazil and Peru have experienced problems relating to the drug trade and local guerrilla activity. According to reports compiled by the Colombian security forces and the US, the Brazilian was shifting more than 20 tons of cocaine via FARC every year. Colombian drugs traffickers have been offering Peruvian farmers money to sow opium poppies to supply the booming heroin market. Learning from the FARC's successful experience, the Shining Path is conscious of the increasing coca crops a financial support, which allows them back to stage.

The argument of Richard L. Millett may take us to somewhere far from frames of territory. He considers that under the context of global village, any national crisis will not only limited to national borders. Moreover, every conflict has global political, economic, social, and security implications, which can easily clash to local and regional political instability and no country can deal with those problems alone .

Because of the spill out effect of Colombia's conflict, international community is bringing the pressure on Colombian government and that means a more difficult situation to be solved. Converting the international pressure into an auxiliary or an obstruction will be the most difficult lesson for Colombian political elites in their peace efforts.

"Plan Colombia and its consequences in Ecuador" by the Ecumenical Human Rights Commission of Ecuador, March 2001
"Colombia's conflicts: the spillover effects of a wider war" by Richard L. Millett, October 2002
"Colombia and its neighbours: the tentacles of instability" by International Crisis Group, 8 April 2003

2.International

The Role of United States

U.S. Drug War in Colombia
Under the circumstance of the U.S. interference, this is not favorable for the Colombian peace efforts. In 1960s, the U.S. government assisted with his military force to settle Colombia's internal disorders. The unset in Colombia might calm down temporally. Nevertheless, the suppression resulted in the appearance of guerrilla groups. Furthermore, the U.S. anti-drug policies toward Latin America in 1980s, instead of eradicating the narcotics cultivation, caused the insurgent groups possessing of enormous economic resources to strengthen themselves. For the 1990s, U.S. government involved pressuring the Colombian government to go after the leadership of the cocaine cartels based in Medellin and Cali. In fact, the kingpin strategy did little to reduce the overall drug trade. Instead, drug production 'atomized' from the large cartels to a much greater number of small drug producers, making subsequent anti-drug operations more difficult.

Recently, Colombian government's attempt to strengthen the Security Forces with U.S. support generated a more complicated situation. On 9 January 2002, Colombian president Andres Pastrana announced that he was suspending the three-year long peace talks with the FARC. U.S. government spreads his hands toward Colombia in the name of national security. The facts talk that the U.S. intervention may explain, in some way, the development of the Colombian guerrilla movement.

From War on Drugs to Plan Colombia
For more than a decade, a central goal of the United States' international war on drugs has been to reduce the supply of illicit drugs cultivated in, and exported from the Andean countries. U.S. government may receive some success in some countries but drugs industry doesn't disappear in Colombia. However, Colombia is the biggest drug-providing source that U.S. can't ignore. Therefore, a new approach was needed.

At the mean time, Pastrana's peace negotiations fell into deadlock. The Military criticized the government's concessions at the negotiating table were unacceptable. The unrest within the military ranks affected the legitimacy of the Pastrana-led peace process. With the result that U.S. president Clinton along with Colombian president Pastrana declared Plan Colombia.

The contents of Plan Colombia(United States Institute of Peace Library)
U.S. support on Plan Colombia(U.S. Department of State)

Although US government has declaimed that the assistance is provided for counter-narcotics purposes only, there is a clear linkage between the Colombian government's counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency strategies. The intentions of Colombian government are to degrade the guerrillas' ability to carry on the war by striking at the economic center of gravity of the guerrillas.

The bulk of the U.S. assistance package is designed to help the Colombian government implementing the "Southern strategy", that is to train and equip the new counter-narcotics battalions, supported by US-provided helicopters and intelligence, with the objective of taking control of the guerrilla-dominated southern departments. Without questions, this step aims especially to fight the FARC.

"Colombian government strategy", in RABASA, Angel M. ; Chalk, Peter, Colombian labyrinth: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability , Santa Monica: Rand, 2001.

It is important to note that US anti-drugs actions through Plan Colombia have added fuel to the Colombian conflicts. US increases military Aid to Colombia has certainly emboldened the most hawkish voices within the Colombian military. Evidently it collapses the trust in the peace negotiations. An all-out war may get started easily with the US encouragement but is it a permanent solution to a long-term structural problem?

"Is More Military Aid a Solution for Colombia?" by Jorge Rojas, Paz Colombia, January 15 2002

War against Terrorism

After the September 11 terrorist attack on the WorldTradeCenter twin towers, a war on terror has been carried out vigorously. Moreover, against terrorism became the center of all U.S. foreign policies, thus appearing a clear side line for choosing allies. Using the language of anti-terrorism, the three major illegal armed groups are listed in the list of terrorist organizations. However, Washington and Bogota seem to incorporate AUC's force to strengthen the power to crash the FARC. The intention confronts with many condemnations from international community because of the AUC's worst record of human rights violations. From communists, narcoguerrillas to today's terroristic guerrillas, U.S.government has never changed its position against the FARC or the ELN but the dimension of interventions more and more unlimitedly. Besides, Uribe's government is happy receiving the support of Washington to back the regaining state's control work. Through the war on terror, linkages between Bogota and Washington becomes closer, thus a military-oriented settlement is placed on the table.

"The War on Terror in Colombia" by Garry Leech, Colombia Journal, May 2004

Considerations from European Union

The European Commission hosted on 30 April 2001 inBrussels reinforced its strong political support for the peace process in Colombia. At this meeting, the European Union manifested its preoccupation concerning the increasing human rights violations issues and proposed its twofold objectives, which will contribute to confirm the EU's strong political support for the peace efforts of President Pastrana and to undertake a substantial financial commitment to back the peace process as well.

"The EU's relations with Colombia-Peace Process in Colombia : Brussels meeting to galvanise international support", Europa- European Union On-Line

When the governments of United States and Colombia were seeking others countries' support and substantial aids for the Plan Colombia, the European Union intended to keep distance from getting involved. EU had seen the plan as a mistake because of its emphasis on military intentions. Although EU repeated its political support of peaceful means to settle the conflicts and its concern with human rights issue, the EU maintained its wait-and-see attitude without further assistances to make the negotiations between the Colombian government and the guerrilla groups really work. Throughout this article, the author accents the importance of EU's role since most foreign observers feel that the impossibility of a total military success of either the Colombian Armed Forces or the guerrillas will finally give the spotlight back to the international community for a lead role in the negotiations towards a political settlement. If the European involution in Central America provides a comparative case, then it may be considered the European contribution will be duly recognized as the "irreplaceable participant" in the recovery of Colombia.

"Europe: Neither Plan Colombia, nor Peace Process-From Good Intentions to High Frustration", by Joaquin ROY, the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series,Janunary 2003

Analytic Papers

It was the third time that the Colombian government ended the negotiations with the guerrilla groups when the president Pastrana gave up on finding a negotiated solution. What can we learn from this failure? Do they have some similarities among the experiences? The author pointed out such a pattern of failure through his analytic work, in which there are four important characteristics of the pattern:

[1] Deficient diagnosis.
[2] Inadequate procedure.
[3] Preventable manipulation.
[4] Unnecessary vulnerability to events away from the table.

In sum, the three times processes in the past twenty years of Colombian history in which the participants repeated some common mistakes. Without getting a clear understanding of the key elements of failure, the attitude of no willing to correct them, then a negotiated solution is hardly to pursue.

"Why did the Colombia Peace Process Fail? " by Camilo Azcarate, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2003

In contrast to the stop-and-go peace negotiations with the FARC, the resumed ceasefire talks between the Uribe administration and the ELN in Cuba have raised the hope for peace establishment in Columbia. The ELN, which was conventionally perceived as less of a danger, appeared to play a slight role on the negotiation process to the long-standing armed confrontation between government and insurgent group. However, the fact that the Pastrana administration was never able to commit the ELN to a ceasefire may propose the Uribe government adopting the stance that peace with the ELN is more feasible than peace with the FARC, which would produce an important breathing space for Colombia and an encouraging example for the AUC and FARC. Under such circumstances, since that the more time passes without decisive progress toward peace, the more likely it is that hard-liners on both sides will gain the upper hand and jeopardized the peace process, the Columbian government should foremost pursue a carefully structured process with appropriate third party facilitation to follow the confidence-building talks already underway. At the same time, a combination of measures, including enhanced law enforcement and continued military pressure, appears advisable as well, which ultimately lead to the final goal of protecting the lives and expanding the opportunities of all Colombians by democratic, inclusive and legitimate politics.

"Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN", International Crisis Group, October 4 2002

Is it a big step toward the peace-seeking when some members of Colombia's largest paramilitary turned in their weapons and promised more future activities of demobilization? Adam Isacson does not agree with it by documenting the evolution of drug trafficking in Colombia and some kinds of connections between the AUC and the drug cartel, in which "Don Berna" is the key player. Don Berna survived while notorious Pablo Escobar, the boss of Colombia's Medellin drug cartel, had been gunned down; Don Berna succeeded in gaining his leadership in drug trade while the major drug cartels were struck heavily by the government. With some evidences demonstrated by the author, the motive of turning in weapons is not as simple as a peace-making effort. It is contentious to consider that Don Berna will not give away everything instead of asking for his amnesty.

"The New Face of Peace in Colombia" by Adam Isacson, The Center for International Policy,January 2, 2004

Conclusion

Far from Peace

The Colombian government began its peace negotiation process with the guerrilla groups in 1982; however, the situation reminds unresolved, or even worse. The government's negotiating position is simply vacillating between to recognize or ignore guerrilla groups as political actors and between to broaden the negotiating issue or limit the issues to disarmament. Since 1982, every administration is circling round with an anti-guerrilla strategy mingled with military method and pacific resolution.

Because of coca boom, the guerrilla groups grew fast their capabilities and finally became a seriously threat to the government's legitimacy. With different ideologies and power struggles, the guerrilla groups could not gather together to carry out a revolution. Nevertheless, the guerrilla groups have been proficient in the characteristic of government's negotiating strategies. From negotiating experiences, the guerrilla groups also realized that as the time lasts longer, favorslesser the government. Thereupon, the guerrilla groups at the negotiating table often adapt delaying tactics even though the uncooperative behavior might result in an armed confrontation. As the military force is not strong enough to harm the guerrillas significantly, after the armed confrontation another round of peace negotiations is about to come and the guerrilla groups will ask for more concessions to back to negotiating table.

President Pastrana took in office in 1998 and showed his willingness to end Colombia's decades of unrest on a peace platform. However, the FARC didn't make any concessions in return. Pastrana's peace efforts finally fell into deadlock. Subsequently, Colombian government along with U.S. government, with intention to force the guerrillas to make concessions, announced Plan Colombia.For more than a decade, the United States' international war on drugs has focused on reducing the supply of illicit drugs cultivated in, and exported from the Andean countries. Through Plan Colombia, now American war on drugs and Colombian counterinsurgency war become one only war. It is clear that Plan Colombia emphasizes on a military method. Less than 1% of funding distribution is used on peace purpose. And more than 50% of U.S. aid goes to Military assistance. After the 11th September terrorist attack, the U.S. government put Colombian guerrilla groups on its list of terrorist organizations which means U.S. government reinforces its attempt to deal with the Colombian terrorist organizations through the armed force way. From war on drugs to counter terrorism war, along with the change of world order, peace process in Colombia is even more arduous.